The Size and Structure of Government by Michael, Bryane & Popov, Maja
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
The Size and Structure of Government
Bryane Michael and Maja Popov
University of Hong Kong, Government of Serbia
2011
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/53283/
MPRA Paper No. 53283, posted 1. February 2014 15:49 UTC
 
 
 
 
 
The Size and Structure of Government 
 
 
Bryane Michael, Columbia University - SIPA 
  Maja Popov, General Secretariat of the Government of Serbia 
 
 
 
 
 
Does government size and structure adapt to changes in government’s organisational 
environment (particularly to uncertainty and complexity) as predicted by organisational 
theory? We find – using a range of statistical analyses – support for each of the major 
theories of organisation adaptation (the contingency-based view, resource-based view, 
and rational choice view). We find that both government size and structure change – 
holding other factors constant – for changes in the uncertainty and complexity of 
governments’ organisational environments. We find seven clusters of governments 
which adapt their organisational sizes differently in response to changes in the 
uncertainty and complexity of their organisational environments – and four clusters of 
governments with differing preferences for the way they adapt governmental structures. 
We also use the available data to divide governments according to the extent to which 
they adapt their organisational size and structure reactively (after changes occur in their 
organisational environment), contemporaneously or strategically (before these changes 
in their organisational environment occur).  
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The Size and Structure of Government 
Bryane Michael, Columbia University (SIPA) 
  Maja Popov, General Secretariat of the Government of Serbia 
 
Introduction 
 
Despite over 40 years of theorizing about public sector organisation, we still know very 
little about how government responds – writ large – to changes in its organisational 
environment. A variety of theories predict how government size and structure should 
respond to the national macroeconomic environment it regulates and buys and sells 
labour, capital and goods in. Contingency theorists argue -- though are now in relative 
disrepute -- that government departments and agencies grow, shrink, divide and/or 
merge in response to changes in the macroeconomic environment (Gupta et al., 1994). 
Resource theorists – and their newer off-spring who write about “competencies” -- argue 
that these government departments morph, depending on the resources (budgetary, 
staffing, know-how and so forth) they already have available – or can obtain through 
bureaucratic and/or political means (Bryson et al., 2007). Rational-choice theorists, and 
select scholars in public administration, argue that government organisational structure 
does (or should) foresee upcoming challenges and respond to them before they occur 
(Robertson et al., 1993 and especially Vietor, 2007). Finally, a new school of 
interpretative and post-modern scholars argue that government organisational structure 
reflects cognitive understandings, culture, politics and symbols which no empirical study 
can correctly capture – or even try to (Frumkin and Galaskiewicz, 2004). Yet, despite 
these 40-plus years of studying public sector organisational theory, most primers about 
organisational theory in the public sector contain almost no actual empirical studies of 
the theories they present (Christensen et al., 2007). 
 
Different governments’ size and structure responds to its organisational environment 
(particularly the uncertainty and complexity of that environment) differently. Some 
governments’ size and structure responds more to the resources they have at their 
disposal more than to changes in their organisational environments. In no case did we 
find that government size and/or structure does not correlate at all with changes in the 
uncertainty and complexity of the government’s organisational environment (as we 
define them in this paper) – militating against institutionalist theories of government 
(which argue that cognitive and internal processes drive the size and structure of 
government more than external factors). In this paper, we answer three questions. First, 
do different countries’ government size and structure respond to the uncertainty and 
complexity of the government’s organisational environment (as we have defined these 
terms in our paper)? Second, do such changes in organisational adaptation occur 
strategically (in the year before changes in the macroeconomic environment), 
contemporaneous (in the same year as changes in the macroeconomic environment) or 
reactively (in the year after such changes)? Third, do some governments’ organisational 
changes correspond with changes in resources available rather than external changes in 
the government’s organisational environment?   
 
While we arrive at many interesting (even exciting) results, the reader should keep three 
caveats in mind. First, we base our conclusions on very narrow proxies which we hope 
reflect the broad issues we study. For example, we base conclusions about changes in the 
structure of government on macroeconomic data about the composition of government 
expenditure – and hope that such changes reflect on the actual organisational changes we 
hope to explain. Second, we rely on statistical methods to find patterns in the data 
(where sometimes such patterns may reflect over interpretation rather than actual fact). 
We group countries using similarities in the way they spend government money and 
often treat statistical significance as practice significance. Third, we take 40 years of rich 
and deep research about public sector organisation – and reduce it to summary statistics 
based on data from the World Bank and IMF (often labelling governments’ patterns of 
organisational adaptation with politically controversial labels). Given these caveats, we 
most certainly do not wish to pass any final judgments on the rich, already-existing 
public sector organisational theory literature. Instead,  we hope the empirical patterns in 
the data stimulate debate and encourage a new generation of scholars to take-up again 
empirical methods in the study of public sector organisation.  
 
What Do We Know About the Way the Size and Structure of Government 
Responds to Changes in the External Economic Environment? 
 
A Brief Background on the Size of Government 
 
The sizes of governments around the world vary between about 10% of GDP to over 
50% of GDP. A cursory glance at Figure 1a shows few similarities between countries 
which allow for generalisations about government sizes. Lesotho, the Maldives, Greece, 
Hungary and France have some of the largest governments – in terms of the amount of 
national resources managed and spent by the government (spending about twice the 
world average).1 Two countries often thought to be very different – Sweden and the 
USA – (on a world scale) have rather similar levels of government spending. Countries 
often noted for having relatively weak state capacity have some of smallest governments 
in the world (with the exception of China).  
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Figure 1a: Little Explains Differences in the Size of Government Around the World
Biggest 5 Smallest 5 interesting middle countries
Note: The data in the f igure show  government expenditure as a percent of GDP for 14 "interesting" countries (and a w orld 
average) out of a set of 124 countries for w hich the IMF provide data. In cases w here 2009 data w ere unavailable, w e used
data for the latest year available since 2004.  
Source: World Development Indicators (2010).
 
 
The data do not support the conventional view that government sizes correspond with 
citizens’ preference for public goods. In theory, the size of government should depend 
                                                 
1 We assume, like most authors writing about the size of government, that government expenditure as a 
percent of GDP serves as the most relevant indicator of such size. Other measures used in the literature 
include employment by the government (at various levels), levels of government consumption, 
government revenue (earned through tax and non-tax methods). These other measures of government size 
correlate highly with government expenditure.   
on the level of public goods and services demanded by a country’s citizens. As Swedes, 
Americans and Mexicans demand more roads, hospitals and other large goods which no 
one individual can pay for (or exclusively benefit from), government needs to collect 
and spend more.2  Figure 1b shows the correlation between citizens’ opinions about the 
importance of government in providing (goods, services and social protection) for all 
citizens and the size of their government. No relationship appears to exist between the 
proportion of GDP spent by government and the importance of government assigned by 
survey respondents among low-income, medium-income and high-income countries. 
High-income countries tend to have larger governments and low-income countries tend 
to have smaller governments (judging by the few low-income countries for which the 
IMF provides data). Yet, the conclusion clearly emerges from these data that citizens’ 
preferences for public goods (and government writ large) do not seem to explain the size 
of government.  
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Figure 1b: Attitudes about the Importance of Public Goods Offer Little Explanation 
for Differences in Government Size Across Countries
Data in the f igure show  the importance given by survey respondents to the role of government and the proportion of government 
expenditure as a percent of GDP. Respondents ranked - betw een 1 and 10 - the extent to w hich they thought "government 
should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for." Government expenditure as a percent of GDP measures 
the size of governnment on the ordinate-axis. We use data for the latest year available since 2005.  
Sources: World Development Indicators (2010) and World Values Survey (2010).
 
 
Government expenditure has grown almost everywhere in the world – mostly due to 
raising civil servant nominal salaries. Figure 2a shows the average change in 
government expenditure for high-income and medium-income countries throughout the 
2000s.3 In both groups of countries, government expenditure increased – though much 
more for medium-income countries than for high-income countries. Between 1999 and 
2009, on average, high-income countries’ governments increased their expenditure 
(relative to GDP) by about 5%. Employment in these countries generally fell very 
slightly at the central level and rose very slightly at the local level – as well as in 
government bodies like the social security administration and in state-owned enterprises. 
Across various levels of government, expenditure by medium-income governments 
increased much more – by about 10%. In these medium-income countries, employment 
also remained stagnant; while nominal compensation to (government) employees 
increased by about 15% or more. As such, the story of expanding government – for 
                                                 
2 A number of non-economic explanations – like citizens’ desire to use government programmes to ensure 
justice in society or promote good citizenship – help explain differences in government size. We do not 
discuss (or analyse) these factors as these values and preferences change more slowly over time and prove 
more difficult to study using economic methods. 
3 We use the terms medium-income and middle-income countries interchangeably throughout the paper. 
These terms refer to the World Bank’s classification of countries by levels of income-per-capita.  
high-income but especially for medium-income countries -- lies in paying existing 
workers more (in nominal terms) rather than hiring more staff.  
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Figure 2a: Civil Servant Nominal Wages Expand in the 2000s - More in the Medium-
Income Countries that in the Rich Ones
High-Income Countries Medium-Income Countries
change in
expenditure
change in
employment
change in
w ages paid
The figure show s w eighted averages of rates of change of overall government expenditure, nominal w ages and employment in countries for 
w hich the IMF and ILO provide data. For each individual country, w e calculate these rates of change as the simple arithematic average 
betw een 1999 and 2009 of the annual grow th rates of each of these three variables. We obtained w eights for government expenditure by 
taking the country's US dollar government expenditure in 2007 and divided such expenditure by the total US dollar government expenditure for 
the country group w hich the country belongs to (either high-income or medium-income). We obtained w eights for changes in employment by 
f inding each country's proportion of employment as a percent of the total number of people employeed in general government for the income 
group the country belongs to in 2007 (or for the nearest year for w hich data are available). For changes in the compensation of  employees 
(w hich proxies changes in w ages), w e w eight rates of change by 2007 dollar government expenditure (as the IMF provides data for such 
compensation in local currency and thus w e can not simply add pay across countries). Both the IMF and ILO provide data at the central, local 
and general government levels -- allow ing us to provide averages across these levels of govenment. The IMF and ILO do not provide data on 
enough low -income countries in order to draw  valid averages for low  income countries in general. 
Sources: World Development Sources (2010) and ILO Employment database (2010).  
 
 
The growth of capital in the public sector does not really explain the expansion of 
government sizes in the 2000s. Figure 2b shows the average change in financial and 
non-financial assets (the nearest proxy to capital one can obtain using public data). High 
income countries loaded-up on financial assets during the period (almost doubling the 
amount of financial assets they held) and generally divested from non-financial assets. 
Medium-income countries tended to do the reverse – slightly divesting from financial 
assets and focused on acquiring non-financial assets. The rapid acquisition of financial 
assets during the end of the decade – during the financial crisis – only partly explains the 
overall acquisition of financial assets by high-income countries during the period.  
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Figure 2b: High Income Governments Accumulated Financial Assets
Whereas their Poorer Cousins Accumulated Physical Ones
The data in the graph show  the average change in expenditure and the net acquisiton of f inancial and non-financial assets betw een 2000 
and 2009 for all countries for w hich data are available. Period averages represent the simple arithemathic average of rates of change for 
each country over the 9 year period. In order to arrive at the average rates of change for high-income and middle-income countries, w e 
used each country's current 2004 government expenditure (expressed in dollar terms) in order derive w eights. For example, Germany's 
government expenditure (expressed in dollar terms) comprised roughly 11%  of the total expenditure for the high-income country group. 
Thus, Germany's average rate of change of government expenditure contributed 11% of the total w eighted average value for the high-
income country group. We used a similar procedure to f ind group averages for changes in f inancial and non-financial assets. We used 
expenditure w eights because the IMF reports f inancial and non-financial assets only in local currency. The IMF does not provide enough 
data to provide similar comparisons for low -income countries. 
Source: IMF's Government Financial Statistics (2010). 
 
 
 
 
 
Differences in the type and variability of economic shocks in these government’s 
organisational environment (as we define it in this paper) may in-part explain differences 
in government sizes across countries.4 Figure 3a shows the variability of GDP over the 
period 2000-2008 for selected high-income, medium-income and low-income countries. 
Low-income countries’ GDP varied more throughout the period than GDPs in the other 
income groups. The most volatile economies in the high-income countries had variances 
similar to the most volatile economies in the medium-income countries group. The least 
volatile economies in all three income groups exhibited very similar levels of 
(non)volatility during the period – suggesting that income-level itself makes a poor 
predictor of the volatility (and thus uncertainty) of a national economic environment.  
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Figure 3a: Different Countries Have Very Different Economic Environments 
high-income economies medium-income economies low-income economies
The data in the graph show  the volatility of GDP betw een 1999 and 2009 for all countries for w hich the IMF provide data. We show  
examples of countries w ith the highest and low est GDP volatility in each income group. We measure such volatility as the standard 
deviation of the log of GDP over the period divided by the average log value of GDP during the period. We used the natural log of GDP 
(rather than GDP itself) because using log values removes the effect of relvative size (as bigger economies w ill have a larger volatility of 
GDP simply because of their size). Log values - by their nature - describe changes in magnitudes. Thus, by looking at the standard 
deviation of the log of GDP, w e are focusing on changes in the magnitudes of GDP over the period rather than levels themselves. 
Source: World Development Indicators database (2010).  
 
 
A more detailed analysis of asymmetric macroeconomic shocks reveals much about the 
uncertainty of various governments’ organisational environments. Figure 3b shows the 
magnitude and timing of asymmetric shocks (shocks which affect one sector of the 
economy rather than the entire economy) for high-income, middle-income and low-
income countries. The figure specifically shows changes in output in the industrial sector 
(as a percent of GDP) relative to changes in the service sector and/or the agricultural 
sector. The index we show in the figure rises as more resources are drawn into the 
industrial sector – and falls as more resources are pulled into the service or agricultural 
sectors. All three income groups have roughly the same magnitude of changes in sectoral 
production – albeit at different times. High-income countries tended to have larger 
volatility (measured by changes in the change) in industrial output than countries in the 
other income classification groups. Medium-income countries tended to have more 
steady growth rates in industrial output (with far fewer swings in the value of industrial 
                                                 
4 The canonical definition of an organisational environment from the organizational theory literature 
defines such an environment as the “forces outside the boundaries [of the organization] that can impact 
upon it [the organization]” (Hatch, 2006). In this paper, we focus on the macroeconomic environment and 
leave out the other elements such as legal environment, societal, and other environmental factors in order 
to limit the scope of our analysis.  
production). Low income countries tended – in general – to show much less inter-
sectoral macroeconomic volatility than the simple measure of GDP volatility we used in 
Figure 3a above shows. For many low income countries, the size of GDP throughout the 
period varied much more than the composition of that GDP between the industrial, 
service and agricultural sectors. In all cases, the variance or change in the broader 
macroeconomic environment makes the government’s organisational environment more 
uncertain – as both government and businesspersons have greater difficulty deciding to 
which sector of the economy they should allocate resources. 
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Figure 3b: Different Profiles of Uncertainty in Governments' Organisational Environment
The figure show s the changes in the relative proportion of GDP in the industrial sector as opposed to in the service sector or the 
agricultural sector. We use these changes as a proxy w hich might show  the effects of sector-specif ic, asymmetric shocks (and 
thus measure the overall uncertainty of the macroeconomic environment). We constructed our proxy as follow s. We subtracted the 
proportion of the service sector in overall GDP from the proportion of industry in overall GDP (giving the absolute change in the 
importance of the service and industrial sectors). We divided these dif ferences by the proportion of GDP in the agricultural sector 
(thus expressiing all "shocks" relative to the size of the agricultural sector). We calculated the rates of change of these ratios for 
each year (removing any rates of change over 300% or -300% w hich might have popped up due to the country having a relatively 
small agricultural sector). We found the arithematic average of these grow th rates betw een 1999 and 2009 and calculated a 
w eighted average of these grow th rates for each of the three groups of countries (high-income, medium-income and low -income). 
We used each country's share of 2004 GDP in current US dollars (as a proportion of the total GDP for that county's group) as the 
w eight applied in our w eighted average calculation.
Source: World Development Indicators (2010).     
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The Size of Governments Respond Weakly to a Changing Economic Environment 
 
How does government size respond to changes in the uncertainty and complexity of the 
government’s organisational environment? In the previous section, we showed the 
varying degrees to which the organisational environment of various governments around 
the world changed during the 2000s. Variance in GDP represents a simple proxy for the 
uncertainty and complexity of governments’ organisational environment (and we will 
discuss more refined measured later in the paper). More volatility in GDP makes 
planning more difficult – thus increasing overall uncertainty. More volatility also likely 
corresponds with more complex economies – because more complex economies have a 
greater need to reallocate resources across economic sectors, respond quickly and 
effectively to changes in tastes and technologies – and so forth.   
 
Changes in government size positively correlate with the uncertainty and complexity of 
government’s organisational environment – as measured by the variance of GDP. Figure 
4a shows the relationship between the uncertainty and complexity of government’s 
organisational environment (as measured by average variances in GDP) and changes in 
the size of government (as measured by average changes in total government 
expenditure). For low-income, medium-income and high-income economies, more 
output volatility corresponds roughly with more volatility in government expenditure 
during the 2000s. Such a correlation increases in strength for richer economies. Low-
income economies exhibit a very weak pattern in the data while high-income economies 
show a relatively strong correlation between output volatility and the variance of 
government expenditure.  
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Figure 4a: The Size of Government Probably Increases as the Government's 
Organisational Environment Becomes More Uncertain and Complex 
The figure shows the relation between average rates of nominal GDP growth and average growth in government expenditure (in USD terms) from 
1999 to 2009. Our averages represent simple arithematic means over the period. We use the World Bank's classification of countries by 
income-per-capita in assigning countries to income-groupings. 
Source: World Development Indicators (2010).
 
 
Different types of governments adapt to changes in their organisational environment 
with different speeds. Figure 4b shows the correlation between changes in government 
expenditure and changes in GDP for the previous year, the current year and the 
following year. We assume that differences between these correlations tell us about the 
government’s overall adaptive stance toward changes in the macroeconomy. For 
example, the figure shows the contemporary response (occurring in the same year) of 
changes in government spending to changes in GDP. Subtracting the difference between 
changes in government expenditure and changes in GDP between 2000 and 2008 gives a 
total “error” in government’s response to changes in output of roughly 36%.5   
 
Depending on your view of the nature of change in government expenditure, 
governments in high-income countries adjusted government sizes strategically while 
governments in medium-income countries adjusted contemporaneously. As shown in 
Figure 4b, between 1999 to 2003 changes in government expenditure relatively closely 
matched changes in output in both sets of countries. Only by 2004 did the “match” 
between changes in government spending change significantly from changes in output. 
By 2008, we observe changes in government spending again returning to a closer 
tracking of changes in output. Moreover, high-income countries’ governments tended to 
                                                 
5 We assume that policymakers will want to adjust government expenditure pro-cyclically with changes in 
GDP -- and by exactly the same percentage amount (in other words, unity represents the optimal elasticity 
of government expenditure with respect to GDP). Much empirical evidence suggests that policymakers 
instead adjust government expenditure counter-cyclically. In this case, the largest “errors” in the figure 
would best explain the government’s adaptive response to changes in its organisational environment. We 
use the figure to discuss the method of determining the government’s responsiveness to changes in its 
organisational environment – namely whether certain kinds of governments adaptive reactively, 
contemporaneously or strategically – rather than use the figure to pass judgments or make definitive 
conclusions about fiscal policy in these countries. We put the word “error” in quotes to emphasize that we 
take a positive rather than normative view of the data in this paper – seeking to describe the data rather 
than determine a best or optimal response.     
match changes in expenditure (and thus probably government size) sooner and more 
closely with changes in output than medium-income countries’ governments. Figure 4b 
shows the annual differences between changes in government expenditure and changes 
in output – treating differences as an “error” (though such differences could reflect 
thoughtful policymaking in the presence of counter-cyclical organisational adaptation of 
organisational buffering against an excessively volatile organisational environment). For 
high-income countries, contemporaneous changes in output correlate less well with 
changes government spending than a similar correlation using lagged changes in output. 
The difference between changes in output and government expenditure is almost twice 
as large if we assume that high-income country governments respond contemporaneous 
rather than strategically (changing government size before changes in output occur).6 
For medium-income economies, however, the two approaches to government’s 
organisational adaptation to changes in output yield roughly the same error. Using our 
measure of the “fit” of organisational response to changes in output, the figure shows 
that a model of contemporaneous response fit very well until about 2004 – whereas a 
model of strategic response fit less well. Thus, we have – for the purposes for labelling 
this set of countries in one category or the other – chosen to portray these countries 
governments’ organisational response as contemporaneous rather than strategic.  
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Figure 4b: High Income Countries Adjust Expenditure Strategically 
while Medium-Income Countries Contemporaneously
High-income  
contemp response
(36% "error")
Medium-income- 
strategic response (42% "error")
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The figure shows the error in the adjustment of government expenditure to changes in GDP. The area under each line represents the difference 
between the change in government expenditure and GDP -- thus representing a type of "error" in government spending (assuming governments 
adapt pro-cyclically). We looked at three scenarios. We first substract the current year's change in GDP from the current year's change in 
government expenditure to investigate the extent to which government expenditure contemporaneously adjusts to changes in GDP. In the 
second set of calculations, we subtracted the current year's change in GDP from the following year's change in government expenditure to 
investigate the extent to which government expenditure changed reactively. In the third set of calculations, we subtracted the previous year's 
change in government expenditure from the current year's change in GDP in order to asses the extent of strategic change in government 
expenditure. We do not show reactive responses as they "fit" much less closely with changes in GDP.  
Source: World Development Indicators (2010). 
 
 
Government employment follows the same pattern of strategic adaptation to changes in 
the macroeconomic environment as expenditure does. Figure 5a shows three models of 
the “fit” of government employment to past, present, and future changes in output. When 
we compare the current year’s change in general government employment with changes 
in the current year’s GDP, we find a total “error” (as a defined previously) of 12.3%. In 
other words, using this measure results in about 12% difference between the sum of each 
year’s change in employment and output over the 9 year period.7 Assuming that high-
                                                 
6 As described previously, we use the word “strategic” to describe changes in government expenditure 
occurring before changes in output. The lack of a response, or a counter-cyclical response may be more 
“strategic” (as commonly understood in the public administration literature). We only use the word to 
describe changes in government spending in time and do not attach a value-judgment nor argue that 
strategic responses are necessarily superiour to other types of responses.  
7 The graph starts at 2001 because the ILO report employment data only starting in 2000.  
income economies governments’ adopted a reactive response to changes in output would 
result in a higher “error” of 13.5%. Yet, the reader should not interpret the lower “error” 
as a better error. The higher error attached the lagged change in government employment 
could as well reflect organisational buffering – an organisational strategy aimed at 
insulating the organisation from pernicious changes in its external environment.8  
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Figure 5a: High-Income Economies Exhibit Greater Strategic Organisational Change
The figure show s the "error" in the current year's, the previous year's and the follow ing year's adjustment in employment in the general 
government to changes in GDP for high-income countries. Controversially, w e describe series w ith the least difference betw een 
changes in GDP and changes in government employment and ignore the possibility of organisational buffering or counter-cycle 
employment practices. For example, for the high-income countries w e analyse, the sum of each year's  difference betw een the current 
year's changes in GDP and previous year's change in government employment is low er than the sum of these differences using the 
current year's and the subsequent year's expenditure change. The three indicators show n in the f igure represent w eighted averages, 
w here w eights come from each country's share in its income group's total employment. 
Source: World Development Indicators (2010). 
 
 
Medium-income countries’ government employment practices have responded much 
more sluggishly to changes in output. Figure 5b shows the annual difference between 
changes in GDP and changes in general government employment under 3 scenarios. 
Assuming that government employment responds contemporaneously to changes in 
output results in a 38% total difference between the change of employment and changes 
in output between 2001 and 2009. Assuming that medium-income countries respond 
strategically – that employment adjusts before changes in GDP – results in a larger 
difference between overall changes in employment and output over the period than 
assuming that they adapt reactively.   
 
                                                 
8 Organisational theory does not provide specific predictions about the extent to which government 
organisations buffer against a highly volatile organisational environment. In theory, organisational 
complexity emerges to buffer the organisation from variation in the external environment up to a point. 
After a certain size and age, very large and complex organisations learn to adapt to their external 
environment (mostly out of necessity). Most academic commentators assume that buffering against largely 
un-diversifiable shocks represents one of the key functions of government – an assumption we do not 
make in this paper (as little large-scale empirical support for or against this hypothesis exists).  
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Figure 5b: Organisational Response of Medium-Income Countries Much Sloppier in 
Responding to Changes in the External Policy Environment
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The figure show s the "error" in the current year's, the previous year's and the follow ing year's adjustment in employment in the 
general government to changes in GDP for medium-income countries. Controversially, w e describe series w ith the least difference 
betw een changes in GDP and changes in government employment and ignore the possibility of organisational buffering or counter-
cycle employment practices. For example, for the medium-income countries w e analyse, the sum of each year's  difference betw een 
the current year's changes in GDP and subsequent year's change in government employment is low er than the sum of these 
differences using the current year's and the subsequent year's expenditure change. The three indicators show n in the f igure 
represent w eighted averages, w here w eights come from each country's share in its income group's total employment. 
Source: World Development Indicators (2010). 
 
 
Changes in government real wages also support the conclusion that government size 
(and probably structure) in the high-income countries responds more to changes in the 
external macroeconomic environment than low-income economies’ government size and 
structures do. Changing real wages pull labour in, out, up and around government – 
serving as a useful proxy for larger structural changes in government.9 As shown in 
Figure 6a, the differences between changes in GDP and changes in real compensation 
paid to government employees appeared the greatest in the high-income economies. 
Compensation for government employees (after adjusting for inflation) changed the least 
for low-income economies during the period – resulting in the largest differences 
between changes in compensation and national output. For governments in countries of 
all income-levels, inflation-adjusted compensation for government employees fell during 
the period (as shown the constantly negative differences between changes in government 
employment compensation and changes in GDP). These trends contrast with the trends 
in nominal wages shown in Figure 2a – which showed large increases in nominal 
government wages.  
 
                                                 
9 In theory, changes in wages drive workers’ decision to accept government employment, promotions 
within government and serve as an important variable in workers’ decision to resign. As government 
departments emerge, expand, disappear – wages change (usually in practice through promotions or job 
category reassignments rather than explicit wage changes for the same job assignment). While government 
managers do not have the same right to engage in individual wage negotiations that their private sector 
counterparts have, they can greatly influence job reclassifications, promotions and reassignments which 
change the government worker’s wage.   
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Figure 6a: High Income Economies Adapt Real Wages Most Closely 
to Changes in the External Environment
40% error for high 
income countries
98% error for middle 
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117% error for low 
income countries
The figure show s the "error" in the response of central government inflation-adjusted w ages to changes in GDP. Each 
indicator represents the w eighted average of the change in real (government) employee compensation (adjusted for local 
inf lation) minus the change in real GDP for that year. We w eighted real employee compensations for each group of countries 
(given in the original data in local currency terms) by the total US dollar sum spent on government w ages for that country 
relative to the total spend for all governments in that country's income group.  
Sources: IMF's Government Financial Statistics (2010) for (government) employee compensation and the World Bank's World 
Development Indicators (2010) for US dollar expenditure on government w ages. 
 
 
Countries of all income levels “anticipated” falling output over the period with real wage 
compression. As shown in Figure 6b, the strategic scenario – where changes in the 
inflation-adjusted compensation of government employees precedes changes in output – 
fits more closely with changes in output than the other two scenarios. The overall 
difference or “error” centres on about 32% for high-income countries, 95% for medium-
income countries and 112% for the few low-income countries for which the IMF provide 
data. In hindsight, reductions in government expenditure proved fortuitous in light of the 
sharp reductions in GDP (and thus in revenues) stemming from the 2009 global 
economic crisis. Thus, to some extent, all countries governments engaged in “strategic” 
adjustment (as we define the term strategic in this paper) of real wages (even if nominal 
wages increased during the same period).  
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Figure 6b: Was Real Wage Compression in All Economies Prescient or Just Lucky?
The f igure show s the "error" in w age adjustments over the period from 1999 to 2009 for low , middle and upper-income countries. The 
smaller bars for the upper-income countries mean that these countries changed public sector w ages more closely w ith changes in their 
countries' GDP. In order to calculate these errors, w e used the indicators show n in Figure 6a (w hich show  w eighted averages of the real 
changes in public sector employees' compensation compared w ith changes in these countries' GDP). The contemporaneous change 
category show s the difference betw een changes in the current period's public sector w ages minus changes in GDP. The strategic change
show s the difference betw een changes in real w ages for a period and the change in GDP in the follow ing period. The adaptive change 
category show s the difference betw een the previous period's real w age changes and the subsequent period's change in GDP. High-
income countries signif icantly reduced real w ages throughout the 2000s, preparing them to adjust to the severe economic crisis of 2009. 
Sources: IMF's Government Financial Statistics (2010) for (government) employee compensation and the World Bank's World Development 
Indicators (2010) for US dollar expenditure on government w ages. 
 
 
Using unemployment rather than GDP volatility as the measure of the uncertainty and 
complexity of the government’s organisational environment produces much weaker 
correlations. Unemployment might serve as a better (or at least different) measure of the 
uncertainty and complexity of the economic environment because unemployment 
represents a “bad” (which results according to popular expression from economic 
uncertainty and complexity) to which government should respond. Variance in output, 
on the other hand, does not represent a “good” or “bad” from a policy perspective. 
Figure 7a shows the unemployment levels for all the countries for which we could obtain 
data -- compared with government size (as measured by government expenditure as a 
proportion of GDP). The data rather clearly show that government sizes do not respond 
to changes in overall unemployment – neither across country nor across time. We do not 
observe upward or downward sloping data; which we would expect for relationships 
across countries between these two variables. We neither observe gray dots “moving” 
(as black dots) in any particular direction – as we might expect for a relationship 
between these variables across time. As such, government does not act as an “employer 
of last resort,” shoring up unemployment during hard economic times. Government 
probably responds more to changing fundamentals in the macroeconomic environment 
rather than simply responding to domestic politics around employment (as we will 
discuss later in the literature review).  
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Figure 7a: No apparent pattern in the levels of government size and 
unemployment rates across countries nor with changes in those levels 
between 2003 and 2007
The figure show s the relation betw een government expenditure (as a share of GDP) and unemployment (as a share of 
the labour force) in 2003 as compared w ith 2007 for high and medium-income countries. Each gray dot show s the 
combination of unemployment and government expenditure for a particular country in 2003. Each black dot represent that 
same pair of data in 2007. 
Source: World Development Indicators (2010). 
 
 
We do not observe a relationship between changes in government size and the 
magnitude of asymmetric/sector-specific shocks. The data show – as shown in Figure 4a 
-- a relationship between the average size of shocks to a macroeconomy (which 
presumably results in greater policymaker uncertainty in choosing correctly sizes and 
targeted policies) and the size of that country’s government. Yet, Figure 7b shows the 
relationship between the magnitude of asymmetric, sector-specific shocks – as measured 
by changes in industrial output relative to service-sector and agricultural sector output – 
and changes government size (as measured by expenditure). In the simple portrayal 
shown in Figure 7b, for economies of all income-levels, larger industrial sector shocks 
(relative to other sectors) do not correlate with changes in government size – as shown 
the circular clouds of dots in the figure.10  
 
                                                 
10 The correlation coefficients for each pair of data are all below 0.40 and not significantly different than 
zero. For high-income countries, the correlation coefficient equals 0.34, the coefficient for medium-
income countries equals 0.16 and for low-income countries equals 0.22.  
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Figure 7b: No Relation Between Average Changes in Expenditures 
and Changes in Economic Shocks
The data in the f igure show  the average changes in government expenditure compared w ith changes in the magnitude of 
economic shocks betw een 1999 and 2009. The index of economic shocks consists of subtracting the percent of industrial 
GDP from the percent of GDP in the service sector and dividing the resulting difference by agriculture's share in GDP. The 
average magnitude of economic shocks show n in the f igure takes the arithematic average of changes in this index of 
economic shocks over the period 1999 to 2009 for each of the 96 countries show n in the f igure. The average change in 
government expenditure show s the simple arithematic average change in dollar-valued government expenditure betw een 
the same period. 
Source: World Development Indicators (2010). 
 
 
The data also shows some validity for the resource-based view of organisational 
structure – that government size responds more to tax and other resources available than 
to changes in government’s organisational environment? Figure 8 shows that such an 
explanation seems most plausible for medium-income countries – at least when looking 
at contemporaneous changes in government expenditure and revenue. Between 2000 and 
2009, the sum of each year’s differences between low-income country governments’ 
expenditure and revenue resulted in an “error” (as we have previously defined such 
error) of 43%.11 Adjustment in high-income economies’ government expenditure 
showed an “error” of 47%. Medium-income country governments’ expenditure 
mismatch between expenditure and revenue over the period summed to 36%. The 
resource-based explanation of government organisation clearly provides some 
explanatory power – depending on the particular country and time.  
 
                                                 
11 Just like with our measure of adaptation to changes in government’s organisational environment, our 
measure of government’s “error” in responding to changes in resources only looks at the extent to which 
changes in government size contemporaneously adjusts to changes in revenues. Policymakers may wish to 
break the link between revenues and expenditure in any year in order to build up budget surpluses (in 
anticipation of future economic shocks), pay down previously acquired debts, or engage in fiscal policy to 
stimulate (or dis-stimulate) the macroeconomy. Given this wide range of organisational objectives, we 
only report the positive aspects of organisational adaptation -- ignoring the normative aspects (dealing 
with the desirability and/or optimality) of such changes.  
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Figure 8: Resource-Based View of Government Organisation Most Valid for Middle Income 
Countries in the Short-Run
Medium-Income countries
The figure shows the difference between changes in government expenditure and revenue for each of the three 
categories of countries shown. The difference between changes in contemporaneous government expenditure and 
revenue (with changes occuring in the same year) is lowest across the entire period for medium-income countries -- 
which we interpret as most strongly supporting the resource-based view of government (that government revenue 
determines expenditure rather than other considerations). To derive these indicators, we took the weighted average 
of changes in US dollar valued expenditure and revenue. Weights for changes in government revenues consisted of 
the country's 2004 government revenue (in US dollars) as a percent of the total revenue (also expressed in US 
dollars) for that country's income group. Weights for government expenditure consisted of that country's 2004 
expenditure (expressed in US dollars) as a percent of that country's income group's total expenditure (again 
expressed in US dollars).  Source: World Development Indicators (2010).                                                                       
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Different countries’ governments adapt their organisational sizes at different speeds in 
response to changes in their organisational environments. Figure 9 shows the best fitting 
(possessing the least amount of “error”) adaptive orientation for various countries’ 
government sizes among strategic, contemporaneous, reactive and resource-based 
models of organisational adaptation to changes in the macroeconomic environment (as 
measured by the change in industrial GDP relative to other sectors). In general, the 
changes in the size of governments like those of the USA, China and Finland correlated 
more closely with changes in the sectoral distribution of output before such changes in 
output occurred. Changes in government sizes for countries like India, Australia, 
Kazakhstan and Argentina tended to correlate with changes in sector output as such 
changes in sectoral output occurred. Changes in government size for countries like 
Russia, Algeria, Germany and the UK tended to correlate with changes in industrial 
output (relative to other sectors) only after such changes in industrial output occurred. 
Finally, for countries like Canada, Iran, and Sweden, changes in government sizes 
correlated most closely with the revenue these governments had at their disposal in any 
given year.    
 
 
 
Each theory of government organisation provides a partial explanation for these data. 
Even the most die-hard critics of the contingency theory of government organisation 
must acknowledge that government size should respond (at least in part) to changes in 
the macroeconomic environment. Fiscal policy (namely government expenditure on 
goods, staff and assets like office desks) – by law if not by practice in many countries – 
smoothes out the effects of general and asymmetric macroeconomic shocks (which 
would be seen in relatively low correlations between changes in government sizes and 
macroeconomic changes in some countries). Critics of the resource-based theorists can 
not argue that governments can not expand beyond their means in the long-run (namely 
their revenue and borrowing power). Critics of rational-choice theorists can not argue 
that government can anticipate many kinds of shocks – rising grain or oil prices, 
demographic changes and so forth. Some of the “strategic” organisational adaptation we 
observe in the data probably does reflect actual strategic policymaking. Yet, some of the 
“reactive” organisational adaptation we observe in the data may reflect rational 
organisational buffering or anti-cyclical spending.  
 
A Background on the Structure of Government  
 
Changes in the size and composition of government expenditure must translate into 
changes we typically think of as the “structure of government.” When an organisational 
theorist thinks about the structure of structure, concepts like the number of 
organisational units or agencies, the number of staff in a department, the number 
administrative or budgetary departments in a division or directorate come to mind. No 
public data exist on these classical organisational features. Yet, we can infer changes in 
the structure of government by looking at changes in the composition of government 
expenditure. Rather than define a formal model, we will present a very simple thought-
experiment.  
 
A simple thought-experiment shows the relation between the distribution of government 
expenditure and more classical notions of the “structure of government.” Imagine you 
hold a job in a government ministry (or department) in the late 1990s -- when 
government departments started using IT-technologies extensively (though the 
introduction of an anti-terrorism programme or any other policy initiative will do). The 
ministry of finance allocates money in order for your government department to install 
and use a couple of computers. Your minister might give an IT specialist(s) an office and 
maybe even create a separate small organisational unit for these IT specialists. Now 
image – as shown in Figure 10a – changes in IT technology (and thus large changes in 
the country’s IT production or imports) cause the ministry of finance to allocate $20 
million more in resources for the computerisation of your department. Your own 
minister or boss must spend the money somewhere. Your boss hires more people, 
purchases more equipment and so forth. After a point, the original IT manager can not 
cope with all the new staff. He or she can not manage unlimited amounts of staff and 
assets. Only three “structural” solutions exist – make the IT unit bigger (into a division 
or department), split it up by functions and scatter those functions around your ministry, 
or send it partially (or completely) outside your department. No other organisational 
responses exist. We can not deduce – only by looking at changes in resources – how 
organisational structure changed. But we can be fairly certain – particularly when we 
collect data about the large numbers of governments and their changing composition of 
expenditure – that the “structure of government” (as a classical organisational theorist 
would understand the term) changes as the composition of government expenditure 
changes.  
 
organisational unit obtains twice the resources…
Make a new department or division (or both)….
…or establish new structures outside of our
existing department  (or make cross-agency one)
Resources “entering” the organisation must go somewhere…. and limits on spans of control, office 
space, and group-dynamics prevent unlimited expansion without more fundamental changes in the 
“structure” of the organisation (though not true if only storable financial resources come in). 
Figure 10a: The Intuition Behind the Link Between Changes in the
Composition of Resources and Changes in the Structure of Government
 
 
We can infer that the “structure of government” probably differs between countries. 
Figure 10b provides a comparison of the allocation of expenditure across functional 
categories between high-income and medium-income countries (for ease of exposition, 
though we could show differences for each country). High-income and medium-income 
countries tend to allocate the same proportion of expenditure on general government 
services (about 22%), education (about 10%) and health (about 9%) – though with very 
significant variation between countries (which we do not show). Yet, even average 
levels differ greatly between high-income and medium-income countries in defence and 
public order (with a 3% difference) and economic affairs and social protection (with 
about an 8% to 10% difference). We know from anecdotal evidence and just plain 
observation as well, that different countries structure their governments differently – by 
almost any definition of the “structure of government.” 
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Figure 10b: Rich Countries Structure Expenditures Toward Social Protection and 
Away from Economic Affairs
defence
public order
economic affairs
health
education
social protection
gen. government services
The figure show s the average break-dow ns of overall government expenditure divided into functional categories for the upper-
income and middle income countries for w hich the IMF provides data in 2007. We obtained these estimates by summing expenditure 
(given in local currency) over all 7 categories and then finding each category's share in that total. We used each country's total 
government expenditure (expressed in US dollars) as a percent of the country's income group's total government expenditure 
(expressed in US dollars) in order to derive the w eighted averages show n in the f igure. We chose to show  only one year (2007) 
because that is the last year for w hich most data are avaiilable and show ing multiple years w ould complicate the graph. 
Source: IMF's Government Financial Statistics (2010) and World Bank's World Development Indicators (2010).  
 
 
If changes in the allocation of expenditure across governmental functions reflect deeper 
changes in organisational structure, than organisational structures in various 
governments have changed during the 2000s. Figure 10c shows the extent of these 
changes in various areas of government spending. Expenditure – and thus the structure 
of government pertaining to economic affairs – has changed most in the high-income 
countries during the 2000s. General government services exhibits much less annual 
variation in expenditure patterns – suggesting that government structures providing these 
services tended to be more stable than those governing economic affairs. The size of 
these changes also tended to be relatively modest – changing by less than 10% in any 
given year (with the exception of economic affairs which likely had several countries 
changing their structure greatly in 2000 and 2006).  
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Figure 10c: Changes in the Resourcing of Government Agencies in Rich Countries
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The figure show s changes in government expenditure in each of the 7 functional categories given by the IMF for high-income 
countries. We have highlighted changes in expenditures in economic affairs, social protection and general government 
services as these are most likely to respond to changes the macroeconomic environment. We have w eighted these annual 
changes for each country by that country's share in total upper-income country government expenditure (in US dollar terms). 
Source: IMF's Government Finance Statistics (2010) and the World Bank's World Development Indicators (2010).  
 
 
During the 2000s, medium-income country governments reallocated expenditure 
between economic functions much more than high-income country governments. Figure 
10d shows the average change – across the 15 medium-income countries for which we 
could obtain data – of expenditure in 7 categories of government expenditure. Like in 
the high-income economies, expenditure in economic affairs and general government 
expenditure exhibit relatively high volatility during the period. Unlike in the high-
income economies, almost all expenditure categories in the medium-income countries 
show significant year-on-year variation.  
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Figure 10d: Medium-Income Countries Distributed Resources Across Organisational 
Units Much More Volatilely than in the Rich Countries
The f igure show s changes in government expenditure in each of the 7 functional categories given by the IMF for medium-
income countries. We have highlighted changes in expenditures in economic affairs, social protection and general government 
services as these are most likely to respond to changes the macroeconomic environment. We have w eighted these annual 
changes for each country by that country's share in total medium-income country government expenditure (in US dollar 
terms). Source: IMF's Government Finance Statistics (2010) and the World Bank's World Development Indicators (2010).  
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These data seem to contradict our previous assumption about the complexity of rich 
country governments’ organisational environment. We showed in Figure 4a that the size 
of the economy might correlate or proxy the complexity of that economy. Thus, 
governments operating in bigger, richer economies should face more complex 
organisational environments. We showed in Figure 10b that government expenditure 
governments in high-income countries exhibits much less dispersion or spread between 
expenditure categories than in medium-income countries. Thus, governments operating 
in bigger, richer economies ostensibly face less complex organisational environments. 
Yet, according to the data in Figure 10d, medium-income countries’ government 
expenditure volatility suggests that these governments face a more complex 
organisational environment – as their past expenditure has responded abruptly to some 
kind of changes we can not directly observe. Whether medium-income governments 
transact in a more complex or less complex organisational environment than their richer 
peer governments remains an open question to be addressed using other measures – like 
centralisation of central government – an in more refined regression analysis.  
 
The centralisation of government – as measured by the size of central government 
expenditure relative to general government expenditure – serves as another proxy for the 
structure of government. The IMF provides data too poor to use to calculate the relative 
expenditure between the central and local levels of government.12 However, the ILO 
                                                 
12 The IMF provide data for government expenditure by central, regional, local and general government 
for a range of countries. However, central and local expenditure sometimes exceed general government 
provides data on employment in various levels of government -- which we might use to 
infer the relative size and structure of government at the central government and other 
levels. Using these ILO data, we observe significant variation in the centralisation of 
government between countries.  Figure 11 shows the relative proportions of labour at the 
central government level, in general government and for the whole public sector. Among 
high-income countries, countries like Italy and Finland have the largest central 
governments – whereas Canada and the Netherlands have the smallest. Countries like 
Greece and the Netherlands instead have a fair proportion of their government 
employment in public enterprises and areas outside of central government. To the extent 
we can trust these data, middle-income countries – overall – tend to much larger levels 
of employment outside of central government. Countries like Azerbaijan, Poland, and 
the Ukraine have around 50% or more of all employment outside of central government.  
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Figure 11: Division of Government Labour At the Core versus Periphery of Government
The f igure show s the most recently available estimates of the relative amount of labour employed at various levels of government. We show  
employment in ministries, executive agencies and other institutions comprising the central government, the general government (w hich includes 
employees w orking for the social security agency or agencies), and other governmental not-for-profit organisations, and the public sector w rit 
large (w hich includes state ow ned enterprises). We show  the limiited number of countries for w hich the ILO provide reliable data and cross-
country estimates may not be directly comparable as w e take the last year for w hich such data are available after 2005 (as data before 2005 
w ould be too dated to provide a useful picture of the distribution of labour in various parts of government).
Source: ILO (2010).  
 
 
We might hypothesize that differing levels of government centralisation respond to 
differing degrees of uncertainty and complexity in government’s environment across 
countries. On the one hand, governments might centralise to buffer against the effects of 
an uncertain and complex organisational environment (as government can – and should -
- insure against shocks which no natural or legal person can insure against). 
Centralisation provides economies of scale in the provision of government services and 
prevents duplication. On the other hand, governments often decentralise in order to 
respond more quickly and in a more refined way to narrow shocks in a particular 
geographical area or economic sector. As such, a highly centralised government should 
be expected to respond to very symmetric, specific and predictable shocks. Whether 
centralisation represents a buffering strategy to insulate against a highly unstable 
external organisational environment -- or represents an optimal response to a rather 
simple environment -- remains an open question.  
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                
expenditure (according to the official IMF statistics). Such inconsistencies – along with others – make the 
IMF too unreliable to use.   
The Structure of Government Responds More to the Changes in the Policy Environment 
 
Changes in the composition of government expenditure correlate – more or less closely 
depending on the country – with changes in the sectoral distribution of output. Figure 
12a shows the highest correlation between our measures of changes in the allocation of 
expenditure and changes in the sectoral distribution of output for several countries. For 
about 50% of the 23 countries for which data are available, reactive organisational 
adaption (as we define such adaption in this paper) represents the explanation with the 
highest correlation with changes in the sectoral allocation of output. The explanations 
which we have previous labelled as strategic and contemporary both cover about 25% of 
this small sample of countries respectively.  
 
Figure 12a: Organisational Structure Follows Strategy – At Least for Some 
Countries 
(correlation between sectoral changes in output and allocation of government expenditure across different 
functional spending categories) 
 
Czech Republic -54% Reactive  Singapore 60% Reactive 
Denmark -41% Strategic  Slovenia 83% Reactive 
Estonia -74% Reactive  Spain -89% Reactive 
Finland 40% Strategic  Sweden 72% Contemp 
Greece 89% Strategic  Switzerland 45% Contemp 
Ireland -20% Reactive  Tunisia -88% Strategic 
Italy 59% Reactive  Ukraine 58% Strategic 
Korea, Republic of -80% Strategic  Kazakhstan -62% Reactive 
Lithuania 29% Reactive  Pakistan -75% Contemp 
Netherlands -50% Contemp  Moldova 74% Contemp 
Norway 51% Reactive  Nepal 26% Contemp 
Poland 60% Reactive     
The figure shows the highest correlation between asymmetric shocks to the economy and changes in 
relative expenditure for 23 countries. To construct the index measuring the extent of asymmetric shocks, 
we subtracted the share of service-sector output from industrial output and divided the result by the share 
of agricultural output in the economy. We found the rate of change per year of the resulting proportion. To 
construct the index measuring the change in government expenditure, we calculated the sum of the 
squared changes in the proportions of expenditure in each functional category. More simply stated, we 
first calculated the proportion of each functional category (health, education, economic affair, government 
services, etc.) to total expenditure. We then calculated the annual change of each of those proportions for 
each country – and then squared that rate of change (to remove the effects of any negative rates of 
change). We finally summed all these squared rates of change for all 7 functional categories – resulting in 
an index for each country of the variability of expenditure across expenditure categories. To compare 
changes in government expenditure with changes in sectoral output, we made three comparisons. For 
strategic adaptation of government expenditure to changes in the sectoral allocation of output, we found 
the correlation between changes in the sectoral allocation of output and the previous year’s change in 
expenditure. For contemporaneous adaptation, we correlate the present year’s index of output change with 
the same year’s change in expenditure (using the indices we described above). For reactive adaptation, we 
found the correlation between our index of changes in the sectoral allocation of output and the following 
year’s change in expenditure. We report the highest correlation among these three comparisons in the 
figure. We do not report the other correlations in order to keep the figure relatively easy to read. Positive 
correlations indicate that large changes in the allocation of government spending across functional 
categories correspond with large increases in industrial output. Negative correlations indicate that these 
large reallocations in government expenditure correspond with large growth of the service sector. As we 
care more about the magnitude of these changes – rather than which sector increased output – we do not 
comment on the possible reasons for these correlations. The reader can ignore the sign of the correlation.   
Source: authors based on data taken from the World Development Indicators database (2010).  
 
The initial evidence suggests that local government expenditure responds to asymmetric 
shocks, like differences in the distribution of national income. Figure 12b shows (for the 
limited number of countries for which data were available) the correlation between 
changes in local government spending and changes in the inequality of household 
income (as measured by Gini coefficients). The data show a slightly positive relationship 
between income inequality and increases in government expenditure – both across 
countries and across time. These data suggest that decentralisation – for some countries 
at some times – represents an organisational response to one particular measure of the 
complexity of the government’s organisational environment (in this case the distribution 
of income).  
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Figure 12b: Does Local Government Serve as an Amortiser for Income Inequality?
The f igure show s the relation -- for a range of countries -- betw een changes in income inequality and changes in local government expenditure. 
To measure changes in income inequality, w e calculate the average rate of change in Gini coefficients across each of the tw o periods w e look 
at (1999-2003 for the first period and 2004-2008 for the second period). We plot the arithematic average of these rates of change in the f igure. 
Similarly, w e use the yearly rates of change in local government expenditure as the basis for the arithematic averages w hich w e report for each 
of the tw o periods w e analyse for our study. Across both periods, w e observe a slight positive correlation betw een these variables. 
Sources: IMF Goverment Finance Statistics (2010) for local government expenditure and World Development Indicators (2010) for Gini 
coeff icients. 
 
 
The share of high-tech, information technology (IT), industrial, scientific output 
represents another way of depicting the complexity of the macroeconomic environment 
that the government regulates and transacts in. Figure 13a presents values of an index 
describing the complexity government’s organisational environment – as a weighted 
average of “complex” types of outputs (and the transactional/logistical structures needed 
to support the production of these outputs). Countries coloured in darker shades of green 
have higher values of the index we have constructed as a proxy for the complexity of 
government’s targets of regulation. Countries coloured in lighter shades of red represent 
“simpler” organisational environments (as measured by our index).  
 
The index representing the complexity of government’s organisational environment 
tends to follow common sense – with some exceptions. The USA and Japan represent 
the world’s most technological complex countries – an impression bourn out by the data. 
However, China falls into the same league of technological complexity as the US and 
Japan – having higher complexity index values than the Western European economies. 
China’s high ranking probably reflects its economic size – as the index is not scaled by 
population. Western Europe follows closely behind -- and the BRIC as well as OECD 
member countries (with the exception of Portugal and Greece) all have high 
technological complexity scores. Countries with medium-ranking levels of technological 
complexity tend to congregate in Latin American, North Africa and the Middle East 
(with the exception of several Eastern European and Former Soviet countries). Countries 
with the lowest technological complexity scores tend locate in Sub-Saharan Africa (with 
14 exceptions scattered throughout the world).  
 
Figure 13a: A Snapshot of the Complexity of Government’s Organisational 
Environment 
 
 
The figure shows colour codings for a complexity index we have constructed in order to gauge the 
complexity of the organisational environment that various national governments regulate and transact in. 
The index represents the weighted average (from 1999 to 2009) of each country's high-technology exports 
(in US dollars), expenditure on information and communication technologies, scientific and technical 
journal articles, and the value (in current US dollars) of the country's industrial and service sectors. We 
weighted each of these factors equally (except for the share of the service sector, which we gave half the 
weight of the other variables as the variable measures lots of things besides actual service-related 
activities). We took log values of each of these variables (in order to focus on changes and remove the 
effect of relative size). We then scaled the index (which ranges between 10 and 25) on a 10 point scale in 
order to make the data easier to read and interpret graphically. We coded 10, 9, and 8 (relatively highly 
complex economic environments) in various shades of green. We coded 7, 6 and 5 as various shades of 
yellow. Low complexity values received red colourings. Lighter shades represent less complex 
organisational environments (so a country coloured in light green received a lower complexity score than a 
country coloured in a darker shade of green… and so on with yellow and red coloured countries).  
Sources: IMF Government Finance Statistics (2010) for allocation of expenditure and World Development 
Indicators (2010) for spending on variables which proxy the complexity of the economic environment 
which government operates in. 
 
 
The initial data suggest that government organisational structure seeks to buffer against a 
highly complex organisational environment. Figure 13b presents a simple correlation 
between the complexity index scores we discussed above and the extent of governmental 
organisational change. For the purposes of this graph, we measured the extent of 
organisational change as the ratio of the standard deviation of spending on economic 
affairs relative to the standard deviation of spending on social protection – serving as a 
proxy for the extent to which government redeploys resources in order to respond to a 
changing economic environment.13 In general, economies having more complex 
                                                 
13 We make the rather Anglo-Saxon assumption that governments would respond to economic change by 
responding with changes in spending on economic affairs – leaving its social safety net relatively 
unchanged. We acknowledge that if the government focuses on social protection objectives, government 
may significantly alter its social protection coverage in order to respond to economic shocks (the 
traditionally Scandinavian view of government). If social protection responds counter-cyclically (as one 
economic environments tend to correlate with governments which change less their 
allocation of spending on economic affairs relative to social protection. Such a trend 
could either mean that governments operating in more complex organisational 
environments prefer to let private actors “fend for themselves” (facilitating rather than 
actively intervening like in developmentalist states) or constantly adjust welfare 
protection to respond to new risks emerging from new, emerging sectors.  
 
0.00
0.20
0.40
0.60
0.80
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
index of government's organisational environment's complexity
(higher values mean more complex)
in
de
x 
of
 g
ov
er
nm
en
t 
or
ga
ni
sa
tio
na
l c
ha
ng
e 
(h
ig
he
r m
ea
ns
 m
or
e 
fle
xi
bl
e)
Figure 13b: The Textbooks are Wrong? Government Seems to Change Less as the 
Organisational Environment Becomes More Complex
The figure show s the relation betw een the extent of organisational change in the public sector the complexity of government's 
organisational environment. We calculate the index of governmental organisational change as the standard deviation of a 
country's expenditure on economic functions as a proportion of its expenditure on social protection. Governments w hich 
allocate a large amount of resources to economic functions (and change that allocation in response to changing macroeconomic 
fundamentals) w ill have larger index values. The index of the government's environmental complexity comprises the same index 
as that show n in Figure 13a. Namely, w e simply take a w eighted average of the country's high-technology exports (in US 
dollars), expenditure on information and communication technologies, scientif ic and technical journal articles, and the value (in 
current US dollars) of the country's service sector. We w eighted each of these factors equally (except for the share of the 
service sector, w hich w e gave half the w eight of the other variables as the variable measures lots of things because actual 
service-related activities). 
Sources: IMF Government Finance Statistics (2010) for allocation of expenditure and World Development Indicators (2010) for 
spending on variables w hich proxy the complexity of the economic environment w hich government operates in. 
 
 
High-income country governments’ organisational structure seems to adapt more to the 
uncertainty of the organisational environment than its complexity or affluence. Figure 
13c shows the magnitude of correlations between governments’ organisational change 
(as proxied by changes in expenditure on economic affairs relative to social protection) 
and the measures of complexity, uncertainty and resource-availability which we have 
discussed previously. As a whole, high-income governments’ changing resource 
allocations tend to correlate best with the contemporary and reactive view of government 
organisational adaptation. Assuming that government spending adapts either 
contemporaneously or reactively with changes in the organisational environment, such 
changes in expenditure correlate most with changes in economic uncertainty (as 
measured by the inter-sectoral reallocation of output). Changes in the allocation of 
government expenditure on economic affairs also negatively correlates with changes in 
                                                                                                                                                
would expect), such a view of government would not change our conclusions. In the welfarist 
“Scandinavian” view of government, the denominator in our measure of government organisational 
change would change in the same direction as a change in pro-cycle economic policy. In about half of the 
countries in our sample, the standard deviation of expenditure on economic affairs exceeded the standard 
deviation of spending on social protection during the 2000s. See Appendix III for more information about 
the relative variability of spending in each category.  
the resources (as measured by revenues) governments have available. The complexity of 
the macroeconomic environment seems to be a relatively unimportant consideration for 
organisational adaptation – as the proxy for such uncertainty correlates very little with 
changes in government expenditure on economic affairs.  
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Figure 13c: Upper-Income Countries' Government Organisational Strategy 
Focuses on the Present and Past
The data in the figure show the correlation coefficients for changes in government organisational structure and three 
environmental factors -- the complexity of the organisational enviornment, the effect of uncertainty stemming from 
asymmetric economic shocks, and the effect of control over financial resources (revenues). We proxy changes in 
governnment organisational structure through the proportion of economic-related expenditure to social protection-related 
expenditure. A weighted average of each country's expenditure on high tech, IT, industrial output and service-related output 
forms the basis of the proxy for the complexity of the government's organisation environment. An index -- which subtracts 
industrial output from service sector output and divides this difference by agricultural output -- forms the basis for looking at
the effect of sector-specific shocks (and thus the uncertainty of the macroeconomic environment). The level of 
government revenues (in the log value of US dollars) forms the basis of our proxy looking at the effect of resource-control 
on changes in the type of government spending. To test the effect of contemporanous organisational adaptation, we find 
the correlation between the present year's proxy for government stuctural change and the current year's proxies for the 
effect of the complexity of the economy, the effect of sector-specific shocks and the effect of resources (namely 
government revenue). Tests for strategic orientation looked at the effect of the current year's government organisational 
structure and the following year's proxies for complexity shocks and resources Tests for adaptive orientation looked at
 
 
Correlations between the changes in the allocation of government expenditure (as a 
proxy for changes in government structure) and changes in the government’s 
organisational environment seem much more varied for medium-income countries. 
Figure 13d shows the magnitude of correlation coefficients for medium-income 
countries -- assuming that the allocation of government expenditure between economic 
affairs and social protection adapts contemporaneously, strategically or reactively to the 
uncertainty, complexity and resources available in the government’s organisational 
environment. All correlations for medium-income countries are much lower than the 
correlations shown above for high-income countries – most likely reflecting the 
increased diversity of medium-income countries. All models of government’s 
organisational adaptation show the highest (and negative) correlations with uncertainty 
in the economic environment (as measured by the shocks to the inter-sectoral allocation 
of output). Changes in the allocation of government expenditure correlate much less 
with changes in the complexity and resources available in the organisational 
environments in which these governments operate. The tentative conclusion thus 
remains that government organisational structure responds much more to uncertainty in 
the macroeconomic environment than other factors. Such a response is usually positive 
for high-income economies – while negative for medium-income economies.  
 
The data in the figure show the correlation coefficients for changes in government organisational structure and three 
environmental factors -- the complexity of the organisational environment, the effect of uncertainty stemming from 
asymmetric economic shocks, and the effect of control over financial resources (revenues). We proxy changes in 
government organisational structure through the proportion of economic-related expenditure to social protection-related 
exp nditure. A weighted average of eac  country's expenditure on high tech, IT, industrial output and servic -related output 
forms the basis of the proxy for the complexity of th  government's organisation e vironment. An i ex -- which subtrac s 
indu trial output from service sector output and divides this difference by agricultural utput -- forms the basis for looking 
at the effect of sector- pec fic hocks (and hus the uncertainty of the macroeconomic environment). T  level o  
gov rnment revenues (in the log value of US dollars) forms he basis of our pr xy looking at th  effect of resource-control 
on chang s in the type of government spending. To test the eff ct of contemporaneous or anisational adaptati n, we fi d the 
correlation between the present year's proxy for government structural change and the current year's proxies for the effect of 
the complexity of the economy, the effect of sector-specific shocks and the effect of resources (namely government 
revenue). Tests for strategic orientation looked at the effect of the current year's government organisational structure and the 
following year's proxies for complexity, shocks and resources. Tests for adaptive orientation looked at the effect of the 
previous year's complexity, shocks and resources on the current year's government's organisational structure. Source: 
derived from data taken from the IMF's Government Financial Statistics (2010) and World Bank's World Development 
Indicators (2010). See paper for description and derivation of the indicators used to find these correlations. 
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Figure 13d: Medium-Income Countries' Government Organisational 
Adaptation Much More Varied
The data in the figure show the correlation coefficients for changes in government organisational structure and three 
environmental factors -- the complexity of the organisational environment, the effect of uncertainty and shocks, and the effect 
control over financial resources. We proxy changes in governnment organisational structure through the proportion of 
economic-related expenditure to social protection-related expenditure. A weighted average of the country's expenditure on 
high tech, IT, industrial output and service-related output forms the basis of the proxy for the complexity of the government's 
organisational environment. An index -- which subtracts industrial output from service sector output and divides this difference 
by agricultural output -- forms the basis for looking at the effect of sector-specific shocks (and thus the uncertainty of the 
macroeconomic environment). The level of government revenues (in the log value of US dollars) forms the basis of our proxy 
looking at the effect of resource-control on changes in the type of government spending. 
To test the effect of contemporanous organisational strategy, we find the correlation between the present year's proxy for 
government structural change and the current year's proxies for the effect of the complexity of the economy, the effect of 
sector-specific shocks and the effect of resources (namely government revenue). Tests for strategic orientation looked at the 
effect of the current year's government organisational structure and the following year's proxies for complexity, shocks and 
resources. Tests for adaptive orientation looked at the effect of the previous year's complexity, shocks and resources on the 
t ' t' i ti l t t S d i d f d t t k f th IMF' G t Fi i l
 
 
As with the size of government, each theory of government organisation provides a 
partial explanation for these data. All proxies for changes in the structure of government 
show that such government structures do change with variation in the external 
policymaking environment – thus validating to some extent the contingency-based view 
of government. However, the data also suggest that governments – particularly in high-
income countries – use organisational structure to buffer against high levels of 
uncertainty and complexity in their organisational environment. The resource-based 
view of government clearly explains changes in the allocation of government spending 
in some countries – particularly in medium-income countries. Certain governments do 
seem to anticipate changes in their organisational environments – adjusting their 
organisational structures before these changes occur. However, other governments adapt 
reactively – waiting until such changes occur and then adapting (sometimes only 
partially) to these changes. Despite such a rich and varied tapestry of empirical data, the 
existing literature serves as a relatively poor guide in helping to understand the 
relationship between government organisational structure and its responsiveness to its 
organisational environment.   
 
Literature Review 
 
Despite the wealth of data available (such as the data we have just reviewed), scholars 
have conducted very few empirical tests of many of the basic concepts from 
organisational theory taught for past 40 years in a public sector context. Both Hatch’s 
(2006) classic textbook and Christensen et al. (2007) more recent rehash of 
organisational theory in a public sector context include an entire chapter on the relation 
between the organisational environment and organisation structure – yet provide very 
little actual data. To grossly simplify the theory, organisational structure “complexifies” 
The d ta in the figure show the correlation coefficients for changes in government organisational structure and three 
environmental factors -- the complexity of the organisational environment, the effect of uncertainty and shocks, and the 
effect control over financial resources. We proxy changes i  governme t organisational structure through the proportion 
of economic-related expenditure to social protection-related expenditure. A weight d average of the country's 
exp nditure on high tech, IT, industrial output and service-relat d output forms the basis of the prox  for the complexity 
of the g vernment's organisational environment. An index -- which subtract  industrial utp t from service ector output 
and divides this difference by agricultural output -- forms the ba is f  looking at the effect of sector-specific shocks (and 
thus the uncertainty of the macroeconomic environment). Th  level of government revenues (in the log value of US 
dollars) forms the basis f our proxy oking at the effec  of resourc -control on changes in the type of government 
sp nding. To test the effect of c ntemporaneous organisational strategy, we find the corr la ion b tween the present
year's proxy for government structural cha ge and the current year's proxies for the effect  the complexity of th  
ec nomy, the effect of sector-spe ific shocks and the ffect of resourc s (namely government revenu ). Tests for strategic 
orienta ion looked at the effect of the current year's government organisational structure and the following ear's proxies
for complexity, shocks and resources. Tests for adaptive orientation lo ked at the effect of the previous year's 
complexity, shocks and resources on the current year's government's organisational structure. Source: derived from data 
taken from the IMF's Government Financial Statistics (2010) and World Bank's World Development Indicators (2010). 
See paper for description and derivation of the indicators used to find these correlations. 
(using a number of metrics which we will not describe in order to keep our exposition 
straight-forward) when the organisational environment becomes more complex and 
more uncertain. Yet, these canonical theories prove notoriously difficult to test 
empirically. Any related literature survey must analyse “by analogy” – drawing on 
disparate econometric studies on other topics (but which might suggest hypotheses for 
our current study).   
 
Return of Contingency Theory: Government Size and External Shocks  
 
The political economy literature of the 1990s and early 2000s theorises about the size of 
government as government’s response to macroeconomic change. A number of authors 
ask whether government size responds more strongly to external shocks or to internal 
political economy pressures – clearly mimicking the debate in the organisational theory 
between contingency theory and organisational politics (Rodrik, 1997; Alesina & 
Wacziarg, 1998 and Kimakova, 2008 for a much more recent revision of the debate). 
Almost all the empirical evidence points to a strong correlation between government size 
and increased openness to foreign trade and capital flows. Governments clearly grow in 
order to help off-set unwanted changes in output and employment from a more open 
“organisational environment” (to continue to use our own framework for interpreting 
this literature). Such evidence seems to provide powerful support for some form of 
contingency view of public sector organisation.  
 
Rodrik (1997) – in a dated by still well-cited paper – served as the seed for this branch of 
the literature and still provides interesting insights into old questions in public sector 
organisation. Figure 14a shows the relationship between two measures of government 
size – the proportion of government consumption as a share of GDP and government 
employment as a share of total employment – and exposure to external shocks (basically 
trade openness). Rodrik – and other authors subsequently – have found a very weak – 
though positive – relationship in data such as these. As shown in the Figure, the trend in 
the data suggest that government size (as proxied by either expenditure or consumption) 
increases slightly with increased exposure to foreign economic shocks (as measured by 
the sum of imports and export values relative to GDP). Common sense also tells us that 
government size should respond to external shocks (rather than external shocks 
becoming worse for countries with larger governments).14  
 
                                                 
14 On the one hand, larger governments may help to redistribute income from foreign trade which may 
affect the distribution of income. At the same time, larger governments may encourage foreign trade 
(indeed, many large governments have very active trade and investment promotion programmes). Rodrik 
does briefly discuss this chicken-and-egg problem (known in economics as the endogeneity problem). He 
creates another variable which should (at least in theory) not suffer from the problem that the country’s 
exposure to external risks depends (in part) on government size. Explaining both his methods and the 
variable he uses -- known as an instrumental variable – would take our discussion beyond the confines of 
this paper. The reader should see the original paper for more details. As an aside, his instrumental variable 
does not perform much better than the original measure of exposure to external macroeconomic shocks 
and risks.  
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Figure 14a: Governments Increase their Size In Order to Help Respond to Trade-
Related Macroeconomic Shocks?
The data in the f igure show  the relationship betw een government consumption (expressed as the log value of 
such consumption as a percent of GDP) and the volume of trade (imports plus exports again expressed as a 
percent of the country's GDP). We have plotted the relation betw een government consumption (in blue dots) 
and government employment (in red dots) on the same graph for comparison (though in the original, Rodrik split 
these data into tw o graphs). Each dot represents one country in the sample. Source: Rodrik (1991).
 
 
More interestingly, Rodrik also tests whether, what we might call the contingency view 
of government organisation, explains changes in government size better than a view 
focusing on internal politics and interests. In such a “political economy” view of 
government, government sizes would increase as the result of rent-seeking.15 Rodrik 
(and subsequent authors) hypothesizes that exposure to trade opportunities in natural 
resources may lead to larger government sizes. More trade in natural resources should 
thus lead to bribe-taking and patronage in distributing the right to trade in these 
resources. Like us, Rodrik and subsequent authors writing in this vein, do not seek to 
explain in detail how bureaucratic interests inside of government militate for increased 
government employment and the creation of new departments set-up to capture rents 
from the trade in natural resources. Instead, they seek to use correlations between the 
trade in natural resources and government size to make inferences about the importance 
of rent-seeking and internal politics in public sector organisation.  
 
Rodrik (and subsequent writers) find that the uncertainty from macroeconomic volatility 
(a contingency view) correlates more strongly with changes in government size than the 
possible rent-seeking opportunities inherent in natural-resource trade (an internal politics 
view). Figure 14b shows the importance of several variables Rodrik tested while 
explaining government size. Openness to foreign trade (which provides his measure of 
exposure to external risk) positively correlates with various measures of government 
size. Rodrik’s constructed measure of exposure to external risks also explains about as 
much as using the original measure.16 Exposure to foreign rents seems to offer little 
explanation of government size. As shown in the figure, out of Rodrik’s 4 measures of 
rent-seeking, only trade in primary commodity exports significantly correlates with the 
size of government.  
 
                                                 
15 We put the term political economy in quotes to indicate that the term (which has numerous meanings in 
various branches of the social sciences) refers to analysis which looks at the role of economic incentives 
(pay-offs) on various groups’ support for various policies.   
16 As discussed in a previous footnote, the instrumental variable -- which we have labelled as external risk 
IV -- supposedly cancels out the possible effect of government size affecting openness to trade.  
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Figure 14b: Nothing Seems to Explain Government Size… But Exposure to 
External Shocks Explains It Less Poorly than Exposure to Trade-Related Rents
The bands show n in the graph represent the range of standardised beta coefficients explored by the author over a range 
of models. We only include coefficients signif icantly different from zero w ith 95% confidence or better (higher). Authors 
may have transformed variables for their analysis. For this graph, this have included the results of several panels of 
regression analyses. 
Dependent variables: Governmemnt employment, government consumption, central government employment and public 
sector employment, and the grow th of government employment betw een the periods 1960-64 and 1985-89 (depending on 
the model).  
Regression factors having little impact: Per capita income, being a Sub-Saharan country as opposed to an East 
Asian one, land area, trading in oil and having many positive terms of trade shocks.  
Source: Rodrik (1991). 
 
 
While Rodrik and his scholarly descendants establish that government size responds to 
the uncertainty and complexity of the macroeconomic environment, they do not discuss 
whether policymakers respond on purpose to external shocks. While economists must 
assume at government officials act rationally, organisational theorists make no such 
claims. The policymakers of economics can use economic models and statistics to 
predict the emergence of external shocks – and adapt government sizes to minimise the 
negative economic effects of those shocks. In the words of organisational theory, these 
policymakers can act strategically – by predicting changes in their organisational 
environment.17 At the very least, if policymakers can not predict the future, they can 
reactively adjust to changes which have already occurred in the past. Much empirical 
work from economics helps us assess whether governments’ organisational responses (or 
at least sizes) have reacted strategically or reactively to changes in these governments’ 
external macroeconomic environment.  
 
The extant data show little evidence that organisational sizes have reactively adapted to 
more uncertain and complex macroeconomic environments.18 Figure 15a shows the 
relationship between government sizes among OECD member states and past economic 
shocks. Government sizes – at least in the OECD – do not “adjust” to long-run changes 
in the uncertainty and complexity of their macroeconomic policymaking environments.19 
                                                 
17 We draw attention to a very basic misunderstanding about strategy between economic theory and 
organisational theory. In economics, strategy describes the best response to the action of another sentient 
player who can predict (and react to the predictions of) other players. Strategy, in organizational theory, 
usually refers to predicting the future and emerging trends and patterns. We adopt the “future seeing” 
definition of organizational theory as we attempt to test theories in organizational theory rather than 
economics.   
18 Openness to foreign trade should – by definition – increase the uncertainty and complexity of the 
macroeconomic environment. Foreign trade brings new technologies and new products (which increase 
overall complexity of the policymaking environment) as well as new shocks to prices, wages, and returns 
to capital -- which increases overall uncertainty. We deliberately use the words uncertainty and complexity 
to characterize these economic features as organizational theory makes predictions precisely about the 
uncertainty and complexity of the organizational environment (and offers predictions about organizational 
responses to such uncertainty and complexity).  
19 We put the word adjust in quotes because if OECD government policymakers chose organisational 
buffering as an optimal adaptation to a more complex and uncertain organisational environment, then the 
Several of the most open OECD countries have relatively open economies and yet small 
government sizes (as defined by the proportion of government consumption in overall 
national consumption). Yet, several of the most closed economies also have relatively 
small government sizes. The timing of government responses to changes in its 
(macroeconomic) organisational environment plays an important part in the story.  
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Figure 15a: Among OECD Member Countries, Weak Relation Between Prior 
Exposure to External Shocks and Government Size
The data in the f igure show  the (lack of a) relation betw een historical trade openness (as measured by the sum of imports 
and exports as a percent of GDP from 1985 to 1994) and ex-post average government consumption as a percent of GDP 
(from 1995 to 1998). 
Source: Molana et al.  (2004). 
 
 
Yet, the data suggest that some governments time their changes in organisational size 
much better (or at least differently) than others. Molina et al. (2004) – using time series 
analysis – test whether changes in government size follow or precede changes in trade 
openness (and thus possibly the complexity and uncertainty of the overall 
macroeconomic environment). We show in Figures 15b the correlation coefficients 
reported by Molina and co-authors between government size (as measured by 
government consumption) and the complexity-uncertainty of the government’s 
macroeconomic environment. We note two trends in both figures. First, some countries’ 
change in government size “fits” changes in trade openness better if we assume that that 
such changes occur due to strategic organisational adaptation (where government size 
changes precede changes in trade openness) or reactive adaptation (where government 
size changes follow changes in trade openness). Second, some countries respond (or at 
least change) to more trade openness by expanding government size while other 
countries’ government sizes shrink. Why one government would grow in response to 
increased macroeconomic uncertainty, while another government contracts, remains one 
of the unsolved puzzles of public sector organisational theory.  
 
                                                                                                                                                
lack of a relationship in the data shown in the figure reflects the optimal (or at least equilibrium) 
organisational response.  
 
Figures 15b: Reactive and Strategic Organisational Responses to Increased 
Exposure to External Shocks 
 
Reactive Organisational Responses: Governments Like Japan and Australia 
Expand Government After Trade Openness While Germany and Canada Contract
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The bars in the f igure show  the correlation coeff icient betw een this year's change in trade openness (as defined as imports plus 
exports divided by the value of GDP for that year) and the next year's level of government consumption (again expressed as a 
percent of GDP).  For example, changes in Japan's trade openness in any year "explain" about 40% of increases in the Japanese
government's overall consumption of GDP in the follow ing year. Similarly, increases in Ireland's trading openness in any year 
explain about 20% of decreases in the amount of Irish government consumption during the time period the authors explore. We 
interpret high correlations betw een this year's change in trade openness the next year's change in government consumption as a
reactive organisational response. 
Source: Molina et al.  (2004). 
 
 
Strategic Organisational Responses: Governments Like Belgium and the UK 
Increase their Size before Openness Comes while Italy and Netherlands Contract 
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The bars in the f igure show  the correlation coefficient betw een this year's change in trade openness (as defined as imports plus 
exports divided by the value of GDP for that year) and the previous year's level of government consumption (again expressed as 
a percent of GDP).  For example, changes in Belgium's trade openness in any year "explain" about 20% of increases in the 
Belgian government's overall consumption of GDP in the follow ing year. Similarly, increases in Italy's trading openness in any year
explain about 20% of decreases in the amount of Irish government consumption during the time period the authors explore. We 
interpret high correlations betw een this year's change in trade openness the previous year's change in government consumption 
as a strategic organisational response. 
Source: Molina et al.  (2004).  
 
These data suggest that when governments adapt organisational size to environment 
factors tells us as much as how they respond to these factors. Governments such as Japan 
and Australia (at least in Molina et al.’s study) seem to have reactive organisational 
adaptation to environment factors whereas Belgium and the UK seem to have more 
strategic organisational responses. Countries such as Germany and Iceland seem to react 
to changes in the macroeconomic environment by shrinking government size whereas 
Italy and the Netherlands seem to pro-actively (or strategically in our terminology) 
contract. 
 
Organisational Buffering: Government Size and Domestic Output Fluctuations 
 
Another group of studies look at the way government size changes in response to 
domestic macroeconomic shocks -- rather than increased trade openness. The strong 
feedback between government spending and economic change make these studies fewer 
and harder to interpret. Economic change will affect government spending (the question 
which interests us). However, government spending will affect economic performance 
(the question which interests most economists and average citizens). A few studies 
though look at the question we seek to answer in our paper – by looking at how 
government responds to (rather than affects) macroeconomic shocks.  
 
Much of the available data suggests that governments shrink in more unstable (and thus 
more uncertain) macroeconomic environments. Figure 16a shows a simple correlation 
between government size and output volatility. Countries with more output volatility 
correlate (rather strongly) with smaller government sizes. Such a conclusion appears 
robust to the number of countries included – as a larger sample (as shown in the figure) 
also shows that smaller governments operate in highly uncertain macroeconomic 
environments. Governments thus appear to shrink – rather than expand – when 
confronted with a high variable organisational environment (if we use domestic 
macroeconomic volatility instead of trade openness as our measure of environmental 
uncertainty and complexity).  
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Figure 16a: Forget the Openness Results: Governments Shrink in Response to More 
Uncertain Organisational Environments? 
The f igure show s the correlation betw een government size (as measured by the average amount of government 
spending to GDP betw een 1960 to 1997) and the standard deviation of real GDP over the same period. We have added 
the line of best f it to Fatas and Mihov's data for illustrative purposes only. For comparative purposes, w e have super-
imposed on their graph data from 1999 to 2009 and a line of best f it (in gray) w ith a much larger group of countries from 
our ow n dataset.  
Source: Fatas and Mihov (2001) for dark black line and authors for gray line. 
 
 
Government probably grows or shrinks depending on the source and magnitude of 
uncertainty in the macroeconomic environment. Figures 14a and 15b suggest that 
governments grow when environmental uncertain emanates from foreign trade. 
However, governments shrink (as shown in Figure 16a) when environmental uncertainty 
stems from the macroeconomy itself – suggesting that government uses size as a “shock 
absorber.”20 Even for changes emanating from the domestic economy, government size 
                                                 
20 A series of papers look at the extent to which government acts as a shock absorber (insulating the 
macroeconomy against averse shocks) through counter-cyclical spending and employment practices 
(Furceri, 2010).  
probably does not grow or shrink indefinitely as the government’s organisational 
environment becomes more or less uncertain. As Debrun et al. try to show in Figure 16b, 
governments will respond to increased macroeconomic volatility up to a point – 
consuming up to about 45% of GDP. After that point, governments become either 
unwilling to grow more (because increased expansion does not translate into reduction 
of macroeconomic uncertainty) or unable to grow more (because large governments 
crowd out household consumption and private sector investment). We find similar 
support for Debrun et al.’s model – plotting the line of best fit for the data in our own 
sample as the red line above the x-axis. In both cases, the reductions in output volatility 
– for a marginal increase in government size – seem to asymptote out when government 
expenditure equals about 45% of GDP.  
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Figure 16b: Strategic Adaptation to the Organisational Environment Fails
to Have an Effect After Government Spends about Half of GDP
The data in the f igure show  the relation betw een the size of government (as measured by government expenditure over GDP) and 
tw o measures of output volatility. The low er blue line show s the line-of-best-f it betw een volatility of GDP grow th rates and 
government size in Debrun and his co-authors' model. The upper red line depicts the relation betw een GDP volatility (in nominal US 
dollar terms) and government size betw een 1999 and 2009 in our ow n dataset. Both lines roughly show  that government size no 
longer correlates w ith decreases in output volatility after expenditure-to-GDP ratios of about 0.45. 
Source: Debrun et al.  (2008) for the low er blue line and authors for the upper red line. 
 
 
A glimpse at the government employment helps us to understand more fully the way that 
government size reacts to uncertainty in the external environment. Figure 17a – using 
data taken from 1948 to 2003 – shows the relationship between government employment 
and output volatility in the US. As output volatility rises, government employment 
increases (as shown by the first set of correlations) – obviously suggesting (in contrast to 
the findings we show in the first part of our paper), that public sector employment serves 
as a very partial buffer against these output fluctuations. To paraphrase the second set of 
correlations in the figure – all employment ships do not rise with the tide. Workers take 
public sector jobs by leaving their private sector jobs or by turning down such job offers 
when confronted with changes in the economic environment. However, as shown by the 
third set of correlations, employment in the public rises with rising employment 
opportunities in the private sector (ignoring changes in output). As also shown by all 
three sets of correlation, employment in the government sector changes more 
(exhibits higher volatility) than changes in output and private sector employment.21  
                                                 
21 None of these results would surprise a microeconomist – though the last set of correlations might 
surprise a trade economist. Increased volatility in government employment would point to – in an open 
economy – a relatively high level of labour-intensive traded government-produced goods (or rigidities in 
public sector wages…which the next set of data do not show). These data (at first glance at least) 
confound the widely held view that government employment provides job stability with a steady income.  
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Figure 17a: Government Employment Serves a Very Partial Hedge 
Against Negative Macroeconomic Shocks 
The bands show  the correlation coeff icients betw een the variables described in the f igure. The term "correlation" on the x-axis describes 
the percent to w hich changes in government employment correlate w ith changes in output (or w ith changes in private sector hiring for 
the last set of variables). "Elasticity" describes the effect that a one percent change in output (or private sector hiring) has on employment 
in the government sector. "Relative volatility" describes how  much more employment in the government varies as compared w ith changes 
in output or private sector hiring. (In formal terms, relative volatility describes the proportion of the normalised standard deviation of 
government employment to the normalised standard deviation in GDP or private sector employment). The second set of f igures (denoted 
w ith an asterisk) use the proportion of government employment as a share of private sector employment as the variable of interest w ith 
w hich to compare w ith GDP changes. 
Source: Quadrini and Trigari (2007). 
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Public sector wages also vary with changes in the government’s organisational 
environment. Figure 17b shows correlations between government wages and changes in 
the government’s external environment in the USA from 1948 to 2003. Government 
wages increase as shocks raise domestic output – but fall relative to private sector wages 
with a temporary wave of economic prosperity. Government wages generally rise as 
private sector wages rise – though less than in the private sector. Figures 17a and 17b – 
when taken together – suggest that government size (or at least expenditure) 
responds quite a bit to changes in the government’s external environment.22  
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Figure 17b: Government Pulls In Labour During Good Times Through Higher Wages 
The bands show  the correlation coefficients betw een the variables described in the f igure. The term "correlation" referred to on the x-axis 
describes the percent to w hich changes in government employment correlates w ith changes in output (or w ith changes in private sector hiring 
for the last set of variables). "Elasticity" describes the effect that a one percent change in output (or private sector hiring) has on employment in 
the government sector. "Relative volatility" describes how  much more employment in the government varies as compared w ith changes in output 
or private sector hiring. (In formal terms, relative volatility describes the proportion of the normalised standard deviation of government 
employment to the normalised standard deviation in GDP or private sector employment). The second set of f igures (denoted w ith an asterisk) use
the proportion of government employment as a share of private sector employment as the variable of interest w ith w hich to compare w ith GDP 
changes. Source: Quadrini and Trigari (2007). 
relation between relative wages in 
government and output shocks* 
relation w ith private 
sector factor returns (wages)
relation between govt wages 
and output shocks 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
22 By “quite a bit”, we mean that the elasticity of government labour in value and volume terms with 
respect to changes in output exceeds zero (and is probably less than unity).  
Yet, not all countries’ governments seem to respond much to changes in their external 
environments. Figure 18a shows the results of time series analyses assessing whether 
current government expenditure depends on previous government spending or on other 
factors.23 The figure shows – marked in red or yellow – countries where past 
government expenditure very well explains current government expenditure. For most of 
the countries in Akitoby and co-authors’ study, past government expenditure explains 
rather well current expenditure. The authors also test the extent to which changes in 
government expenditure correlate with changes in output in the current period and in the 
past.24 Countries marked in red show countries where past changes in output best 
explain current changes in government expenditure. For a few countries – Colombia, 
Peru, India, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Ghana – current changes in output best explained 
changes in current government expenditure.  
 
Figure 18a: For Some Countries, the Size of Government This Year Depends on 
What that Size Was Last Year  
 
 
The figure shows the results of an error correction model for changes in government expenditure for a sample of 51 countries. For 
countries marked in red, past changes in output best explain (have the largest regression coefficient for) changes in government 
expenditure. For countries marked in yellow, contemporary differences in output best explain (have the largest regression 
coefficients for) changes in government expenditure. The authors did not provide data for countries marked in white.  
Source: Akitoby et al. (2006).  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
23 The authors used a procedure known as Auto-Regressive Integrated Moving Average (or ARIMA) 
techniques. These techniques test the extent to which the value of a variable depends on previous levels of 
that variable. While a discussion of time series analysis extends beyond the scope of our paper, the reader 
should know that this test assesses whether past values of a variable explain that variable better than other 
variables.   
24 The reader familiar with time series analysis will recognize this as a co-integration test – using a error-
correction model. The authors tested three independent variables to find their impact on differenced 
government expenditure – differenced past government expenditure, differenced output and the lag value 
for differenced output. We chose the most important factor for each country based on the size of the 
corresponding coefficient. For example, if the regression coefficient for past changes in output exceeded 
the value (either positive or negative) of the other regression coefficients, we classified that country 
having reactive organisational adaptation.   
Naturally, government size (as measured by revenues and/or expenditure) responds to 
more than just the uncertainty and complexity of its organisational environment. Figure 
18b shows regression results for several variables likely to impact on government 
expenditure. Governments tend to shrink mainly as inflation rises and grow when 
savings increase, as labour abounds and as exports rise. These results seem to confirm 
that government sizes grow in the face of foreign economic shocks and shrink in the 
face of domestic shocks.  
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Figure 18b: The Size of Government Responds to a Wide Range of Factors
tax expend
The bands show n in the graph represent the range of standardised beta coeff icients explored by the author over a range of models. We only 
include coeff icients signif icantly dif ferent from zero w ith 95% confidence or better (higher). Authors may have transformed variables for their 
analysis.  
Dependent variables: Tax revenue as a percent of GDP (denoted as purple bars) and government expenditure as a percent of GDP (w hose 
results are show n by blue bars).  
Regression factors having little impact: Economic freedom index, index of globalisation, unemployment rate (as a share of the labour 
force), average number of years of education (for entire population), urban population (as a percent of the total population), fertility rate, total 
trade volumes (imports plus exports), imports, exports, percent of young people (aged below  15 years), grow th rate of average years of 
school education, and investment's share in GDP.  
Source: Bergh and Karlsson (2010).
 
 
The Structure of Government: Composition of Expenditure and Decentralisation 
 
At first glance, the structure of government also seems relatively insensitive to changes 
in government’s macroeconomic environment. We previously described in Figure 10a 
that we might infer that changes in the allocation of government expenditure result in 
(many directly immeasurable) changes in the “structure of government” (as an 
organisational theorist might understand the term). Yet, the available data fail to show 
increasing complexity and uncertainty (at least as proxied by openness to foreign trade) 
correlate with changes in the allocation of government spending (and thus the structure 
of government writ large). Figure 19b shows the results of a panel of regressions looking 
at the correlation between a range of independent variables and changes in the allocation 
of government spending across 10 categories (in areas like spending on public services, 
defence and so forth).25 Like Rodrik and most of the authors writing in this branch of 
literature, Dreher and co-authors assume that trade brings increased economic 
uncertainty and volatility. Unlike Rodik, Dreher and his co-authors also explicitly create 
proxies for economic, political and social globalisation. We summarise a large number 
of panel regressions in the figure below – showing statistically significant effects on 
various types of expenditure by marking in black shading effects related to trade, 
economic globalisation, political globalisation or social globalisation. Only defence 
expenditures correlate in any statistically significant way with trade; while education 
expenditure correlates with the authors’ proxies for economic globalisation and political 
globalisation. Expenditure on recreational activities (and thus on the agencies 
                                                 
25 The study uses the expenditure areas in the IMF’s Government Finance Statistics – the same ones we 
show data from earlier. As previously described, we infer that changes in expenditure – in public order for 
example – must also correspond to changes in the organisations responsible for ensuring public order… 
such as the Ministry of Interior, Public Safety or its equivalent.  
responsible for providing recreational opportunities) correlates with social globalisation. 
If a contingency theory of government held, Figure 19b should be covered with these 
black-shaded labels. Instead, increased complexity and uncertainty of government’s 
organisational environment seems to have a very limited impact on changes in the 
structure of government – and then only on areas like defence, recreation, and 
education.  
 
Figure 19a: The Allocation of Public Expenditure Does Not Respond to a Wide 
Range of Factors 
 
area of government factors influencing growth or decay 
public services expenditure share, age dependency ratio 
defence average expenditure share, trade index 
public order expenditure share 
econ affairs expenditure share, age dependency ratio, capital account restrictions  
environ expenditure share 
housing (none) 
health lending rate 
recreation lending rate, social globalisation 
education 
average expenditure share, age dependency, economic globalisation, 
political globalisation 
social average expenditure share, age depend, lending rate 
Source: Dreher et al. (2006).  
 
Other data suggests that the uncertainty and complexity of government’s organisational 
environment has a limited impact on the structure of government. While no publically 
available data allow us to describe with precision these changes, we can infer such occur 
by changes in the composition of public expenditure. Figure 19b shows the results of 
regression analysis seeking to identify factors responsible for changes in the composition 
of government expenditure. Many of these factors relate to citizen heterogeneity (the 
percent below 15 years old and over 65 years old, the degree of ethnic, linguistic and 
religious fragmentation as well as Gini coefficients). The study also includes openness to 
trade (the proxy we have suggested leads to changes in the complexity and uncertainty 
of government’s organisational environment). Two variables in the study – GDP per 
capita and federally structured government – describe structure characteristics which tell 
us relatively little about changes in the country’s organisational environment).  
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Figure 19b: Little Explains the Structure of Central Government (Spending) 
The bands show n in the graph represent the range of standardised beta coeff icients explored by the author over a range of models. We 
only include coeff icients signif icantly different from zero w ith 95% confidence or better (higher). Authors may have transformed variables 
for their analysis. We present signif icant results for any of the 12 dependent variables explored by the author. The author does not 
provide R-squared values for these regressions. 
Dependent variables: The author provides results for 12 dependent variables related to central government: total expenditure, 
education, health care, social security, public safety, general government services, transport, defence, transfers, public goods, 
government consumption, and public sector w ages and salaries. 
Regression factors having little impact: Political rights, Majoritarian government, presidential system, and the interaction betw een 
majoritarian and presendetial systems. 
Source: Shelton (2007).
 
 
Structural factors -- describing very basic and slowly changing features – seem to 
explain the allocation of government expenditure better than variables measuring various 
aspects of governments’ organisational environment. Countries with federal structures 
(unsurprising) spend less in expenditure categories – while richer countries’ 
governments tend to spend more than their poorer cousins. All variables measuring 
various aspects of the complexity and uncertainty of the organisational environment 
come out having little practical significance (with very low beta coefficients).26 Trade 
openness (measuring vulnerability to external shocks) positively, statistically 
significantly correlates with changes in various types of government expenditure – 
though has much less of an effect on the composition of government expenditure than 
GDP-per-capita or having a federal government structure. Ethnic fragmentation, 
language fragmentation and religious fragmentation could result in a more complex 
policymaking environment because government policies would (or at least should) 
accommodate the larger and more varied groups of voter and citizen interests. These 
three proxies for the complexity of the government organisational environment emerge 
statistically significant – though again with relatively small beta coefficients. Gini 
coefficients – which measure the dispersion of income in a country (and thus the 
“demand” for compensatory government policies) – also negatively correlate with 
changes in government expenditure. Government expenditure on various areas of policy 
increases as the distribution of income equalises across groups in a country.27 Yet the 
conclusion remains – the structure of government (as proxied by changes in the 
allocation of government expenditure) seems to respond little to changes in 
government’s organisational environment.  
                                                 
26 We tend to use beta coefficients for regression analysis rather than b-values (which measure the change 
in the dependent variable for small changes in dependent variables) because these beta coefficients tell us 
a variable’s importance in explaining changes in the dependent variable (in our case the allocation of 
government expenditure). Variables with low beta coefficient values are “less important” in explaining 
changes in the dependent variable (if the analyst runs his or her sets of regression analyses properly) than 
variables with large beta coefficients.  
27 The causality problem makes the results pertaining to the Gini coefficient difficult to interpret. Sweden 
for example has one of the lowest Gini coefficients in the world and a relatively high level of government 
spending. Yet, statistical analysis can not – at least not the analysis in this study – can tell us whether 
Swedish government expenditure (and Swede’s appetite for government goods and services) increased as 
income equality grew…or whether Swedish government expenditure grew in the past precisely to head off 
possible increases in income inequality.  
 
Increased uncertainty and complexity of government’s organisational environment, 
though, appear to correlate with changes to the structure of government as measured by 
central government expenditure relative to general government expenditure. Figure 20a 
shows regression analyses attempting to find out which factors correlate with 
decentralised structures of government. Income per capita most strongly correlates with 
decentralisation of government expenditure – showing that increases in income per 
capita correlate with increased government sizes but decentralised government 
structures. The extent of a country’s urbanisation and regional disparities surprisingly 
and positively correlate with centralisation (or negative decentralisation).28 
Unemployment – which often has a regional component – also correlates with more 
decentralised government structures. As such, changes in the structure of government 
(as measured by structural centralisation) seem to respond more strongly to 
government’s organisational environment than the allocation of expenditure.   
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Figure 20a: Pressures for Centralisation include Urbanisation, Regional
Income Disparities, and Unemployment (among 9 other variables)
The bands show n in the graph represent the range of standardised beta coeff icients explored by the author over a range of models. 
We only include coeff icients signif icantly different from zero w ith 95% confidence or better (higher). Authors may have transformed 
variables for their analysis. All reported models have R-squared values of 0.96 or higher. 
Dependent variables: Decentralisation (as measured the amount of non-central government expenditure). 
Regression factors having little impact: GDP Grow th rate, share of the country's expenditure as a percent of total EU 
governments' expenditure, trade w ith EU, EU political integration. 
Source: Stegarescu (2009).  
 
Exposure to a more complex and uncertain organisational environment – as proxied by 
greater trade openness -- broadly correlates with increased government decentralisation. 
Stegarescu’s (2009) analysis – as summarised in Figure 20a and chosen because of the 
study’s representativeness of other studies in the area – suggests that trade and financial 
openness correlate with increased in decentralised expenditure. His proxies for both 
trade and financial openness show statistically significant correlations with increased 
government decentralisation (after controlling for other factors). His proxies for the 
strength of regional government – legal provisions for the holding of referendums and 
the function of regional parliaments – on the other hand -- all correlate with less 
decentralisation (as measured by non-central government expenditure). These results 
suggest that government can respond to increased complexity in its organisational 
environment – at least complexity as defined as the diversity of economic 
                                                 
28 The theoretical correlation between urbanisation (and regional disparities) and government 
centralisation depends on the dispersion of such urbanisation (or these regional disparities). For countries 
with one or two large urban agglomerations, economies of scale and lower transportation costs might 
militate for government centralisation. In countries with many large cities (or significant and relatively 
equal regional disparities), a decentralised government structure should respond more effectively to local 
wants and needs.  
preferences concomitant with international trade and political preferences at the 
local level – by either centralising or decentralising. Government organisations 
sometimes seek isomorphism with their environment and at times seek to buffer 
themselves against very complex environments.  
 
Previous studies also suggest that central and sub-national organisation serves as 
organisational substitutes rather than complements. Several authors have written about 
the Leviathan Hypothesis – that the growth of local government helps “reign in” the 
growth of central government (Fiva, 2006).29 Figure 20c shows a negative relationship 
across countries between national involvement in certain policies and sub-national 
expenditure. Unsurprisingly, sub-national government expenditure decreases as central 
government assumes more competencies for engaging in a number of policies. The 
relations seems relatively strong – leaving little doubt that the structure of government 
involves a trade-off between expanding local government as opposed to national 
government.  
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Figure 20c: Sub-national Government Gets Less Involved with Central Government
Gets More Involved in Policymaking
The f igure show s, for various European countries, the percentage of 34 policies w hich national government has competency. The y-
axis show s the percent of subnational expenditure (as a percent of total government expenditure) betw een 1995 and 2000. Source: 
Shinkel (2009). 
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More refined country-level data show that central and local government organisational 
forms can work as complements as well as substitutes. Figure 20d shows the change in 
national and provincial (sub-national) government expenditure in China from about to 
1978-2007.30 During the 1970s and 1980s, Chinese provinces accounted for greater 
amounts of total expenditure – with their proportion of expenditure rising from about 
52% of total government expenditure in 1978 to almost 70% in the early 1990s. The 
2000s though saw an increase in both government expenditure (as a share of GDP) and 
an increase in sub-national expenditure. Common sense suggests that China’s 
policymaking environment become more complex and uncertain in the 2000s (due to 
increased participation in the global economy). Yet, across countries, the only robust 
conclusion emerges that the structure of government (as measured by structural 
centralisation) can respond to changes in government’s organisational environment 
by both centralising and decentralising.  
                                                 
29 We use quotes in order to reflect the sometimes sensationalistic language used in a branch of economics 
literature which has resurrected – using the language and tools of modern economics – old questions in 
political theory.  
30 We chose the China study partly to avoid over-citation of the US experience and partly because these 
data illustrate trends shown throughout the literature for a range of countries.  
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Figure 20c: Centralised and Decentralised Organisational Structures Serve as 
Complements as well as Substitutes 
The f igure show s total government expenditure-to-GDP versus expenditure by provential governments (as a proportion of total 
government expenditure). We have labelled these as indices as the author reports these proportions in natural logs (in order to show  
the changes in these proportions more clearly). We have marked the evolution of provincial expenditure by increasingly darker dots 
through time (so the w hitest data represent the early 1980s and the blackest data represent the late 2000s). 
Source: Zhang (2010). 
 
 
Combining evidence about the structure of government – from both the allocation of 
expenditure across functional categories and between central-local government – paints 
a mixed picture about the structure of government. Figure 21a shows the results of 
regression analysis – trying to explain statistically significant differences in central and 
local government expenditure across 12 functional categories of government 
expenditure. For example, the size of the country’s population explains expenditures on 
safety for both central and local government levels. The percent of the population of 65 
years old and ethnic fractionalisation statistically significantly correlates with local 
government expenditure on education.  
 
Central government appears to respond more vigorously to changes in government’s 
organisational environment than local government. In order to help simplify Figure 21a, 
we have tallied the number of significant variables Shelton finds in his study across 
levels of government. Central government only expenditure statistically significantly 
responds to the most number of variables in Shelton’s study – suggesting a particular 
propensity for government to centralise in the face of uncertainty in its organisational 
environment. However, of the variables which statistically significant correlate with 
changes in the allocation of local government expenditure across functional categories, 
most of these variables relate to the complexity of its regulatory environment (as 
measured by the diversity of citizen’s political preferences and characteristics). These 
data suggest that other – non-economic – factors also affect the structure of government.  
 
 
Figure 21a: Differences Between Central and Local Expenditures 
 
type of expenditure both levels of govt central govt only local govt only 
total expenditure population over 65  
openness to trade 
population under 15  per capita GDP 
openness among OECD 
education  openness to trade 
total population 
population over 65  
ethnic fractionalisation 
health   population over 65  
ethnic fractionalisation 
social security population over 65  openness among OECD ethnic fractionalisation 
public order and 
safety 
total population  population under 15 
openness among OECD 
population over 65  
ethnic fractionalisation 
general public 
services 
 total population  
population under 15 years 
old 
population over 65 
transport openness to trade total population 
openness among OECD 
under 15 years old 
population over 65  
 
defence  population under 15  
transfers  population over 65  
openness among OECD 
 
public goods    population over 65  
openness among OECD 
ethnic fractionalisation 
 
government 
consumption 
total population population under 15 
openness among OECD 
ethnic fractionalisation 
population over 65  
ethnic fractionalisation 
government wages total population 
population over 65  
per capita GDP openness among OECD 
Structural factors 6 13 7 
Uncertainty 2 8 2 
Complexity 0 2 5 
The figure shows the variables statistically significantly explaining the variance in government 
expenditure at both the national and local levels. Empty cells indicate that no variable analysed by the 
author (among the roughly 8 variables they analysed) helps predict changes in government expenditure 
across time and countries. We provide – in the final three lines – the total number of significant variables 
for each level of government. We classify “structural” variables as slow-moving features of the state, like 
total population or GDP. Proxies for “uncertainty” consists of trade openness. Proxies for complexity 
consist of measures of voter heterogeneity (like ethnic fractionalisation).  
Source: Shelton (2007), except for the final three lines which we calculate.  
 
Other – non-economic – evidence suggests that the structure of government responds to 
the complexity of its organisational environment. Shrinkel (2009) presents data in a 
remarkable study attempting to find correlations between the level of policy-making and 
changes in general preferences (of the entire population) as well as changes in the 
heterogeneity of ethnic groups’ preferences. Figure 21b shows – in the simplest way we 
could portray his data – the simulated effects of changes in preferences on national, 
regional and local level-policymaking. For example, changes in nation-wide citizens’ 
preferences correlate with a decrease in central government involvement in 
policymaking (and a much larger decrease in local government involvement in such 
policymaking).  
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Figure 21b: Changes in Local and General Preferences 
Led to Some Changes in Level of Policy-making
The bars show n in the f igure describe the changed in the predicted probability of that level of government becoming involved in policies 
studied by the author for a change in general preferences or changes in the heterogeneity of ethnic preferences. For example, a change in 
general preferences results in about a 5% decrease probability in national government involvement in policymaking. change in the 
involvement of government. Ranges highlighted by red boxes are statistically signif icant at 95% or better. 
Source: Shinkel (2009).
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Data such as Shinkel’s suggest that changes in the government’s organisational 
environment (as suggested by changes in citizens’ preferences) does not have simple 
effects on the structure of government. Often various levels of government respond to 
changes in government’s organisational environment. As insinuated by Figure 21b, both 
national and local levels of government decrease their involvement in policymaking for 
changes in general preferences – while regional and local governments (working 
together) increase their involvement. Changes in government’s organisational 
environment leads to complex changes in the structure of data – even if no one 
measure of such government structure can adequately capture them.  
      
The Public Sector Organisational Theory Literature 
 
While a wide number of studies focus on various aspects of government size and 
structure at the micro and anecdotal levels, few studies in public administration tackle 
the issue definitively. For example, in a dated but still very relevant paper, Sharfman and 
Dean (1991) attempt to provide a definitive answer to conceptualising and measuring the 
organisational environment (to borrow the title of their paper). In their paper, they 
attempt to taxonomies the three dimensions of organisational environmental which we 
test in our paper. They also look – in a private sector context – at organisational 
characteristics correlating with each type of organisational environment. For example, 
they find that highly uncertain organisational environments (or revised dynamic 
environments in their terminology) correlate with the most profitable industries. They 
also find (with some relevance to our present study) that the use of written rules and 
market resource (or information gathering in a public-sector context) significantly 
correlate with high competitive and complex organisational environments.  
 
In one of the most relevant studies for our own research, Andrews et al. (2008) uncover 
several statistically significant correlations between UK managers’ perceptions of their 
agency’s organisational environment and the type of organisational strategy their agency 
managers pursued.31 As shown in Figure 22a, these managers thought that highly 
                                                 
31 One study hardly seems like the basis for a valid literature review. In our defence, we searched all the 
major search engines for papers dealing with “organizational environment” and variations of government, 
structure, public sector, strategy, “strategic adaptation” and so forth. The paucity of papers in this area 
reflects deeper epistemological problems around the definition of government structure and the 
centralised agencies followed a reactive as well as strategic organisational adaptation. 
Agencies highly involved in planning corresponded with reactive organisational 
adaptation (using our labels instead of theirs). Agencies following incrementalist 
policies tended to follow reactive and strategic organisational adaptation to changes ii 
their organisational environments. Agencies with a high amount of environmental 
uncertainty tended to adapt their agencies reactively.  
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Figure 22a: Decentralising and Incrementally Changing Agencies Engage in Stategic and Reactive 
Organisational Adaptation -- those in Highly Uncertain Environments Adapt Reactively
The data in the f igure show  the extent to w hich several variables correlate w ith the organisational strategy of UK government 
agencies. For example, the perception that an agency follow s a decentralising strategy correlates w ith UK's managers' perceptions 
that their agency adapts reactive (and strategically) to its organisational environment. Agencies w hose managers foillow  
incrementalist strategy correlate w ith managers' perceptions that those agencies engage in reactive and contemporanous 
organisational adaptation.  We have relabelled the authors' labels for the dependent variables from prospective to "strategic," low  
cost and differentiated defending as "contemporanous" adaptation and reacting as "reactive" organisational structure. 
Source: Andrew s et al.  (208). 
 
 
A more fruitful area of research has centred on the international institutionalisation of 
government structure. The institutionalist literature – and particularly literature dealing 
with the institutionalisation of organisational forms – has spawned a great many studies 
in the private sector (Scott, 2008). However, few studies deal with such 
institutionalisation in a public sector context (except the many policy studies from 
Eastern Europe describing how various governments copied models from Western 
European countries). Yet, reactive organisational adaptation could well occur because of 
the mimetic diffusion of institutional norms of government organisation occurring 
concomitantly with international macroeconomic shocks. In simple language, 
policymakers in many countries may choose to restructure their ministries and 
departments because they observe colleagues in other countries doing the same thing 
during an economic crisis or other macroeconomic event.  
 
Previous studies – and our readers’ own work experience -- provide some support for the 
theory that policymakers “copy” some attributes of government structure from other 
countries – irregardless of changes occurring in their own country’s macroeconomy. 
Figure 24c shows the impact of interaction (as measured by international trade) on 
government sizes. For example, the authors find that government employment expanded 
for the US’s trading partner countries when US government employment expanded (and 
visa versa). They also find correlations in government in countries likely to copy US 
government employment trends because of similarities in economic growth and trade 
balances. However, the authors fail to provide any convincing, detailed mechanism by 
                                                                                                                                                
organisational environment of the public sector – as well as the lack of data from which to evaluate 
various theories. We rather blithely gloss over all these serious considerations in our study in order to 
arrive at some empirically-derived conclusions (however tenuous they might be).  
which such organisational copying occurs. They also fail to show (in our opinion) that 
correlations in cross-country government employment does not occur because of similar 
shocks occurring in both countries – making a contingency-based theory of government 
the most relevant explanation of these data. These observations do not discredit these 
authors’ research. Instead, they point out how much more empirical work remains to be 
done.  
 
0
0.5
1
1.5
Trade w ith
USA -
dow nsizing
Trade w ith
USA -
upsizing
Trade
partnership -
dow nsizing
Economic
grow th -
evidence for
dow nsizing
Trade
Balances -
evidence for
dow nsizing
Figure 24c: The Reactive Government: Organisational Structure as the 
Result of Mimetic Institutional Pressures 
The f igure show s the extent to w hich various factors inf luence the copying of organisational structure betw een countries. 
Their dependent variable measures changs in general government employment of a country as the lagged proportion of 
changes in government employment  in other "proximate" countries. 
Source: Lee and Strang (2006).  
 
 
The public administration literature -- and all the literatures we have reviewed – leave 
many questions unanswered. Do changes in government size respond differently to 
external as opposed to internal macroeconomic shocks? Do macroeconomic shocks tell 
us something about the perceived or actual complexity and uncertainty of government’s 
organisational environment (as we have defined it in this paper)? Does the allocation of 
resources across functional categories really intimate something about changes in the 
structure of government (as an organisational theorist would understand the term)? Does 
government centralisation occur in response to particular types of macroeconomic 
shocks? A model can help reduce the complexity of the research problem partly 
delineated by the existing literature.    
 
The Model  
 
Government size and structure should – in theory – depend on the uncertainty and 
complexity of government’s organisational environment. The initial evidence from the 
literature suggests that government sizes should expand with the rising uncertainty 
stemming from international trade; and shrink with increasing macroeconomic (inter-
sectoral) instability. The structure of government (as measured by the functional 
allocation of expenditure) should not vary very much for changes in the complexity of 
the organisational environment. Moreover, governments may centralise or decentralise 
their organisational structures in response to an increasing complex organisational 
environment. At first glance, these conclusions seem relatively solid. The US and EU 
Member State governments operate in uncertain and complex organisational 
environment – and have large and highly variegated government structures. Yet, as a 
percent of their GDP, some of the poorest countries – like Lesotho, Barbados, and 
Bosnia-Herzegovina – have some the largest governments in the world. The Chinese 
government, according to the initial data, operates in a highly complex macroeconomic 
environment – and has a rapidly changing organisational structure.   
 
Our simple model posits a relationship between government size and structure and the 
uncertainty and complexity of the macro-economic environment, as well as other 
variables. Figure 25 shows the model for government size and structure which we 
describe in Appendix I and which we test in this paper. Government size (denoted by g 
and proxied by each country’s government expenditure expressed as a percent of GDP) 
depends on economic uncertainty (y) and complexity (z). Economic uncertainty (as 
proxied by the changing proportions of national income in the industrial sector, as 
opposed to the service sector or agricultural sector) affects government size in two ways. 
Governments – through voters’ and policymakers’ preferences –will want to buffer the 
economy against various asymmetric shocks (or adjust to them if these are domestic 
macroeconomic shocks). Government also needs to provide more programmes and 
resources as the desire to insure against these shocks grows – thus increasing 
government size (again, unless these shocks originate domestically). Second, as the size 
of these shocks grow, governments are likely to be more risk averse – dedicating 
exponentially larger amounts of resources as the size of these shocks increase. The 
coefficient γ1 represents the first set of (linear) effects while β1 represents the second set 
of (geometric) effects.  
 
 
 
Governments also need to regulate (and for more interventionist governments to co-
ordinate) an increasing complex economy. As represented by the linear coefficient γ2), 
government may expand or shrink to provide more services to a more complex economy 
(or to avoid crowding out more efficient self-regulatory methods of the private sector). 
However, the size of such intervention may increase exponentially as the economy 
becomes increasing complex (represented by the geometric effect of β2). Similarly, 
following the resource-based view of government, the amount of resources – proxied by 
revenues as a percent of GDP – passes through into an expansion of government 
programmes by γ3. Similarly, other factors, such as the size of the country or the 
population should also affect government size – and these variables (η) serve as useful 
controls in testing our main effects.  
 
Government structure depends on the uncertainty and complexity of the economic 
environment government regulates and transacts in. Government structure will depend 
on a natural preference for decentralised governance – measured either as the resources 
given to local rather than central government or by the proportion of government 
functions aimed at economic activities rather than social protection. Some part of 
government structure x* -- by pure practical necessity – will need to disperse across the 
country in order to provide government services somewhat efficiently and/or to provide 
some minimum amount of resource redistribution from well-off regions to regions in 
recession. The parameter ζ1 measures the extent to which asymmetric or sector specific 
shocks translate into further changes in government structure. As these shocks become 
bigger, the gains to decentralisation become exponentially larger as government 
“matches” with its economic environment (λ1). As economic complexity rises, 
government will naturally imitate the complexity of the environment in which it operates 
(using computers, creating facilitating offices like foreign investment offices). The 
parameter ζ2 reflects such a preference. As the complexity of the economic environment 
increases, government may wish to locate (by offering functionally targeted or 
decentralised services) to citizens working in high-tech or other sectors. Exponential 
gains accrue – as denoted by λ2 -- as decentralisation matches specific offices with areas 
of the country more industrialised or advanced than others… as government offices in 
Silicon Valley may need to respond to a different set of business development and social 
welfare needs than offices in agricultural Nebraska.  
 
The equilibrium government size depends on balancing act that governments play 
between matching their economic environment and suffocating it. Figure 26a shows – 
for some reasonable model parameters we inserted into the model for illustrative 
purposes -- that as the uncertainty and/or complexity of government’s organisational 
environment rise, the benefits accruing to increased government size rise faster than the 
cost of expanding government. After some point – in the simulation shown in Figure 26a 
at about 33% of GDP, the cost of expanding government starts to exceed the gains.32  
These estimates lead to our first hypothesis -- the size of government depends on 
uncertainty and complexity of the government’s organisational environment.  
 
g = g*+γ2(x+y)β 2 
- γ1(x+y)β 1 + γ0(x+y) 
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Figure 26a: Model of Government Size
The model show s the effect of increased macroeconomic uncertainty and complexity on government size for a set of reasonable parameter 
values. In the simulation show n, w e include uncertainty x  and complexity y  in order to derive general "pass through" effects on government 
size (the γ s in the model) and exponential effects (the βs in the models). The simulation show s g*<0, γ 1>0 and β1=3, β2=2, and γ 2<0 and 
simple assumptions related to the w ay that costs and the "technology" of increasing government size responds to changes in macroeconomic 
uncertainty and complexity (such that all parameter values are greater than zero but far less than one). Exponential effects are assumed no 
larger than 3. 
 
 
                                                 
32 We show an optimal size of government in this simulation of about 33% of GDP whereas authors like 
Debrun et al. (2008) place this figure closer to 40%-45%. We use these model illustrations in all Figures 
26 only to provide a fast and easy of illustrating model predictions without lots of complicated 
mathematical derivations, lemmas and other modeling basics which make typical economics papers 
relatively unapproachable to non-specialists (and PhD economists alike!).  
Different governments will respond differently to even similarly sized changes in their 
macroeconomic environment. Figure 26b simulates the response of government size to 
changes in the macroeconomic environment -- depending on differing attitudes to risk 
and return. In order to simplify the figure, we only show two responses – using 
parameter estimates which might be expected the arch-typical Continental-Style 
government and Anglo-Saxon government. We assume the Continental-Style 
government will respond – by increasing government size – even to small changes in the 
macroeconomic environment. As these organisational environmental changes become 
larger, government will rely more on private sector adjustment (and the “infra-marginal” 
changes already made). The stereotypical Anglo-Saxon style government will adjust 
much less to external shocks and rely much more on private sector reaction. The figure 
shows – as in the previous figure – that government size will continue to change (grow) 
until the benefit of such changes equal the cost (as depicted by the red line showing the 
changes in the costs involved in increasing government size). As usual in economic 
theory, government size will reach an equilibrium in which the cost of marginal changes 
in government size equal marginal benefits of such change. These simulations suggest a 
second hypothesis -- different governments will have different preferences for 
responding to the uncertainty and complexity of the macroeconomic environment. 
 
gc = gc*+ γ c0x + γc1(x+y)βc1 - 
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Figure 26b: Different Optimal Size of Different Types of Government
The figure show s the rates of change in each of the variables depicted in Figure 26a. We show  the expected
change in the size of government for changes in the uncertainty and complexity of the government's policy-making environment. 
We also simulate how  government size might change as various parameters in our model change. We show  tw o scenarios, using 
parameters w hich represent stereotypical depictions of government "styles." For the type of government w hich w e label as a 
Continential-Style government, w e assume a more risk-averse government w hich increases size much sooner and more 
vigourously to changes in the macroeconomic environment. For the type of government w e label as an Anglo-Saxon government, 
w e assume policymakers prefer to let the private sector respond to these shocks w ithout much government involvement. 
Specif ically, w e assume that 0> γ c0, γc1 and γ c2 <1 and βc1=3 and βc2 =2 and γa0<γ c0, γ a1<γc1, and γa2<γ c2 (for the same, 
corresponding βa1 and βa2). As show n in this simulatiion, the equilibrium change in government size decreases as the the 
preferences for intervention become "w eaker." 
 
 
Different governments will also respond to changes in their organisational environment 
more quickly than others. Figure 26c shows the response of government size to changes 
in macroeconomic uncertainty and/or complexity for a range of the model’s parameters. 
In order to provide concrete, realistic examples, we illustrate 4 cases which roughly 
correspond to different stereotypical types of government. The scenarios which we have 
labelled as responses from Continental-style governments usually exhibit reactive 
responses to shocks (occurring in later time periods than when the shock occurred). In 
several of the cases, which we have marked as characteristic of stereotypical Anglo-
Saxon style governments, organisational responses occur mostly contemporaneous 
(occurring at roughly the same time as the shock) or even slightly before (meaning that 
government officials predicted the shock and took steps to increase government’s size in 
response to the shock before the shock occurred). These simulation results lead to our 
third hypothesis -- different countries will react reactively, strategically or 
contemporaneously to changes in the macroeconomic environment.  
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Figure 26c: Adaptive Orientation of Governments with Various 
Types of Risk-Aversion and Other Preferences
The figure show s simulations of the timing in changes in government size for changes in the sectoral composition of GDP as w ell as changes 
in the volume of high-tech, scientif ic and industrial production in overall output. The thick red line show s the magnitude of the shock (w ith the 
brunt of the shock occuring at the beginning of the second year). We show  four "prof iles" of governments -- changing their overall size 
depending on their preferences for avoiding risk and organising to adapt to these shocks. For the type of government w e steretypically label 
as a Continential-Style government, the simulation show s that these governments respond less quickly to shocks. How ever, they respond 
more aggressively (by expanding more) than governments stereotyped as Anglo-Saxon-type governments. We treat changes in uncertainty 
(x) and complexity (y) the same for this simulation and assume a standard sized shock in order to highlight the w ay that government size w ill 
respond to these shocks for various assumptions about the γ s and βs in the model. 
 
 
Government structure – and particularly the extent of decentralisation – depends on the 
magnitude of economic shocks in our model. Figure 26d shows the relationship between 
the optimal level of decentralisation (as defined by the general measure for “dispersion” 
in our model rather than any specific measure which we will use in our empirical 
analysis) and the extent of uncertainty and complexity in the government’s 
organisational environment. As shown, for relative anodyne assumptions about 
government risk aversion, government’s desire to respond to sector-specific shocks, and 
other parameters, government should decentralise about 20% of its resources (into local 
government or into other functional categories depending on your interpretation of the 
variable). Such a result leads to our fourth hypothesis – that government structure 
changes in response to changing uncertainty and complexity of the macroeconomic 
environment. 
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Figure 26d: Model of Government Structure (Decentralisation)
effect of shocks
effect of complexity
The f igure show s the effect of changes in government structure (as defined by general "dispersion" of government and 
proxied by several variables w hich w e discuss in the paper) concomitant w ith changes in macroeconomic uncertainty and 
complexity. The optimal level of decentralisation balances increasing costs of decentralisation (as the magnitude of shocks 
increases) and the benefits of decentralisation in responding more closely to asymmetric shocks. The parameter values for the 
demand for decentralisation are ζ1=0.17, ζ2=-0.0099 and ζ3=-0.00006 w hile λ2=2 and λ3=3 and z*=-.18. 
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Governments with different attitudes toward adjusting to shocks will decentralise 
differently. Figure 26e shows the responses of various types of governments – classified 
according to their preferences for adapting to changing uncertainty and complexity in 
their macroeconomic environment. We label certain combinations of parameter values in 
our models using simple characterisations of governments in order to illustrate our 
model. For example, we simplistically characterise risk-averse governments which 
respond heavily to shocks (by decentralising only for very small shocks and very large 
shocks) as Continental-Style governments. Anglo-Saxon governments centralise for 
very, very large shocks – as we saw during the 2009 financial crisis. Clearly (as shown 
in the figure) governments with different preferences chose different levels of 
decentralisation. Our Continental style of government chooses to decentralise by 5% in 
response to changes in its macroeconomic environment. Our baseline-style of 
government chooses to centralise by about 1% and Anglo-Saxon style government 
chooses to centralise by about 4%. These differences in equilibrium changes in 
decentralisation lead to our fifth hypothesis -- that differences in the uncertainty and 
complexity of various countries’ macroeconomic environments significantly explain 
changes in government structures.  
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The figure show s the optimal change in decentralisation for a range of parameter values in our model. The parameter values w e used for the 
baseline case (show n by the heavy black line) consist of z *=-.086, ζ1=0.09, ζ2=-0.013, ζ3=0.0005 w hile λ1=1, λ2=2 and λ3=3. The parameters 
for the case w e label as the Continential-Style government are dif ferent in that z * is low er by about 0.07, ζ1 is very slightly negative, ζ2 is very 
slightly positive, and ζ3 is about the same. The Anglo-Saxon style government case dif fers from the baseline case in that z * is much more 
positive (w ith z *=0.11), ζ1 is slightly negative, ζ2 is slightly positive, and ζ3 is basically zero. Like in the last case, multiple equilibrium rates of 
decentralisation exist for various levels of changes in the uncertainty and complexity of the macroeconomic environment.  
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As governments time changes in their sizes in response to shocks to their organisational 
environments by adjusting their size, they also choose to centralise (or decentralise) with 
varying speeds in response to these changes. Figure 26f shows simulations of the extent 
of decentralisation in response to a non-specific shock (either in the uncertainty or 
complexity) to government’s organisational environment. Again, we have labelled 
particular parameter combinations with simplistic monikers for governments which 
would be expected to react in the way predicted by the simulation. Risk-averse, 
developmental Anglo-Saxon countries react strategically – anticipating the shock and 
decentralising in order to minimise the negative effects of these shocks. Very risk-averse 
governments which we have labelled as Continental-style governments, react with a 
significant delay – and then markedly decentralise (only to strongly centralise shortly 
afterward). These differences in response speeds and styles lead to our final hypothesis -
- that different governments’ structures can respond strategically, 
contemporaneously or reactively to changes in their macroeconomic environments.  
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Figure 26f: Type of Adaptive Response for Decentralisation
The f igure show s the structural response of government to changes in its external environment (increased uncertainty and complexity) for a 
range of parameter values in our model. The heavy red line show s the effect of a change to the uncertainty and complexity of the 
government's environment -- w ith most of the effect accruing at the start of the second year (4th quarter). For parameter combinations 
w hich w e label as characterising an Anglo-Saxon style government, decentralisation occurs much sooner and more gradually. For 
parameter combinations w hich w e characterise as becoming a Continential-style government, w e observe more pronounced 
decentralisations (and subsequent more pronounced re-centralisations).  
 
Empirical Results 
 
Overview of the data  
 
Our sample included all countries for which the World Bank, IMF and ILO provide data. 
In total, our sample covered 165 countries between the period 1999-2009 -- for a total of 
1815 possible observations (and we provide detailed statistics about data availability in 
Appendix III). Figure 27a shows the distribution of our sample according to the two 
groupings we used the most in our analysis – classification by geographical area and by 
income-group. Our sample slightly over-represents Sub-Saharan Africa – representing 
almost 5 times as many countries as South Asia. However, Sub-Saharan countries 
provide far fewer usable observations upon which to base our analysis.33 The richer 
                                                 
33 As we discuss in the Appendix, we needed long, uninterrupted stretches for data for numerous variables 
from a country in order to construct the graphs we provide in the first section of our paper (so that we 
could accurately aggregate, average and compare data across countries). On the other hand, we can draw 
strong conclusions from our regression analysis with relatively sparse data. Our regression analysis (in fact 
we use a variation known as a “generalized linear model”) can find patterns the variation of relatively few 
OECD countries take second place – comprising about 20% of the sample (and almost 
all of the usable sample for evaluating the effects of changes in the organisational 
environment on the structure of government). In our sample, as classified by the World 
Bank’s most recent income grouping, about half of the countries in the sample come 
from medium-income countries. Roughly the same proportion of countries derive from 
high-income and low-income countries.  
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Figure 27a: The Distribution of Countries in Our Sample by Regional and Income Group Classifications 
The f igure show s the proportion -- out of 165 countries -- of countries falling into the major classification schemes used in the paper. The reader should interpret 
these data w ith caution (looking at the distribution of cases in Appendix III rather than simple number of countries w e surveyed). For example, the figure show s that 
w e surveyed the largest proportion of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa -- even though relatively few  of these countries provide data for all 10 years w e covered. 
We used the 2010 World Bank income groupings to classify countries by income group. Several of the countries w e surveyed changed income group classif ication 
during the period (most of the countries changing classif ication moved "up" in the classification table). 
regional classification income classification
 
 
At first glance, the data tend to confirm our common sense impression – that low-
income country governments adapt relatively small organisational sizes to match their 
relatively certain and un-complex organisational environments. As shown in Figure 27b, 
average government sizes (as measured by government expenditure relative to GDP) of 
low-income country governments measure up to a little less than half the average 
government sizes of upper-income country governments. Relative industrialisation of 
low-income country governments (the figure which we base our proxy of organisational 
environment upon) rests at about one-fourth the level as that of their high-income 
country counterparts.34 The average value for the proxy of the complexity of low-income 
countries’ organisational environments lies at roughly half the value of high-income 
countries’ values. The value of medium-income countries’ government sizes, relative 
industrialisation, and macroeconomic complexity lie half-way between those values in 
the low-income and high-income countries.  
 
                                                                                                                                                
observations which we could not find with the naked eye alone (albeit with less precision than we might 
wish for).   
34 The data in Figure 27b show the proportions of industrial output relative to output in other sectors, 
rather than changes in such output. We show such relative industrialization rather than the changes in such 
relative industrialization because we already showed these changes in the figure section of the paper. We 
do not use these averages in our analysis – presenting them mostly as background material.   
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Figure 27b: Richer Governments Tend to Be Larger as well as Have More Uncertain
and Complex Organisational Environments 
Complexity 
of Economic Environment
Relative Industrialisation
of Economic Environment
Government Size 
as a Share of GDP
The f igure show s the range of average levels of three variables used in our econometric analysis. We calculated average values for 
the complexity of the economic environment by taking simple arithematic averages of the 10 year period (betw een 1999 and 2009) of 
the proxy for such complexity. The proxy for the complexity of the economic environment consists of a w eighted average of the 
country's production of high-tech output, (valued in US dollars), export of IT (again valued in US dollars), the logirithm of scientif ic 
publications and patents, the proportion of industrial output and service output. The proxy for the uncertainty of the economic 
environment measures the extent to w hich resources moved betw een economic sectors. We calculated the proxy by subtracting the 
proportion of service-sector GDP from industrial GDP and divided the result by the value of agricultural GDP. We report overall levels 
(rather than changes) of this proportion as "relative industrialisation" in the f igure. 
 
 
Our measures for the structure of government show rather significant differences across 
countries in the three income groupings. The larger variation bands shown in Figure 27c 
reflect the much lower number of observations available upon which to create these 
proxies.35 Low income countries’ governments tend to spend a much larger amount on 
general government services and economic affairs (as defined by the IMF) than on social 
protection in comparison with medium-income and high-income countries. Medium-
income country governments tend to spend about double the amount on central 
government (relative to non-central government) as high-income countries – and about 8 
times as much as low-income countries. Using employment in central government 
organisations – rather than expenditure by them – follows a rather different pattern 
between income groupings. Employment in central government tends to be slightly 
lower (relative to employment in non-central government organisations) in low-income 
countries than in high-income or medium-income countries.  
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Figure 27c: Low-Income Country Governments More Dirigiste,  but Medium-Income Country 
Governments more Centralised
Economic Centralisation Structural Centralisation Labour Centralisation*
The f igure show s the range of country averages of three variables aimed at understanding a country's government structure. The 
measure of economic centralisation uses the ratio of government expenditure on general governemnt services plus economic 
affairs as a proportion of expenditure on social protection. The measure of structural centralisation show s the percent central 
expenditure relative to general government expenditure. The measure of government labour centralisation -- w hich w e show  only 
for comparative purposes -- show s the ratio of civil servants in central government relative to local government (multiplied by 10 to 
make the numbers visually comparable w ith the other measures). Source: Calculated from the IMFs Government Financial Statistics 
(2010).  
 
                                                 
35 As discussed previously, any attempt to create a proxy for the “structure of government” will run into 
serious definitional and measurement problems (as no universally recognized definition for the structure of 
government exists and governments report very little data upon which to construct even the most tentative 
proxies).   
Looking at rates of change in government sizes and changes in government’s 
organisational environment confirm our overall impressions about larger governments 
responding to a more volatile organisational environment (with some exceptions). Figure 
27d shows the range of average rates of change in government sizes and our proxies for 
the uncertainty and complexity of the economic environment. The figure broadly shows 
that larger government sizes correlate with more uncertain and complex organisational 
environments (as shown by bars lying entirely above the x-axis). These data show two 
possible exceptions to such a trend. First, several low-income countries’ government 
expand while facing a more uncertain and complex macroeconomic environment. 
Second, some high-income country governments shrink while interacting with a more 
uncertain and complex organisational environment. These trends suggest that we can 
not simply generalise based on income groupings – we should look at more refined 
country groupings.36  
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Figure 27d: Government Sizes Generally Growing... With Increasing Complexity and 
Uncertainty of the Economic Environment (and much higher variability among low-Income 
countries)
Change in…
Complexity of 
Economic Environment
Change in…
Uncertainty of 
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Change in…
Government Size
The f igure show s the range of average changes in three of the main variables w e analyse in our paper. We calculated these data by 
taking the difference of the log value of each of these three variables (our proxy for the complexity of the economic environment, the 
uncertainty of that environment and government size) betw een 1999 and 2009.  We took the arithematic average of these differences 
and report them as percent changes (as the dif ference in log values usually closely resembles the normal rate of change calculated 
for the original variables). The range show n in the figure depicts the range  of these averages across countries in each income-
classif ication. 
 
 
Hypothesis 1: The size of government depends on the uncertainty and complexity of 
government’s organisational environment 
 
Government sizes do respond to their organisational environment. Figure 28a shows the 
effect of a number of variables on government size for all 165 countries we analysed. 
The largest effect consists of previous government size – strongly suggesting the 
prevalence of an inertial organisational strategy. In more simple language, policymakers 
tend to choose government sizes largely based on government’s size last year. The 
availability of resources also (slightly) more strongly explains changes in government 
size than changes in the uncertainty and complexity of the organisational environment 
(as we have defined such uncertainty and complexity in this paper). Finally, the other 
variables we expect to influence government size – such as the country’s population and 
the effectiveness of its government – have an impact (though less strongly than most of 
the other variables).37 Quite understandably, less effective governments tend to spend 
                                                 
36 In Appendix III, we provide a similar (but less edifying) analysis -- grouping countries by geographical 
grouping rather than income group.  
37 As we noted previously, beta coefficients (which we report in the figure) tend to indicate the relative 
importance of each variable in explaining and/or predicting the independent variable (government size in 
more (as a percent of GDP) than more effective ones. We can conclude, with a 
reasonable amount of confidence, that government sizes grow – holding all other 
variables constant – when government’s organisational environment becomes more 
complex and more uncertain.38  
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Figure 28a: Governments Grow in Size When their Organisational Environment Becomes 
More Complex and Uncertain (and for a bunch of other reasons) 
The bands show n in the graph represent the range of standardised beta coeff icients (over a range of models) w hich w ere significantly 
different from zero w ith 95% confidence or better (higher). We may have transformed variables for their analysis. The variable capturing 
the effects of uncertainty and economic shocks is negative -- meaning that more resources move from industrial sectors into service 
sectors w hen as government size increases. 
Dependent variable: Governmemnt size (government expenditture as a percent of GDP)   
Regression factors having little impact: Change in complexity over time, change de shocks, changes in revenue, membership in a 
particular geographic region, past levels of GDP, the proportion of the population living in urban centres, the level of business freedom, 
unemployment rates, and the country's level of development. 
 
 
Nothing explains why some governments expand (or contract) rapidly while others 
change slowly. Figure 28b shows the importance of a range of variables in explaining 
the change in the government expenditure-to-GDP. All the beta estimates, taking into 
account their 95% confidence intervals, pass through zero. Such results suggest that 
government size responds to changes in government’s organisational environment. 
However, the rate of change of government size depends on some unknown variable 
which does not depend on features of government’s organisational environment. 
The model, then, provides a very poor basis for explaining why some governments 
expand rapidly and others expand slowly.  
 
                                                                                                                                                
the case of this analysis). Variables with higher statistically significant beta coefficients are more likely to 
have a substantial effect on the independent variable than variables with low beta coefficients.  
38 We should qualify the term “reasonably confident” with two caveats (which apply to all the conclusions 
we reach in our regression analysis. First, our statistical tests have small probabilities (less than 5% and 
often less than 1%) of reporting that factors like the complexity and uncertainty of the organisational 
environment statistically significantly correlate with government sizes when, in fact, they do not (known 
as Type I error in statistics jargon). Second, if we mis-specified our model, our procedures will show 
relationships which do not really exist in the data. Problems like these – known as omitted variable bias, 
collinearity, and so forth – bedevil all empirical studies. We ran all the “usual” tests – often testing other 
models to check for the robustness of our results. We do not report all these procedures in order to keep 
this paper readable.  
-0.60
-0.40
-0.20
0.00
0.20
0.40
Co
mp
lex
 
Ch
an
ge
 in
 C
om
ple
x
Un
ce
rta
in
Ch
an
ge
 in
 U
nc
ert
ain
Go
vt 
Si
ze
Ch
an
ge
 in
 G
ov
t S
ize
Co
un
try
Ye
ar
Inc
om
e G
rou
p
Ge
og
ra
ph
y G
ro
up
Ur
ba
n p
op
 %
De
bt 
to 
GD
P
Un
em
plo
y t
o t
ota
l
Go
vt 
Ef
fic
Biz
 Fr
ee
do
m
be
ta
 c
oe
ff
ic
ie
nt
s
Figure 28b: Nothing Explains the Rate of Change of Government Size
The bands show n in the graph represent the range of standardised beta coeff icients over a range of models -- all of w hich pass through 
zero (meaning that they are not statistically signif icant).  
Dependent variable : Annual change in governmemnt size (annual difference in log government expenditure as a percent of GDP)   
Regression factors having little impact: All.
 
 
Hypothesis 2: Different governments will have different preferences for responding to 
the uncertainty and complexity of the macroeconomic environment 
 
Different governments should (in theory) respond differently to the uncertainty and 
complexity which characterises their economic environment. In our model, government 
sizes adapt to an uncertain economic environment differently; depending on their risk 
aversion and the level of overall changes occurring in the wider micro-economy (the γ1 
and β1 in the model).39 Governments also grow or shrink depending on the complexity 
of economic transactions – reflecting government’s isomorphism with the 
macroeconomic environment and its role in facilitating that growing complexity (the γ2 
and β2 in our model).  
 
Our statistical analysis points to seven kinds of governments. Figures 29a and 29b show 
the results of regression analyses performed on clusters of countries -- which show the 
ways different groups of countries’ governments respond to changes in their 
organisational environment. The statistical procedures we used chose these clusters of 
countries based on statistical similarities (which are described in the Figure and shown 
in Appendix III). Only about 20% of the governments we analysed seem to follow a 
strong-form of our model – adapting to changes in the uncertainty and complexity of 
their organisational environment (from group 3). Of these high-adapters, all comprise 
high-income countries. Almost double that proportion – almost 40% of the countries 
analysed – have governments whose size seems to respond almost exclusively to 
changes in spendable resources (from groups 1,2,4 and 5) . These governments seem to 
fit mostly closely the resource-based view of organisational strategy.  Another 20% of 
the governments in our sample adapted their size in response to the uncertainty of their 
organisational environment (as proxied by changing sectoral weights in overall GDP). 
For these countries, only one of the two environmental variables we analyse seemed to 
explain changes in government size (group 6). For another set of countries (again about 
20% of the sample), these countries’ governments grew with the increasing complexity 
of their economies (group 7).  
                                                 
39 In Appendix I, we derive the formal model and show more specifically under which circumstances 
governments with different preferences are likely to respond to changes in their organisational 
environments.  
Figure 29: Statistically Suggested Groupings of Governments According to their 
Preferences for Responding to Changes in their Organisational Environment 
 
Group 1: Advanced Resource-Based Growers 
These governments grow primarily in response to changes in the resources they have (or can borrow).  
However, they “match” the complexity of their organisational environment.  
Members: Belgium, Cyprus, Greece, Italy and Jamaica              
 b-value se R2=0.75 
Revenue to GDP 0.87 0.11  
Debt to GDP 0.10 0.17   
Geometric Effect for the Complexity Proxy **   
Group 2: Tax and Grow Economies 
The governments’ size seem bounded strictly by the amount of resources they are able to raise. The 
heterogeneity of these countries makes further generalisation about these countries impossible – and their 
different variance profile excludes them from Groups 4 and/or 5. .  
Members: Bhutan, Brazil, Canada, El Salvador, India, Moldova, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, 
Philippines, Senegal, Spain, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, Uruguay  
 b-value se R2=0.87 
Revenue to GDP 0.81 0.04  
Group 3: The Environmental Adaptors 
These economies best exemplify the model presented in this paper. The levels, size and rates of change in 
all measurable parts of the government’s organisational environment (complexity and uncertainty) reflect 
in changes in the size of government.  
Members: Austria, Denmark , Finland , France , Hungary, Netherlands , New Zealand, Norway , Poland , 
Portugal , Spain , Sweden  
 b-value se  R2=0.62 
Complexity Proxy 1.79 0.43  
Uncertainty Proxy 0.09 0.04  
Debt to GDP 0.23 0.02  
Geometric Effect for the Complexity Proxy **   
Interaction between the Uncertainty Proxy and Revenue to GDP **   
Interaction between the Uncertainty Proxy and Debt to GDP **   
Interaction between Revenue to GDP and Debt to GDP **   
Group 4: Low-Income Tax and Grow Governments 
Governments in these low-income economies -- like their counterparts in the rich countries (see Group 5) -
- respond only to changes in their revenues.  
Members: Cote d'Ivoire, Kyrgyz Republic, Madagascar, Mongolia, Sri Lanka  
 b-value se R2=0.67 
Revenue to GDP 1.05 0.20  
Group 5: High-Income Tax and Grow Governments 
These governments’ size mainly appears tied to revenues – expanding slightly less than their colleagues in 
the low-income countries.  
Members: Germany, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States  
 b-value se R2=0.96 
Revenue to GDP 0.88 0.08  
 
Note: The groupings of countries shown in the figure reflect k-clustering – a statistically procedure which 
groups data according to the similarity of the data’s variance. The procedure looks at variation in the entire 
dataset and constructs groups which minimise the variation in the data. We use these clusters of countries 
in order to test our model for each group of countries in order to estimate the way that changes in 
government size differs between groups of countries. The b-values show the change in government size 
(expenditure as a percent of GDP) for changes in the variables shown in the figure. Differences in these b-
values indicate differences in the way that government size responds to the variable. For example, 
governments in group 1 expand 6% more for a similar increase in revenue-to-GDP in Group 2. Asterisks 
indicate the presence of a geometric effect. R2 represents the proportion of variance in the size of 
government “explained” by the model. We report b-values rather than beta coefficients in order to show 
the exact relationship (rather than only magnitudes of importance) between variables.  
 
 
Figure 29: Statistically Suggested Groupings of Governments  
(continued) 
 
Group 6: Risk-averse social insurance governments 
These governments’ size correlates strongly with changes in the sectoral distribution of national output 
(and the amount of resources these governments have to spend). Such a correlation suggests an 
organisational strategy which seeks to minimise the economically disruptive effects of asymmetric shocks 
and/or the shift in resources between sectors.  
Members: Australia , Belarus , Czech Republic , Estonia , Ireland , Latvia , Lithuania , Russian 
Federation and Slovak Republic  
 b-value se R2=0.55 
Revenue to GDP 0.99 0.15  
Uncertainty Proxy **   
Interaction between Uncertainty Proxy and Revenue to GDP  **   
Interaction between Uncertainty Proxy and Debt to GDP **   
Group 7: Technology-adaptors  
These economies grow bigger as their economies are becoming more complex. 
Members: Bangladesh , Georgia , Guatemala , Indonesia , Kazakhstan , Mauritius , Mexico  
Oman , Peru , Thailand  
 b-value se R2=0.82 
Complexity Proxy -0.80 0.21  
Revenue to GDP 0.82 0.06  
 
Note: The groupings of countries shown in the figure reflect k-clustering – a statistically procedure which 
groups data according to the similarity of the data’s variance. The procedure looks at variation in the entire 
dataset and constructs groups which minimise the variation in the data. We use these clusters of countries 
in order to test our model for each group of countries in order to estimate the way that changes in 
government size differs between groups of countries. The b-values show the change in government size 
(expenditure as a percent of GDP) for changes in the variables shown in the figure. Differences in these b-
values indicate differences in the way that government size responds to the variable. For example, 
governments in group 1 expand 6% more for a similar increase in revenue-to-GDP in Group 2. Asterisks 
indicate the presence of a geometric effect. R2 represents the proportion of variance in the size of 
government “explained” by the model. We report b-values rather than beta coefficients in order to show 
the exact relationship (rather than only magnitudes of importance) between variables.  
 
Hypothesis 3: Different countries will adapt reactively, strategically or 
contemporaneously to changes in the macroeconomic environment.  
 
The data clearly show that changes in government size correspond with past and future 
(or expected) changes in their organisational environment. Changes in government size 
which correlate heavily with the previous year’s changes in the organisational 
environment suggest a reactive public sector organisational strategy. Changes in 
government size which correspond to changes in future (next year’s) changes in the 
organisational environment suggest a strategic or forward looking organisational 
adaptation. In general, and across countries, government size exhibits elements of 
reactive, contemporary and strategic organisational adaptation.  
 
Except when responding to changes in revenues, much organisation adaptation seems 
reactive rather than strategic. Figure 30a presents the beta coefficients of regressions of 
government size on past and future values of organisational complexity, uncertainty and 
a range of structural factors (like the level of unemployment, debt and human 
development). In these regressions, government size increases with changes in past and 
expected macroeconomic uncertainty focused on the service-sector. Government size 
also decreases with past and expected macroeconomic uncertainty focused on the 
industrial sector. Government size also decreases with changes in previous levels of the 
complexity of government’s organisational environment – suggesting that government 
sizes may over-shoot in the short-term their equilibrium size as the complexity of 
government’s organisational environment increases. Such a finding – along with the 
previous results showing that past government size strongly predicts present government 
size -- strongly supports the simulations from model we provide in this paper. 
Governments will adjust their organisational size with an overall target level – 
sometimes overshooting or undershooting in any one period their adjustment to a 
shock in the organisational environment.  
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Figure 30a: Changes in Resources and Long-Term Structural Factors Determine
the Size of Reactive and Strategic Changes in Government Size
The bands show n in the graph represent the range of standardised beta coeff icients over a range of models w hich w ere signif icantly different 
from zero w ith 95% confidence or better (higher). We may have transformed variables for their analysis. The variable capturing the effects of 
uncertainty is negative -- meaning that more resources move from industrial sectors into service sectors w hen as government size increases. 
We do not show  in this f igure the effect of the statistically signif icant control for a country's membership in its income group. Categories marked 
w ith an x  denote beta coeff icients for the model of strategic adaptation. 
Dependent variables : Lagged governmemnt size (government expenditure as a percent of GDP regressed against variables in the previous 
year w hose results are show n in crimson) and leading government size (regressed against variables in the subsquent year and w hose results 
are show n in emerald).
Regression factors having little impact: Geographical group, population, governnment effectivness, changes in the complexity of the 
economic envrionment, changes in the uncertainty of the economic environment, GDP, and revenue. 
beta coeff icients for governments that 
change size before economic changes happen
(strategic organisational strategy --- marked by emerald)
beta coeff icients for governments
that change size after other changes 
(reactive organisational strategy -- marked by crimson)
 
 
Governments following a reactive organisational strategy adjust to a number of 
structural variables. They tend to shrink after their urban populations grows, they grow 
after they accumulate more debt, grow after unemployment becomes a bigger problem, 
they grow after their human development indices improve, and after they restrict 
business freedom (to paraphrase the regression results). They grow after revenue from 
the previous year increases, they shrink as previous year’s government efficiency 
increases, and as deficits grow.  
 
Governments following a strategic organisational strategy tend to adjust to expected 
changes in their organisational environment more than longer-term structural factors. 
They anticipate increased complexity and uncertainty of their economic environment by 
shrinking – following what we have flippantly labelled in our model as the Anglo-Saxon 
style of government. They respond strongest to expected changes in revenue – 
increasing size in the present period on the expectation of increased revenues in the 
future.  
 
Yet, the data do not seem to support the view that particular types of countries – rich 
versus poor – have particularly reactive or strategic government organisational 
strategies. Figure 30b shows the explanatory power of the models we used for 
government size for low-income, medium-income and high-income countries. Looking 
only at the adjusted R-squared values of the models we used (and ignoring the margins 
of error for each estimate), we find several counter-intuitive results. Models of strategic 
adaptation of government size have the highest explanatory power for low-income 
countries. Medium-income countries’ government sizes seem to correlate most with 
contemporary changes in their organisational environment and other structural variables. 
Past values of the variables we analyse seem to explain best high-income countries’ 
changes in government sizes.  
 
Figure 30b: Explanatory Power of Three Models of Government 
Size for Low, Middle and High Income Countries 
 
 
Contempt 
Govt Size 
Lagged 
Govt Size 
Strategic 
Govt Size  
Low-Income Countries 64% 34% 68% 
Medium-Income Countries 89% 88% 87% 
High-Income Countries 82% 84% 80% 
The figure shows the R-squared coefficients for three models of government adaptation to changes in the 
government’s organisational environment. We regressed – for the countries in each income group 
separately -- variables related to the uncertainty and complexity of government’s organisational size as 
well as a range of control variables on the previous year’s, current year’s and following year’s government 
sizes. For example, for medium-income countries, our regression of the current year’s independent 
variables and control variables on the current year’s government size yielded an R-squared of 0.89. We 
have highlighted in gray the model for each income-group with the highest R-squared value.    
 
How can individual high-income countries demonstrate a strategic stance on 
organisational adaption (of their expenditure as a share of GDP), while as a group they 
demonstrate a reactive stance? The first explanation relates to the strong developmental 
aspects of low-income countries’ governance. Low-income countries’ governments have 
grown through the 2000s in order to tackle the problems of unemployment, low human 
development scores and so forth. High income countries, on the other hand – being 
much more complex and often tied together more tightly by trade and investment links – 
will respond to large scale changes in unemployment, demographic change or 
urbanisation after a period of reflection. For low-income countries, the direction of 
organisational change remains relatively clear – grow the government and the economy. 
In the high-income countries, the direction of organisational changes remains much less 
clear—as the demographic problems confronting Sweden will be drastically different 
than those of the USA.   
 
Hypothesis 4: Government structure changes in response to changing uncertainty and 
complexity of the macroeconomic environment 
 
Like the size of government, the structure of government should adapt to changes in the 
government’s organisational environment. The proportion of spending on economic 
functions compared with social protection provides one proxy for larger changes in 
government structure (such as the creation of new departments, the transfer of functions 
from one agency to another and so forth). Figure 31a shows the exact composition of 
such spending – so that the reader might infer the changes in the structure of government 
which our proxy for the economic centralisation of government measures. Our proxy for 
changes in the composition of public expenditure includes spending on the “machinery 
of government” (as general government services – which most closely deals with the 
structure of government as a classical organisational theorist might conceive of the 
term). Our proxy also includes changes in economic affairs – spending on government 
programmes dealing with topics such as agricultural adjustment, forestry, fishing and 
hunting programmes, as well as government programmes dealing with fuel and energy – 
and so forth. We divide expenditure in general public services and economic affairs by 
spending on social protection (which consists of spending expected in this category – on 
issues like pensions, unemployment benefits, regional support for disadvantaged regions 
and groups and so forth).  
 
Figure 31a: Formula for Economic Structure 
 
General Public Services 
executive and legislative organs, 
foreign economic aid, general 
services, basic research, R&D 
for general public services, 
general public services, public 
debt transactions, transfers 
between govt units 
 
Economic Affairs 
general economic, commercial and labour 
affairs + agro, forestry, fishing and 
hunting + fuel and energy + mining, 
manufacturing and construction + 
transport + communication + other 
industries + R&D economic affairs 
Economic   
Structure  = 
Indicator 
Social Protection 
Sickness and disability + old age + survivors + family and children + 
unemployment + housing + social exclusion + R&D social protection 
 
Source: IMF Government Finance Statistics Manual (2001) 
 
Despite the impression given by the authors reviewed in the literature review, 
government organisational structure (as proxied by economic centralisation) adjusts to 
changes in government’s organisational environment. As shown in Figure 31b, 
governments operating in more uncertain and complex organisational environments tend 
– holding other variables constant and before looking at specific groupings of countries 
– to spend more on general government services and economic affairs as a proportion of 
their expenditure on social protection (which we describe as a more centralised 
economic centralisation indicator). Larger government sizes (as measured by 
government expenditure as a percent of GDP) also correlate with lower spending on 
general government services and economic affairs as a share of spending on social 
protection. We conclude then that government’s structure changes in response to 
changes in government’s organisational environment – and smaller governments 
tend to focus their resources on economic affairs related activities instead of social 
protection. 
 
Changes in the composition of government expenditure (and thus possibly the structure 
of government) also correlates with a number of structural variables. Governments spend 
more general government services and economic functions as unemployment increases, 
as their debt increases and as population increases. These trends suggest that – for 
governments in general and holding other variables constant -- government policy seeks 
to grow out structural problems instead of alleviate them with palliative social protection 
programmes. The positive relation between increases in business freedom and 
expenditure on general government services and economic functions also corroborates 
this interpretation of these data. Such a trend is lamentable from a human development 
point of view. Lower government spending on social protection (relative to general 
government services and economic affairs) correlates with a country’s lower human 
development indices.  
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Figure 31b: The Structure of Government Changes as the External Policymaking 
Environment Changes 
(though we don’t know know exactly)
The bands show n in the graph represent the range of standardised beta coeff icients over a range of models w hich w ere signif icantly 
different from zero w ith 95% confidence or better (higher). We may have transformed variables for their analysis. The variable capturing the 
effects of uncertainty and economic shocks is positive -- meaning that government spends more on general government services and 
economic functions relative to social protection as resources move into the industrial sectors from the service sectors.  
Dependent variables : Proportion of government expenditure on generral government services and economic functions relative to 
expenditure on social protection (w hich proxies the organisational changes accompanying such a reallocation of expenditure). 
Regression factors having little impact: Changes in complexity, changes in government size, revenue, changes in revenue year, 
deficits, percent of urban population as a share of total population, and government effectivenss. 
 
 
The proportion of expenditure by central government – compared with the general 
government – also provides a measure of government structure. As discussed in the 
literature review, theory provides no clear-cut prediction about the effect that an 
increasingly uncertain and complex organisational environment would have on the 
allocation of expenditure between central government and the wider general 
government. On the one hand, governments should centralise as the organisational 
environment becomes more chaotic (as risk-averse governments seek to buffer 
themselves and the wider macroeconomy from disruptive output volatility) through co-
ordinated and centralised government programmes. On the other hand, large and 
particularly diverse changes in government’s organisational environment should lead to 
decentralisation – as government diverts resources to the areas where they can most 
directly affect changes in government’s organisational environment.  
 
Government centralisation responds more to structural variables and particularly fickle 
organisational environments. Figure 31c shows the effect of a number of variables on the 
level of central government spending relative to spending by the general government. 
Most significantly (from a practical point of view), such government centralisation does 
not statistically significantly correlate with changes in the uncertainty and complexity of 
government’s organisational environment. However, government centralisation 
negatively correlates with the rates of change in the uncertainty and complexity of 
government’s organisational environment. Governments decentralise as macroeconomic 
uncertainty and complexity speed up. The structure of government (through 
decentralisation) responds more vigorously to fundamental structural factors and 
the speed of change of change in its organisational environment more than to 
change itself.  
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Figure 31c: Centralisation Depends More on Structural Factors 
Than Government's Organisational Environment
The bands show n in the graph represent the range of standardised beta coeff icients over a range of models w hich w ere signif icantly different 
from zero w ith 95% confidence or better (higher). We may have transformed variables for their analysis. 
Dependent variables : The proportion of government expenditure at the central level compared w ith expenditure for the general government 
(reflecting local government and other entities).  
Regression factors having little impact: Complexity of the economy, changes in the complexity of the economic envrionment, the level of 
shocks (uncertainty) in the economic environment, changes in GDP, changes in revenue, debt, and unemployment.
 
 
Our initial data provide contradictory views on the so-called Leviathan Hypothesis. As 
noted in the literature review, many authors have tested the extent to which regional and 
local government expenditure correlates with decreases in government sizes. Our data 
show that – controlling for the effects of government’s organisational environment and 
other factors – larger governments (as a share of GDP) tend to have more decentralised 
structures (or at least expenditure). However, periods of rapid growth in government size 
tend to focus on central government growth rather than non-central government growth. 
Moreover, increases in government revenue (as a share of GDP) tend to pass to central 
government more than non-central government. Our analysis thus finds very qualified 
support for the Leviathan Hypothesis – larger governments tend to have more non-
central government expenditure (though rapidly growing government sizes do 
correlate with growth in revenue and expenditure of central government rather 
than non-central government).  
 
The extent of government centralisation also responds to more immutable structural 
variables. Government centralisation tends to correlate with higher human development 
indices, increased government efficiency, as well as higher levels of GDP and business 
freedom. These trends are impossible to interpret though -- as we can not tell if more 
central government results in overall higher government efficiency scores (for example) 
or whether a more efficient government prefers to govern centrally. This example – 
illustrating something called an endogeneity problem – makes the interpretation of these 
data difficult.  
 
Hypothesis 5: Differences in the uncertainty and complexity of various countries’ 
macroeconomic environments significantly explain changes in government structures.  
 
Changes in the structure of government – in response to changes in government’s 
policymaking environment – tend to fall into four categories. Figure 32 shows the results 
of cluster analysis which categorizes countries according to the variance in the 
composition of their governments’ expenditure between general government services 
and economic affairs as opposed to social welfare spending.  
 
 
Figure 32: Different Groupings of Countries According to the Way They Change 
Allocation of Expenditure (and Thus Most Likely Their Structures of Government) 
When Their Organisational Environment Changes 
 
Group 1: Marginalist Response Governments   
The two governments in this group spend a tiny bit more on general government services and economic 
affairs as opposed to social protection (consequently causing minor changes in government structure) in 
response to the increased uncertainty and complexity of their organisational environment.  
Members:  Greece and Italy 
 b std.err R2=0.90 
Complexity Proxy 0.1 0.0  
Uncertainty Proxy  0.0 0.0  
Government Expenditure to GDP 0.1 0.0  
Group 2: Structure Follows Size  
Governments in this group spend a tiny bit more on general government services and economic affairs 
according to the overall size of the government. Such size could likely be tied to the overall complexity of 
the organisational environment and the government’s ability to borrow.  
Members: El Salvador, Finland, Ireland, Moldova, Mongolia, Nepal, Netherlands, Norway, Poland  
Spain , Tunisia, Ukraine  
 b std. err R2=0.60 
Complexity Proxy -0.1 0.0  
Government Size 0.0 0.0  
Geometric Effect of Debt to GDP **   
Group 3: Complex Adaptors 
These governments’ expenditure – and thus possibly organisational structure – best exemplify the model 
presented in this paper.  These governments’ expenditure responds to the complexity and uncertainty of 
the economic environment.  
Members: Denmark, Germany , Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland  
 b std. err R2=0.88 
Complexity Proxy -0.2 0.0  
Uncertainty Proxy 0.0 0.0  
Geometric Effect of Debt to GDP **   
Interaction between Complexity and Uncertainty  **   
Interaction between Complexity and Debt-to-GDP **   
Group 4: Developmentalist Governments  
These governments allocate more resources to general government services and economic affairs as their 
economic environment complexifies.   
Members: Czech Republic, Estonia, Indonesia, Ireland, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Moldova, Norway, Spain 
and Thailand. 
 b std. err R2=0.35 
Complexity Proxy 0.8 0.3  
Geometric Effect of Complexity  **   
 
Note: the figure shows the grouping of countries (for which the IMF provide data) according to the 
similarity of their composition of expenditure (as a proxy for changes in the structure of government), the 
complexity and uncertainty of their organisational environment and the amount of debt these governments 
take on (relative to their GDPs). We first used cluster analysis to divide the sample of countries into 
groups, according to the similarity of the variance in the variables we have just described. Using these 
groupings, we regressed the composition of expenditure (as our proxy to detect changes in government 
structure) on our proxies for the uncertainty and complexity of these governments’ organisational 
environment – as well as range of other control variables. The b-values thus report the change in the 
structure of expenditure for a change in the variable listed in the figure. The R2 describes the proportion of 
the variance in this dependent variable explained by our group-specific regression. Asterisks indicate the 
presence of a geometric effect (which normal linear regression methods can not provide a slope for).  
 
 
 
 
The first group of countries – consisting of Italy and Greece – have governments which 
statistically significantly change the composition of government expenditure in response 
to changes in the uncertainty and complexity of the external policymaking environment. 
These two countries increase their expenditure on general government services and 
economic affairs (as a proportion of their spending on social welfare) by about 10% for a 
one-unit change in our complexity proxy and about 1% for a 10% increase in 
government size. They edge, ever so slightly upward, such expenditure for a change in 
our uncertainty proxy. However, as shown by the extremely low (but still statistically 
significant) b-values, their response is extremely slight.  
 
For governments in a second group of countries, the size of the government and the 
complexity of the organisational environment correlate with their composition of 
expenditure. These governments -- a mix of low and high-income countries – spend 
about 10% less on general government services economic functions (as a proportion of 
spending on social welfare) as the complexity of the economy increases (the 
stereotypical Anglo-Saxon style government we referred to when we described our 
model). Changes in these governments’ composition of expenditure positively correlate 
ever so slightly with government size. However, governments in this group which 
rapidly incur debt tend to spend more on general government services and economic 
affairs than governments not rapidly increasing their debt burdens.  
 
A third group of countries – most exemplifying the model we present in our paper – 
adapt the composition of government expenditure (and thus probably their structure of 
government) in response to changes in the organisational environment. As with the 
previous group, these governments tend to withdraw from spending on general 
government services and economic affairs as the nature of economic transactions in the 
macroeconomy complexifies. These governments also spend very slightly more on 
general government services and economic affairs (as a proportion of their spending on 
social welfare) as uncertainty in their economic environment increases – possible to 
“follow” the movement of resources between economic sectors. The composition of 
expenditure – and thus likely the structure of government – also changes, depending on 
the interaction of the complexity and uncertainty in the policymaking environment.  
 
Governments in the final group change their composition of public expenditure (and thus 
likely their structure of government) mainly in response to changes in the complexity of 
their organisational environment. As shown by the b-value, a 1 point change in the 
complexity indicator (a proxy consisting of the log values of the value of high-tech, IT, 
industrial and service output as well as science-related publications and patents) 
correlates with a 0.8 point change in the amount of money these governments spend on 
general government services and economic affairs as to social protection. Moreover, 
governments in this group regulating very complex macroeconomic environments tend 
to change their expenditure on these general government services and economic affairs 
differently than those governments regulating relatively simple (un-complex) economic 
environments – as shown by the geometric effect on our complexity proxy.  
 
 
 
 
Hypothesis 6: Different governments’ structures can respond strategically, 
contemporaneously or reactively to changes in their macroeconomic environments 
 
In theory, the structure of government expenditure should respond to changes in the 
external policymaking environment more quickly or slowing – depending on the 
preferences of the policymakers responding to these changes. Such changes in the 
structure of government may consist of altering their composition of expenditure 
between general government services and economic affairs (as opposed to social 
protection) or between the central government (as opposed to other government entities). 
Strategic adaption consist of changes in government structure which occur before 
changes in the policymaking environment – because policymakers anticipate these 
changes or observe the beginning steps of these changes and make large changes in 
government structure. Reactive adaption consists of changes in government structure 
occurring one year after the change in the policymaking environment – as policymakers 
are unwilling to unable to make changes sooner.  
 
The data provide strong evidence that government organisational structure adapts 
reactively to changes in their organisational environment. Figure 33a shows the ranges 
of regression estimates for variables explaining past decisions to change government’s 
allocation of spending (and thus indirectly its structure). Changes in the complexity and 
uncertainty of the policy environment correlate strongly with changes in the following 
year’s allocation of expenditure on general government services and economic affairs 
(as opposed to social protection). Other structural variables – particularly the country’s 
human development index values, population size and level of business freedom also 
positively correlate with the previous year’s composition of government spending. We 
interpret these correlations as suggestive of a reactive adaptation of government 
organisational structure to its organisational environment (and a couple of other 
variables). 
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Figure 33a: Changes in the Policymaking Environment Lead to the Changes in Expenditure 
Priorities Which May Induce Changes in Governnment Structure 
The bands show n in the graph represent the range of standardised beta coefficients over a range of models w hich w ere signif icantly dif ferent 
from zero w ith 95% confidence or better (higher). We may have transformed variables for their analysis. The variable capturing the effects of 
uncertainty is positive -- meaning that government spending on general government services and economic affairs increases as more resources 
move into the industrial sector from the service sectors. 
Dependent variables: Lagged proportion of expenditure on general government services and economic affairs relative to social protection (the 
economic structure indicator regressed against variables in the previous year) and the leading measure (regressed against variables in the 
subsquent year).
Regression factors having little impact: Changes in complexity, government size, changes in government size, government revenue, 
changes in government revenue, year, government debt, deficits, changes in absolute levels of government expenditure, government eff iciency 
and the percent of the urban population. 
beta coefficients for governments that change structure before economic changes 
happen (strategic organisational strategy --- marked by emerald)
beta coefficients for governments that change structure after other changes 
(reactive organisational strategy -- marked by crimson)
 
 
 
 
The data also point to a limited amount of strategic adaption of government expenditure 
to changes in government’s policymaking environment. Figure 33a also shows – in 
emerald bars – the range of regression coefficient values for variables regressed against 
the following year’s composition of government spending. Government revenue (as a 
percent of GDP) and government debt both positively, statistically significantly correlate 
with a model of strategic adaptation of government structure (or at least the composition 
of expenditure). Such a correlation suggests that policymakers predict next year’s level 
of revenues in deciding the current year’s allocation of expenditure. Our regression 
analysis also strongly suggests that a number of structural variables determine strategic 
adaption of government structure. The next period’s business freedom index values and 
government efficiency index represent two variables with the highest beta coefficients – 
suggesting these variables explain a relatively large amount  of prescient (strategic) 
change in government organisational structure. In brief, the data suggest that the 
structure of government (as measured by the allocation of government 
expenditure) adapts reactively to the uncertainty and complexity of its 
organisational environment and strategically to expected revenue and structural 
variables.  
 
Governments adopt many strategic responses in the centralisation of government 
structures in response to changes in their organisational environments. Figure 33b shows 
the results of regressions using the amount of expenditure at the central government 
level (as a proportion of general government expenditure) as a proxy for the structure of 
government. The predominance of emerald-coloured bars indicates that most of the 
variables we tested statistically significantly correlate with the previous year’s change in 
central government expenditure. Increases in central government expenditure correlate 
with increased uncertainty in government’s economic environment (as measured by the 
inter-sectoral reallocation of output) in the following year. Centralisation also correlates 
with increases in service-sector output (as opposed to industrial output) and with 
declines in government expenditure.  
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Figure 33b: Policymakers Generally Adopt Long-Term Decisions
about the Centralisation of the Structure of Government 
The bands show n in the graph represent the range of standardised beta coeff icients over a range of models w hich w ere signif icantly different from zero w ith 
95% confidence or better (higher). We may have transformed variables for their analysis. The variable capturing the effects of uncertainty and economic 
shocks is negative -- meaning that more resources move from industrial sectors into service sectors w hen as government size increases. 
Dependent variables: Lagged percent of central government expenditure relative to general government expenditure (the centralisation indicator regressed 
against variables in the previous year) and the leading measure (regressed against variables in the subsquent year).
Regression factors having little impact: Complexity, changes in complexity, changes in government size, GDP, government revenue, changes in 
government revenue, country-specif ic effects, unemployment, government size (expenditure as a percent of GDP), and debt.  
beta coeff icients for governments that 
change structure before economic changes happen
(strategic organisational strategy --- marked by emerald)
beta coeff icients for governments
that change structure after 
other changes (reactive
 organisational strategy -- 
marked by crimson)
 
 
Measures of the structure of government focusing on centralisation (expenditure by the 
central government rather than other parts of government) weakly support the Leviathan 
Hypothesis. Increases in central government expenditure precede changes in revenue 
(suggesting that policymakers choose central government spending in part based on 
expectations about future revenues). Increased central government expenditure (relative 
to expenditure by other levels and parts of government) positively correlates with 
governments growing their government sizes quickly in the subsequent year. However, 
central government expenditure negatively correlates with large government sizes in the 
subsequent period.  
 
Strategic changes in government structure (as measured by central government 
expenditure) correlate strongly with a number of slow-changing, structure variables. 
Central government expenditure (as a proportion of general government spending) rises 
in anticipation of higher levels of next year’s government efficiency, human 
development indices, and business freedom. Such spending falls in anticipation of rising 
deficits and urban populations   
 
Governments also adopt many reactive responses in the centralisation of government 
structures in response to changes in their organisational environments. Reactive changes 
in government structure (as proxied by the following year’s changes in central-to-
general government expenditure) correlate strongly with several (mostly structural) 
variables. Central government expenditure (relative to general government expenditure) 
increases with increases in the previous year’s government efficiency, human 
development index, and business freedom. Increases in urbanisation seem to correlate 
with decentralisation (or at least decreases in central government spending relative to 
general government spending). In brief, the statistical significance of past, present, 
and future values of model variables, combined with the importance of several 
structure variables, points to long-run decisions about the structure of government 
(as measured by central government expenditure relative to general government).  
 
Conclusions 
 
The size and structure of government responds to changes in the government’s 
organisational environment – much as predicted by organisational theory (theories). 
Some governments, at some times, adapt their organisational sizes and structures in line 
with the predictions of contingency-theory. Other governments, at some times, engage in 
organisational buffering – refusing to adjust size and structure to the uncertainty and 
complexity inherent in their organisational environments. Other governments tie size 
and structure to the resource available (in line with resource-based explanations of 
organisational strategy). Some governments – and we provide lists of countries for 
whose experience correspond to each of these theories – seem to adjust their 
organisational sizes and structures “rationally” (in anticipation of future changes in their 
organisational environments).  
 
In this paper, we present a model of the size and structure of government which depends 
on the uncertainty and complexity of governments’ organisational environments (and 
other controlling variables). We find statistical support for the classical view that 
government size and structure adapts to changes in the external policymaking 
environment. We categorise governments into seven types (depending on the way they 
adopt government size to increasing uncertainty and complexity of their organisational 
environments). We find strong evidence that some governments change their size 
reactively (after) changes in the policymaking environment while others change them 
strategically (before asymmetric shocks or increased production of high-tech output 
occurs).   
 
We also find statistical support for the classical view that the structure of government – 
or at least two proxies of government structure -- also adapts to changes in the 
government’s organisational environment. We find four groupings governments – 
according to the way they modify their organisational structures in response to changes 
in the uncertainty and complexity of their organisational environment. We also find 
evidence for strategic and reactive structural adaptation in response to these changes in 
the government’s organisational environment. As an addition, rather than a 
contradiction, we find a set of countries which do not significantly modify their size and 
structure in response to changes in their macroeconomic environment. Instead, these 
governments change their size and structure according to the revenues available.  
 
These findings – probably some of the first comprehensive (or extremely tentative) 
attempts at testing the basic theories we all learn in public administration – provide only 
the start of a deeper debate on the relation between the public sector organisational 
environment and government organisation. The question lies not in which theory of 
organisational theory is right – but instead which theory is right for which country, 
during which time period, and to what extent. Further empirical work will help to answer 
these questions.  
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Appendix I: The Model 
 
Basic Set-Up 
 
We start from a group of individuals (citizens) who are (as usual) profit maximising and 
risk averse. They produce output (Y) and either consume part of the resulting output (c), 
invest part (i), trade with foreigners for other goods they desire (nx) or “invest” part of 
their output in government (g). These citizens will want to invest in government in order 
to obtain public goods which improve their other investment and consumption 
possibilities. Governments collect resources for use through taxation – such that 
government consumption g will equal taxes t. These individuals’ investment in g will 
thus equal gY= Y – cY – iY - nxY which implies that g = 1-c-i-nx. We assume that 
investment in government depends on the relative risk and return of investments in other 
areas of the economic -- like future output and trade as well as the risk and return of 
receiving output in the next period. If we denote the rate of return for investment as rI 
(and the other rates of return similarly) and the unpredictability of investment as σI (and 
the unpredictability of the other variables similarly), then we can represent the 
investment in government “size” as    
 
g = t = c – i (rI,rG, rY,σI,σG,σY) – nx (rX,σX, rG,σG, rY,σY)    (1). 
 
Given the logic in equation (1), the size of government must equal the resources 
available for government spending – which is determined by risks and rewards of 
investment in various sectors of the economy.  
 
Looking more specifically at the output side of the economy, we assume a 4-sector 
economy. These sectors consist of an agricultural sector (whose output we denote by 
Ya), low-tech industrial sector (Yi), a low-tech service sector (Ys), and a high-tech sector 
which produces everything the low-tech industry and service sectors do not (Yh). Output 
thus can be divided into:  
 
Y = Ya + Yi + Ys + Yh         (2). 
 
Rates of return in the high-tech sector determine the returns on investment in the overall 
economy. Production in an economy will start from agricultural production, such that 
Y=Ya – until superiour returns for industrial production divert resources away into 
industrial production. At that point, overall returns in the economy will be such that 
ry=ra=ri (where the sub-script on the rate of return corresponds with the sector in which 
workers create output). Output will start to “fill in” in other the other sectors of the 
economy; until the rate of return on high-tech output starts to exceed rates of return in 
other parts of the economy. At that point, returns on high-tech output will need to exceed 
returns in other parts of the economy in order to draw resources into that sector.  
Given the almost axiomatic role played by rates of return in high-tech sector, the 
size of the high tech sector must reflect the complexity of the economy and 
economic relations.    
 
The perceived unpredictability of investment will depend on the extent to which 
resources move between sectors – as proxied by differences in the sectoral composition 
of output. Imagine that – because of changing rates of returns in a sector – the majority 
of output in any one year comes from agriculture. Subsequently, rates of return in the 
industrial sector start to pull resources into industrial production. At this point, citizens 
may wish to invest in government-produced social goods -- like electric cables, roads 
and city infrastructure – because these investments will raise the overall rate of return on 
industrial production. Or these citizens may wish to “invest” part of their output in 
government as a hedge against an agricultural disaster or industrial accident – and both 
events would reflect the proportion of agricultural to industrial output. Government also 
serves as useful savings vehicle – providing more security than leaving resources with 
neighbours as “deposits” (in our simple model, we do not need banks). Large shifts in 
output from one sector to another make investors less sure about where to invest their 
resources – and where government should invest in social goods and social protection. 
Given the almost axiomatic role played by the relative distribution of output 
between sectors, changes in the allocation of output between sectors must reflect 
uncertainty of the economy and economic relations.    
 
Size of government 
 
Given the exposition above, the size of government should be a function of tastes and 
technology, economic uncertainty, complexity and resources available to the 
government. The proportion of output “invested” in government equals g, such that the 
size of government equals gY. Equation (1) indicates that the proportion of output 
invested in government, as well as the overall size of the economy Y are functions of 
risks and returns in various sectors of the economy. Substituting equation (2) into 
equation (1) yields  
 
g = t = c – i (rYa, rYi, rYs, rYh, σaYa, σiYi , σsYs, σhYh)     (3a). 
– nx (rX,σX, rG,σG, rY,σY) 
 
We can express each of these functions as linear functions, in order to make the maths 
easier. We can also assume (as we described above) that the rate of return on investment 
in all sectors equates to the highest rate of return.in any particular sector. Including these 
two assumptions gives us the following equation (and we explain each of these 
coefficients below) 
 
g = t = c – αarYa - αirYi - αsrYs - αhrYh - γaσaYa - γi σiYi - γs σsYs    (3b) 
- γh σhYh - βxrx + γxσX - αGr - γg σG + αYr - γY σY 
 
and rearranging terms a bit yields the following equation  
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The first set of parameters describes a desired level of government determined by tastes 
and technology. In this case, these tastes consist of consumption c, some natural desired 
pass-through effect of dividends of work into public goods αG and aversion (γG) to the 
riskiness of government production σG (which depends on the way citizens organise 
their government). Such an intrinsically desired size of government also depends on 
overall economic risk σY and the desire to contribute to government (αx) in order to 
improve returns from the tradeable sector (to make up for future trade deficits, etc.). If 
we simplify these effects into a single parameter (which we would estimate using 
regression analysis), we could represent these effects as g*, such that  
 
][)([* GGYYxYGrcg σγσγααα −−−+−=       (4a). 
 
The next set of variables describe the amount of money citizens desire to give as taxes in 
order to improve output (through improving  overall rates of return) in various sectors of 
the economy. Tax revenue t – representing the resources available to the government -
- equals some proportion of output citizens want to set aside from the agricultural sector 
αarYa, the industrial sector αirYi, and service sector αsrYs. The uncertainty of the 
macroeconomy – which we label innocuously as σy – depends on uncertainty in each 
sector of the economy {σa, σi, σs, σh} and the aversion citizens have to each type of risk 
{γa, γi, γs, γh}. If βt represents the effect that changes in output have on government size, 
then (rearranging the terms a bit from equation 3b gives the effect of revenue (taxes) as 
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As noted above, government size should also depend on the complexity of the economy 
the government regulates and transacts in. Our simple model tells us that the government 
will want to “match” the expansion of the economy in the high-tech area by a fixed 
amount αh. The effect of macroeconomy complexity on government size, if we re-label 
complexity as z and the effect αrh as βzz, equals 
 
hhz rYz αβ =           (4c). 
 
The effect of macroeconomic uncertainty on government size represents the most 
complex effect. If we denote βy (beta with a little y sub-script rather than a big Y 
because big Y denotes national output) and use the terms describing the effects of such 
uncertainty from equation 3b, then the effect of macroeconomic uncertainty (as proxied 
by changes in the inter-sectoral composition of output) equals 
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to equation (4d) 
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As such, equation 3b can be expressed – for the purposes of regression analysis – as  
 
G  = g* + βyy + βzz + βtt        (5a)  
 
which, if expanded to show all the parameters included in {βy, βz, βt} equals  
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Equation 5b leads to hypotheses about our first hypothesis that the size of government 
depends on uncertainty and complexity of the government’s organisational environment. 
In order to find the effect of uncertainty and complexity on government size, we 
differentiate equation (5b) by a small change in output in one sector. The expected 
change in the size of government for changes in the complexity of the organisational 
environment is simply the elasticity of change with respect to output change in the high-
tech sector or r
Y
g
h
h
α=∂
∂ . The effect of changes in uncertainty on government size depends 
on which sector is affected. We will look at the effect of a change in industrial output 
just to show the intuition of our analysis. Differentiating equation 5b by a change in 
industrial output yields 
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The effect of different natural preferences for changing government size in response to 
changes in macroeconomic complexity and uncertainty – as suggested by our second 
hypothesis – simply equals partly the intercept of our regression equation 
][)([* GGYYxYGrcg σγσγααα −−−+−= . In addition, to the extent that different 
countries’ citizens prefer to contribute differing amounts of resources in response to 
changes in sectoral output, then the other part of this effect equals 
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where {αij,γij≠ αi(j+1),γi(j+1) for country j). 
 
The reactive, contemporaneous and/or strategic response of government size to changes 
in the macroeconomic environment – as suggested by our third hypothesis – depend 
only policymakers’ preferences. We need to expectation operators and lagged operators 
to equation 3b in order to find these effects. We denote these operators with a super-
script e, which denotes an expected value and a sub-script t-1 denotes the previous 
year’s value. We reflect policymakers’ preferences for responding in the present period 
to expected changes in the macroeconomic environment by γe (for changes in the 
expected uncertainty of the macroeconomic environment) and λe (for changes in the 
expected complexity of the macroeconomic environment). The parameters reflecting 
policymakers’ preferences for responding in the subsequent period to the present 
period’s changes in the macroeconomic environment equal γt-1 (for the effect of the 
present period’s uncertainty on later government size) and λt-1 (for the effects of current 
environmental complexity on later changes in government size). Substituting these 
parameters into equation 3b gives 
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and completely differentiating yields for shocks in the industrial sector  
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Structure of government 
 
Government structure responds to uncertainty in the macroeconomic environment by 
increasing spending in the sector experiencing a macroeconomic shock. We know – 
from our differentiation of equation 3b -- that government size responds to shocks 
by
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g σγα +∂
∂+=∂
∂ . Government size changes in three ways in response to a sectoral 
shock. Government expenditure will respond to the extent that such expenditure: a) 
increases the productivity of industrial investment, b) it affects other sectors of the 
economy and, c) hedges against unwanted risks (unemployment, significant decreases in 
income, and so forth). We assume that this overall increase in the size of government 
can be divided into two parts. Part of the increase in government size will occur to 
respond – using spending on what we label empirically as “economic affairs” – to risks 
in the industrial sector γi. Part of the increase will deal with the effects in other parts of 
the economy by expenditure on what we have empirically referred to as expenditure on 
“social welfare” (though for modelling purposes, we assume that such expenditure is 
anything except spending on economic affairs and we use the sub-script o to denote 
spending on other sectors). If θ represents the overall proportion of expenditure on 
economic affairs and (1-θ) represents spending on other sectors, then 
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because any growth in the economy must reflect the rate of return on investment 
r, the structure of government (the proportion of expenditure on economic affairs 
relative to expenditure on social protection) equals (when there are no technologically-
improving shocks and affect the complexity as well as uncertainty of the macroeconomic 
environment)  
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However, we need to find the change in government structure for changes in 
macroeconomic complexity. In our simple economy, all uncertainty stems from the 
high-tech sector (where all new inventions are made). In order to solve this equation, we 
need to make some simplifying assumptions. We assume that Y=Ya+Yi+Ys and assume 
that all risk aversions are the same (γaσa= γiσi = γsσs) so that if  
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and finally, to find the change in uncertainty (given the way that government 
expenditure in the non-high tech sectors changes), we need to apply the proportion of 
change in the industrial sector to changes overall government. Thus,  
 
][)/(
2
iihh
ii
iho
o
i
y trY
r
Y
gg
g
g σγασγ
αβ −=∂
∂=      (6d). 
 
Sector-specific government spending (as one proxy for the structure of government) will 
respond to changes in the complexity of the organisational environment in a slightly 
different way. Any change in complexity of the government’s organisational 
environment will (by our own assumptions) be equivalent to an asymmetric shock to the 
economy’s high-tech sector. Such a shock will increase the overall size of government 
(by increasing the size and complexity of the economy) and lead to specific-specific 
spending on all sectors which experience gains in productivity coming from the high-
tech sector. The proportional response of government expenditure to changes in 
macroeconomic complexity will equal overall government size as a proportion of the 
size of the high-tech sector (from whence all complexity comes).  
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We can now also drop the assumption that citizens pay “a la carte” – contributing 
resources to government to the extent they find such contributions useful in any 
particular sector. We thus equate all α’s to the tax rate t – giving:  
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and remembering that a change in government size equals hh
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 for any change in economic complexity, leading to  
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The structure of government should change with changes in macroeconomic complexity 
(which we relabel as z) by differentiating equation (6c) such that  
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The change in the structure of government for a change in revenues (and thus taxes) 
equals: 
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We can combine all these effects in order to predict the parameters our regression 
equation would show. If we have our normal equation, tzy
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Another definition of the structure of government may comprise expenditure by central 
government compared with non-central government. In order to make the model 
tractable, we might assume that central government only responds to symmetric shocks – 
shocks which affect Ya, Yi,Ys, Yh equally (they diffuse from the high-tech sector and 
affect the other sectors – like the import of patents or licensing agreements for 
technologies like the personal computer). Government will respond to non-symmetric 
shocks by increasing the amount of non-central to central government expenditure – 
which is equivalent to reducing the central government to total government expenditure 
ratio gc/g. In response to non-symmetric shocks, the government spending will respond 
reciprocally with the case above. Therefore, central government expenditure (as our 
proxy for the structure of government) will respond as 
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We know that these shocks only come from the high-tech sector – but affect all sectors 
equally. So we only need to look at that proportion of government spending which 
responds to the shock as gh, but treat the effect on all sectors of the economy equally. 
Thus, taking equation 6b and treating all sectors of the economy equally gives 
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The equation above suggests that the effect of resources should be such that 
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Functional Form for Regression Analysis 
 
The equations derived above do not yet yield usable regression analyses. In equation 
(3c), we derived a testable equation for the size of government as G  = g* + βyy + βzz + 
βtt. We showed that several of the coefficients (βy and βz in particular), likely have non-
linear effects on government expenditure. If we start our analysis from the regression 
equation rather than micro-fundamentals, we might have an equation such as 
 
Gtzy tzygg εηβββ ρρ +++++= '2'1'*'       (4a) 
 
In this case, g*’ represents the “natural” or desired size of government (just like in the 
derivation part of this section). The parameter βy’ can be interpreted as an amortisation 
effect (the effect of government in reducing uncertainty). The parameter ρ1 represents 
risk aversion (as more uncertainty translates in bigger desired amortisation). The 
parameter βz’ represents a co-ordination effect (bigger government needed to put 
together different parts of a complex economy). The parameter ρ2 represents the 
complexity size effect (more complex economies need geometrically more (or less) 
“putting together”). The parameter βt estimates the effect of resources on government 
size (where t represents government revenues).  
 
In the real world, several variables are likely to affect government expenditure in ways 
not envisioned in our Robinson Crusoe model depicted in the previous section. Real-
world governments will expand expenditure as population and land mass increase (to 
serve a larger citizen base). Real world governments run deficits and resort to debt 
finance – breaking the link between revenue and expenditure in any period. Real world 
governments also operate with differing levels of efficiency (affecting how well they use 
they money they spend) and often have particular policy targets (like a target level of 
social development). We represent these variables by the vector η (which we show as 
just another normal variable for the time being and discuss more fully below). Finally, ε 
represents random factors (terrorist attacks, etc.) which might pull government size away 
from its long-term equilibrium level.  
 
Economic and statistical theory suggest that we need to modify the simple empirical 
model of government size shown by equation 9. We may wish to analyse the rates of 
change of our variables. If we use levels, we have infra-marginal effects which distort 
our analysis – though better regression results using levels rather than rates of change 
will show demonstrate the importance of these infra-marginal effects. Specifically, 
statistically significant levels would indicate a desired government size. If Δi represents a 
difference operator, then taking a total difference of equation (9) above – for i where i is 
time or differences across countries – yields  
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We must also find the log values of variables – in order to obtain elasticities of changes 
in government size as well as to correctly estimate the geometric effects of uncertainty 
and complexity of the organisational environment on government size. Remembering 
that the difference of log variables gives a rate of change, variables like ln ΔG refer to 
the difference in the log values of a variable – like government expenditure. For 
illustrative purposes, we show the log value of the variables in η – though during the 
actual regression, several of the variables may not use log values. The final result comes 
to roughly 
 
GtzygG εηγγβγβ lnlnlnlnlnlnlnlnlnln 32211 ++Δ+Δ+Δ+=Δ   (4b) 
 
The structure of government – or at least the allocation of public expenditure across 
functional categories – can (as shown in the theoretical sector) take roughly the same 
form as equation (10) above. Let x represent a proxy for the structure of government – 
and specifically the ratio of expenditure on a sub-set of government services relative to 
all government spending. Using the same functional form – implied by equation (4) in 
the analytical section – we have   
 
xtzy tzyxx εωζξζ ϕϕ ln* 21 +++++=       (5a) 
 
In this case, x* represents the natural or desired structural dispersion of government 
expenditure (formed by tastes and technology). The factor ζy represents short-term 
isomorphism (or match with the environment) and φ1 represents long-term isomorphism. 
The factor ζz represents short-term imitation of the organisational environment and φ2 
represents long-term match with the environment. As in the last case, we need to look at 
marginal changes, thus:  
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Comparing the Regression Equations with the Model Equations 
 
The regression coefficients given by the regression should represent citizens’ 
preferences in different countries. Figure A shows the correspondence between the b-
values given by regression analysis and model parameters.40 A statistically significant 
intercept should indicate that government expenditure depends on domestic 
                                                 
40 Regression analysis will also give beta values for the variables we test – which in this case indicates 
whether the b-value estimates of model parameters are statistically significantly different than zero.  
consumption, the return on investment, preferences for giving resources to government 
and aversion to risks stemming from overall economic fluctuations and government 
spending. B-values for our proxy for the level of uncertainty in government’s 
organisational environment should reflect mainly aversion to risk in the industrial sector 
(though, if we have mis-specified the model, this b-value would represent aversion in 
any sector of the economy). B-values for our proxy for the complexity of the 
organisational environment should reflect preferences for giving a share of expanding 
resources to government in high-tech (or quickly changing) area of economic activity. 
Unsurprising – as government in our model must spend everything it collects – increases 
in resources correspond to changes in government size. The b-value for our resources 
proxy estimates the preference for citizens in various parts of the economy for 
investment in government.  
 
Figure A: Comparison of Model Parameters and Regression Coefficients 
for SIZE OF GOVERMENT 
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The non-linear or geometric effects on our uncertainty, complexity and resource 
indicators will depend on the size of the economies analysed. The size of uncertainty 
will affect the size of government to the extent that risk aversion changes. Such changes 
in risk aversion (as shown in Figure A) might depend on the size of the standard 
deviation of output in any particular sector and the weight of that sector in the overall 
economy. The size of any non-linear effect on the size of government stemming from 
the amount of economic complexity in the macroeconomic environment (according to 
the model) will depend on may depend on the citizens’ desire to invest part of the gains 
accruing to the fastest growing sector (in our case the high-tech sector) in government 
production. Again as shown in Figure A, such a preference for investing in government 
through taxes should depend on the return to such investments and the overall amount of 
output produced in that sector. The amount of resources available will have non-
linear/geometric effects on government expenditure to the extent that the amount of such 
resources available affect citizens’ desire to contribute part of their overall part toward 
the production of government-made public goods. The preference for contributing part 
of the fruit of their labour to the government will depend on the return to investment in 
each sector, the overall level of output in each sector, and the relative proportion of 
output in any particular sector to total output in the economy.  
 
The regression coefficients for the structure of government should represent basic model 
parameters shown in the second part of Figure A. The intercept g* for a regression on 
economic affairs (as a share of social protection expenditure) should equal contributions 
to government from the high-tech industry relative to all other industries. For regressions 
using central government expenditure (as a proportion of all general government 
expenditure), the intercept should represent the effect of several variables. Such an 
intercept will reflect the desired level of overall government size and aversion to trade-
related risks. The intercept will also reflect the productivity of the high tech sector (as 
the most progressive sector and the sector requiring a decentralised structure).  
 
Figure A (continued): Comparison of Model Parameters and Regression 
Coefficients for STRUCTURE OF GOVERMENT 
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The regression coefficients reflecting the effects of uncertainty in government’s 
organisational environment will reflect risks and returns in the overall macroeconomy. 
For our proxy for the structure of government using expenditure on economic affairs 
relative to social protection spending, the regression b-value will incorporate the effect 
of returns on investments and tax payer’s desires to give part of those returns to 
government in their own sector and in the high tech sector as well as risk aversion in 
their own particular sector. Government centralisation (as measured by spending on 
economic affairs rather than social protection) also expands in line with revenue. If we 
use spending by central government (relative to general government) as the proxy for the 
relative dispersion of the structure of government, then government decentralises as the 
least “progressive” and most widely spread-out sector (agriculture) becomes more risky 
(and as tolerance for these risks increases). On the other hand, government centralises as 
risks in industry and service sectors (which are usually more national and homogeneous 
in nature) increases. Government also decentralises as tax payers desire to spend more of 
their output from the high-tech sector on government production (presumably to respond 
to positive asymmetric changes in that sector).  
 
The regression coefficients reflecting the impact of macroeconomic complexity on the 
structure of government will reflect numerous factors. Decentralisation occurs as returns 
to the high-tech sector rise and as resources (in the form of taxes) decrease in the 
agricultural sector (or rise in the other sectors). Increased complexity in the 
macroeconomic environment also leads to more decentralisation as risk aversion rises in 
the industrial and industrial sectors. Increased aversion to the risks inherent in 
international trade lead to centralisation (as measured by expenditure in economic affairs 
rather than social protection). Our model also predicts than centralisation should occur 
as citizens working in the high-tech industries become more risk-averse.  
 
The effect of increased resources depends heavily on the productivity of the high-tech 
sector. Using both proxies for government centralisation, growth in the high-tech sector 
reduces the effect of resources on government centralisation. Using the proportion of 
expenditure on economic affairs relative to social protection spending (as in the previous 
cases), growth in the agriculture sector leads to increased government centralisation – 
while growth in the other sectors leads to a decrease in government centralisation. 
Growth in the high-tech sector (as a willingness to give more output from that sector to 
government) leads to a relative decentralisation of government (presumably as 
individuals working in that highly volatile and unpredictable sector prefer relatively 
expansive government-provided social protection). Similarly using expenditure by 
central government (relative to general government) as a proxy reflecting the structure of 
government, a higher propensity to pay taxes (or earn income) in the high-tech sector 
should lead to decentralisation.  
 
Other Variables Affecting Our Analysis 
 
Government size depends on a number of other factors – besides the complexity, 
uncertainty, and affluence of government’s organisational environment. Figure B shows 
the most important of these variables – as well the likely effects they might have on 
estimates of government size. In theory at least, omitting these variables should not lead 
to bias in our estimates related to the effect of uncertainty, complexity and affluence in 
the government’s organisational environment on government size. Instead of using 
consumption, investment and net exports as controls – we chose to use only gross 
domestic output. We chose to use the aggregate measure of C+I+G+NX because if we 
used each of these variables as a control, we would have problems with our regression 
analysis.41  
 
We include other controls to ensure that our regression estimates for our independent 
variables are relatively unbiased and precise. The relationship between population, land 
mass, and economic freedom with the inter-sectoral distribution of output or production 
in the high-tech sector should be non-existent. Yet, as shown in Figure B (in the 
Appendix below), these variables correlate very strongly with our independent variables. 
After a bit of reflection, these relatively high correlations seem logical. A proxy for the 
complexity of the organisational environment which relies on the (log) value of 
                                                 
41 The decomposition of GDP into C+I+G+NX relies on an accounting identity. As such, we would expect 
collinearity in any regression using all these variables. Such collinearity would lead to bias and much less 
precise regression estimates.  
production of high-tech goods and services will also correlate with land mass and 
population (as more people living on a larger area will produce more inventions – in 
absolute terms – than few people living in a small area). The Figure provides other 
correlations.  
 
Regressions testing for the effect of various factors on the structure of government also 
require several controls. Figure C shows these controls – as well as the theoretical 
reasons why we included these controls in our regression analysis. These controls and 
the independent variables we seek to measure are also correlated. The dispersion of 
income positively correlates with the percent of central government spending (relative to 
general government expenditure). The dispersion of the population (as measured by 
urbanisation) and the dispersion of negative economic events (as measured by 
unemployment) negatively correlates with government size and central government 
spending. Excluding these variables would likely lead to significant bias in our results.  
 
 
 
Figure B: Controls for Factors Affecting the SIZE OF GOVERNMENT 
 
variable Reason Expected size and magnitude 
C, I and NX 
(log) 
As an accounting identity, the more resources 
other sectors of the economy use, the fewer 
resources available for government (in the short-
run). 
Higher values of C, I and/or NX 
should correlate strongly with 
decreased levels of government 
expenditure.  
Population 
(log) 
More citizens will require larger government 
(particularly if all do not generate equal amounts 
of output as our model assumes)...even if for 
pure administrative purposes (more births to 
record, more drivers to exercise surveillance 
over, etc.) 
Larger populations should correlate 
with larger governments (as a share 
of output). 
Land mass  
(log) 
Transportation costs for providing government 
services included in the cost and price of public 
goods.  
Larger countries should have larger 
governments.  
Economic 
freedom 
The level of economic freedom should correlate 
with government production of goods and 
services. If government “crowds in” private 
investment, large government should correspond 
with high levels of economic freedom. If 
government crowds out such investment, large 
governments should correlate with low levels of 
economic freedom. Government goods and 
services then can serve as complements or 
substitutes for private production.   
Ambiguous…depends on the 
economic role played by 
government. Developmental states 
will have large governments and 
little economic freedom. Laissez-
faire states will have small 
governments and lots of economic 
freedom. Centralised, repressive 
states will have smaller 
governments and little economic 
freedom.  
Efficiency of 
government 
More effective governments can be smaller on 
the one hand. On the other hand, governments 
may use legitimacy from such effectiveness to 
expand.  
Ambiguous…depends on whether 
government has “leviathan” style 
nature in any particular country.  
Deficits (log) Deficit finance distorts (or helps improve) the 
link between changes in government size and 
macroeconomic events. Government may 
respond to future macroeconomic changes now 
with the help of deficit finance. Governments 
may also expand without consideration for 
short-term revenue.  
Ambiguous. Deficits can distort 
relation between government size 
and environment (particularly if 
they need to be repaid) or 
strengthen the link (giving the state 
access to resources otherwise not 
available).  
Debt (log) A large debt may prevent government from 
expanding to its desired size – due to need to 
repay these debts. With empire building 
bureaucrats, debts help explain the size of 
government absent any changes in the 
macroeconomic environment.   
Ambiguous – depends if debts used 
to finance government response to 
a changing organisational 
environment or to unnecessary 
expand.  
Level of 
human 
development 
A targeted level of development would 
encourage increases in government size (for 
developmental states). Very poor countries may 
be unable to draw on sufficient qualified labour 
to expand to optimal size.  
Ambiguous – but a priori expected 
to reduce government sizes.  
Generalised 
unemployment 
Government one of the largest employers in 
many countries. Unemployment creates a pool 
of labour – and a demand for employment by 
government.  
Should correlate with larger 
government sizes.  
 Source: authors. 
 
 
 
Figure C: Controls for Factors Affecting the STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT 
 
variable Reason Expected size and magnitude 
dispersion of 
income (Gini 
coefficient) 
Government organisations should 
locate closer to low income 
individuals to provide support.  
More government dispersion as Gini 
coefficients rise.  
concentration of 
population 
(urbanisation) 
Higher levels of urbanisation 
should allow government to offer 
more goods and services in a more 
concentrated way.  
Higher urbanisation should correlate with 
more centralised government structures.  
Unemployment Unemployment is geographical 
phenomenon – often tied to 
regional economic factors.   
Expect greater government dispersion with 
higher levels of unemployment.  
Market Quality Government comes in places where 
markets function poorly 
Decentralisation to occur when markets 
operate poorly – to act as surrogate for 
market forces.  
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix II: Data Sources and Quality 
 
The following table in Figure D summarises the variables we used in this paper. Except 
where noted, we downloaded data for all available countries between 1999 and 2009. 
We also show, in the final column, the total amount of data available for all countries 
during the time period. For example, for the 10 year period covering 181 countries (and 
another 5 years for one extra country), the World Bank provides only 47% of the total 
number of 1815 “country-years.” Data for our uncertainty proxy were available for 
about 86% of these 1815 country years.      
 
Figure D: List of Variables Used 
 
Variable Description and Source Coverage* 
 
Dependent Variables 
Government 
Expenditure (as 
a percent of 
GDP)  
International Development Sources (2010).  47% 
Economic 
structure of 
government 
index 
The economic structure of government index divided expenditure on 
general government services plus economic affairs divided by 
expenditure on social protection (all as defined in the IMF’s 
Government Financial Statistics database (2010).  
16% 
Centralisation 
structure of 
government 
index 
Expenditure at the central level of government divided by 
expenditure by the public sector in general (both as defined in the 
IMF’s Government Financial Statistics database (2010). 
11% 
Independent Variables 
Uncertainty 
proxy 
The uncertainty proxy subtracts service-sector GDP (expressed as a 
percent of GDP) from industrial GDP (also expressed as a percent of 
overall GDP). The resulting difference is divided by agricultural 
GDP’s share of overall GDP in order to “scale” changes in inter-
sectoral output by the size of the country’s agricultural sector. All 
variables in the proxy come from the World Bank’s International 
Development Sources (2010).  
86% 
Complexity 
proxy 
The complexity proxy takes the weighted average of several 
indicators of the production of outputs which might be considered 
characteristic of a highly complex economy. We found the weighted 
average of the log values of the following variables (all expressed in 
US dollars except for scientific citations and patents): the value of 
high-tech output, production of IT products, the number of patents 
and citations of nationals in scientific publications, the value of 
industrial production and the value of service-sector production. We 
used equal weights for each of these variables, except for the value 
of the service-sector. We gave the value of the service sector half the 
weight of the other variables (and of course all weights equal one). 
All variables taken from World Development Sources (2010).  
61% 
Revenue (as 
share of GDP) 
World Development Sources (2010). 48% 
 
Controls  
GDP (in current 
US dollars) 
World Development Sources (2010). We used the log value of 
GDP.  
96% 
Land size World Development Sources (2010). 100% 
Population World Development Sources (2010). 100% 
Urban pop % World Development Sources (2010). 100% 
Debt to GDP World Development Sources (2010). 27% 
GINI coefficients World Development Sources (2010). 16% 
Unemployment to 
total working 
population 
World Development Sources (2010). 48% 
Deficits World Development Sources (2010). 47% 
Govt Efficiency World Development Sources (2010). 91% 
Human 
Development 
Index values 
UNDP (2010) 70% 
Business Freedom Heritage Foundation (2010).  89% 
* represents the number of observations for all countries out of 1815 total possible observations.  
 
The figures in the first section of the paper often used only a small set of the total 
number of countries. These small sets resulted from missing data in various pairs of 
variables we analysed. In particular, when making calculations requiring data from the 
IMF’s Government Financial Statistics database, we only had roughly 35 countries with 
more than 3 years of data. The World Development Sources database has relatively poor 
coverage of low-income countries’ economic indicators like government expenditure. 
Figure E shows the availability of data by country income group. Our uncertainty proxy 
benefitted from the greatest data availability – with about 85% of all possible country-
years having data. Both government size (expenditure-to-GDP) and revenue-to-GDP) 
had relatively poor data – with low and middle-income countries having data for fewer 
than 50% of all the possible 1815 country-years.   
 
Figure E: Data Availability for Figures and Regression Analysis 
 
 
Complexity 
Proxy 
Uncertainty 
Proxy  
 
Government
Size 
Revenue 
to 
GDP 
Low income 46% 85% 29% 33%
Middle income 63% 91% 42% 42%
High income 69% 75% 73% 73%
 
 
The conclusions which we drew from our regression analyses are statistically more 
reliable than the graphs we constructed for this paper. In order to construct the graphs for 
this paper, we had to omit any observations which did not have comparable data from 
other countries. For example, while constructing Figure 7b (comparing changes in 
government expenditure with changes in the magnitude of asymmetric, sector-specific 
shocks), we had to remove countries for the analysis if we lacked data on either variable, 
a weight for our weighted average of country groupings, for years where rates change 
were not available and so forth. On the other hand, regression analysis treats missing 
cases on a case-wise basis and looks at variation in the data available. The continuation 
of Figure E shows – on a country-by-country basis – the availability of data upon which 
we based on regression analyses. These data show a strong bias against Sub-Saharan 
Africa in our analysis. Namely most countries outside of Sub-Saharan Africa had more 
than 50% of the possible number of 183 observations available (covering about 10 years 
for 18 variables – except for one variable where only 3 years of data were available).  
 
Figure E (continued): Availability of Data by Country 
 
 total obs.  
percent 
to total 
  total obs.  
percent 
to total 
Afghanistan 86 47%  Dominica 75 41% 
Albania 112 61%  Dominican Republic 122 67% 
Algeria 120 66%  Ecuador 101 55% 
Angola 81 44%  Egypt, Arab Rep. 149 81% 
Antigua and Barbuda 66 36%  El Salvador 148 81% 
Argentina 122 67%  Equatorial Guinea 86 47% 
Armenia 140 77%  Eritrea 67 37% 
Australia 152 83%  Estonia 176 96% 
Austria 154 84%  Ethiopia 104 57% 
Azerbaijan 105 57%  Finland 163 89% 
Bahrain 115 63%  France 153 84% 
Bangladesh 140 77%  Gabon 93 51% 
Belarus 165 90%  Gambia, The 96 52% 
Belgium 154 84%  Georgia 176 96% 
Belize 102 56%  Germany 157 86% 
Benin 123 67%  Ghana 135 74% 
Bhutan 133 73%  Greece 162 89% 
Bolivia 133 73%  Grenada 72 39% 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 125 68%  Guatemala 159 87% 
Botswana 100 55%  Guinea 93 51% 
Brazil 129 70%  Guinea-Bissau 85 46% 
Bulgaria 165 90%  Guyana 95 52% 
Burkina Faso 113 62%  Honduras 132 72% 
Burundi 89 49%  Hong Kong SAR, China 85 46% 
Cambodia 119 65%  Hungary 167 91% 
Cameroon 93 51%  India 157 86% 
Canada 147 80%  Indonesia 135 74% 
Cape Verde 109 60%  Iran, Islamic Rep. 165 90% 
Central African Republic 93 51%  Iraq 63 34% 
Chad 87 48%  Ireland 162 89% 
Chile 150 82%  Israel 128 70% 
China 118 64%  Italy 163 89% 
Colombia 114 62%  Jamaica 141 77% 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 94 51%  Japan 93 51% 
Congo, Rep. 112 61%  Jordan 108 59% 
Costa Rica 123 67%  Kazakhstan 183 100% 
Cote d'Ivoire 127 69%  Kenya 143 78% 
Croatia 171 93%  Korea, Rep. 162 89% 
Cyprus 162 89%  Kosovo 42 23% 
Czech Republic 183 100%  Kuwait 137 75% 
Denmark 163 89%  Kyrgyz Republic 132 72% 
Djibouti 84 46%     
       
 
       
Lao PDR 91 50%  Seychelles 124 68% 
Latvia 171 93%  Sierra Leone 117 64% 
Lebanon 128 70%  Singapore 161 88% 
Lesotho 135 74%  Slovak Republic 144 79% 
Liberia 77 42%  Slovenia 176 96% 
Libya 81 44%  Somalia 44 24% 
Lithuania 166 91%  South Africa 149 81% 
Luxembourg 142 78%  Spain 162 89% 
Macedonia 126 69%  Sri Lanka 162 89% 
Madagascar 143 78%  Sudan 89 49% 
Malawi 97 53%  Suriname 95 52% 
Malaysia 133 73%  Swaziland 99 54% 
Mali 139 76%  Sweden 164 90% 
Mauritania 87 48%  Switzerland 165 90% 
Mauritius 171 93%  Syrian Arab Republic 98 54% 
Mexico 120 66%  Tajikistan 124 68% 
Moldova 183 100%  Tanzania 94 51% 
Mongolia 156 85%  Thailand 153 84% 
Montenegro 71 39%  Timor-Leste 66 36% 
Morocco 141 77%  Togo 113 62% 
Mozambique 96 52%  Trinidad and Tobago 137 75% 
Myanmar 69 38%  Tunisia 177 97% 
Namibia 141 77%  Turkey 126 69% 
Nepal 125 68%  Turkmenistan 84 46% 
Netherlands 165 90%  Uganda 154 84% 
New Zealand 126 69%  Ukraine 180 98% 
Nicaragua 116 63%  United Arab Emirates 99 54% 
Niger 101 55%  United Kingdom 153 84% 
Nigeria 85 46%  United States 141 77% 
Norway 156 85%  Uruguay 167 91% 
Oman 94 51%  Uzbekistan 87 48% 
Pakistan 147 80%  Venezuela, RB 142 78% 
Panama 123 67%  Vietnam 103 56% 
Papua New Guinea 107 58%  Yemen, Rep. 89 49% 
Paraguay 129 70%  Zambia 136 74% 
Peru 171 93%  Zimbabwe 87 48% 
Philippines 147 80%     
Poland 165 90%     
Portugal 153 84%     
Qatar 94 51%     
Romania 152 83%     
Russian Federation 155 85%     
Rwanda 94 51%     
Saudi Arabia 99 54%     
Senegal 115 63%     
Serbia 91 50%     
 
Appendix III: Empirical Analysis 
 
Background material related to study 
 
Our analysis resulted in a number of analyses that – while not very useful for our 
statistical study – provide insight into overall trends in international public sector 
management. Figure F presents one such graph – showing the average salary per 
government worker. According to the available data, Greece and Luxemburg have the 
highest average salaries per government employment – both exceeding $80,000 per year. 
Among this set of relatively generous governments, Sweden has the lowest salary – 
paying out less than $10,000 on average (if these data are correct) to government 
workers.  
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Figure F: Salary Per Government Worker 
(latest year available)
 
The data in the figure show the expenditure in salaries (in US dollars) divided by the total number of employees in the 
general government for the latest year available (after 2005).  
Sources: World Bank's World Development Indicators (2010) for data on governmemnt salaries and International Labour 
Organisation (2010) for data on general government employment.
Among the less generous countries, the Swiss and Estonian governments are the most 
profligate in terms of average pay-outs to their employees. At the low end, Belarus and 
Moldova pay less than $2000 per year on average to their government employees. 
Because these data represent simple averages – total salary expenditure divided by total 
general government expenditure – they mask a large amount of variation in wages 
among civil servants which might help explain the size and structure of government. 
However, because no more detailed data are easily available (and because these data 
look rather suspicious), we report these statistics without using them further.  
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Figure F (continued): Salary Per Government Worker 
(latest year available)
 
 
The volatility of government expenditure in different areas – while not useful for direct 
statistical analysis – sheds light on the structure of government in various countries. 
Figure G compares the volatility of expenditure on economic affairs as a proportion of 
the volatility of government spending on social protection. Governments like Italy, 
Poland and Germany tend to change from year-to-year spending on economic affairs far 
more than spending on social protection – suggesting relatively fluid structures of 
government. Countries like Singapore, Afghanistan and Egypt tend to change the 
allocation of resources on social protection far more than they change their economic 
The data in the figure show the expenditure in salaries (in US dollars) divided by the total number of employees in the general 
government for the latest year available (after 2005).  
Sources: World Bank's World Development Indicators (2010) for data on governmemnt salaries and International Labour 
Organisation (2010) for data on general government employment. 
affairs-related spending. Such volatility suggests that these governments respond much 
less fluidly to changes in the economic environment than their European peers.  
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Figure G: Variability of Spending on Economic Affairs Compared with Spending on 
Social Protection
The data in the f igure show s one minus the standard deviation of government expenditure in economic affairs as a ratio of the standard deviation of 
government spending on social protection. Values greater than zero indicate that the volatility of spending on economic affairs exceeds the volatility of
spending on social protection. Values less than zero indicate that expenditure on social protection changes more significantly over time than spending 
on economic affairs. 
Source: IMF (2010). 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics for Regression Analysis 
 
Several graphs help round out the background information on our dataset we give in the 
main body of the paper. Figure H shows the range of values we obtain for the 
complexity and uncertainty of governments’ organisational environment in various 
regions as well as the range of government sizes (as proxied by government expenditure-
to-GDP). The range of values of our complexity proxy do not vary greatly between 
regions. The OECD stands out as having significantly more uncertain policymaking 
environments than in other parts of the world. Government sizes tend to vary within 
regions – with OECD countries having some of the largest governments in the world (in 
GDP terms) while Sub-Saharan African and some East Asian countries tend to have the 
smallest.  
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Figure H: Different Regions' Governments Face Slightly 
Different Organisational Environments
Complexity Uncertainty Government Size
The graph show s the range of values of complexity, uncertainty and government size (as defined and discussed in the 
paper) of 95% of the countries in the regions show n in the f igure. The scale for the complexity variables consists of the log 
values of a combination of several variables measuring technological attributes of the region's economies. The scale for 
uncertainty consists of the absolute value of the quotient of the value of GDP (in the denominator) and the difference 
betw een industrial and service output (in the nominator). Government size represents government expenditure as a percent 
of GDP. 
 
 
The structure of government – given the limited data we have available – tends to vary 
within and between regions. South Asian countries tend to spend the most on general 
government services and economic affairs as a proportion of expenditure on social 
protection. OECD tend to spend more on social protection than on general government 
services and economic affairs. Middle-East and North African governments tend to 
spend more on central government activities than activities for other levels and branches 
of government. OECD member state governments tend to spend the least on central 
government (as a share of overall general government expenditure).  
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Figure I: The Structure of Government (as Measured by Economic Structure 
and Centralisation) Differs Slightly Across Regions 
Economic Centralisation Organisational Centralisation
The ranges in the f igure show s the values of economic and organisational centralisation for 95% of the countries in each 
region. The values for economic centralisation consist of the proportiion of countries' expenditure on general government 
services and economic affairs to social protection. The values for organisational centralisation consist of the proportion of 
central government expenditure to general government expenditure.   
 
 
Changes in the size of government and the nature of its organisational environment tend 
to be rather different over time for various income-categories of countries. Figures J 
through Figure L show the change in government expenditure, expenditure relative to 
GDP, GDP and (of comparison) the complexity of government’s organisational 
environment (as we have measured it). For changes in expenditure, high-income 
countries tend to see these changes most in the middle of the period whereas medium 
income countries see these changes toward the end of the period. Low income countries 
tend to see large increases in expenditure, relatively consistently throughout the 10 
period. Except in the low-income countries, government sizes tend to shrink slightly in 
the middle of the 2000s and then expand again toward the end of the period. In the low-
income countries, government sizes tend to increase throughout the period. Scores 
proxying the complexity of government’s organisational environment changes most for 
low-income countries and least for high-income country governments through out the 
period. The proxy reflecting the complexity of government’s organisational environment 
in middle-income countries tended to remain relatively stable – with an significant 
temporary increase toward the end of the period. Finally, all countries’ economies 
experienced increasing growth of GDP toward the second-half of the 2000s.  
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Figure J: Changes over Time in Several Variables for HIGH-INCOME COUNTRIES
The data in the f igure show  changes in overall expenditure (in USD), changes in government size (as expenditure as a percent of 
GDP), changes in GDP and changes in the complexity of government's organisational environment (as measured by the log value of 
several indicators of technological, high-tech, scientif ic, industrial and service-sector production). 
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Figure K: Changes over Time in Several Variables for MEDIUM-INCOME COUNTRIES
Changes in Expenditure
Changes in GDP
Changes in Govt Size
Changes in Complexity Scores
The data in the f igure show  changes in overall expenditure (in USD), changes in government size (as expenditure as a percent of  GDP), 
changes in GDP and changes in the complexity of government's organisational environment (as measured by the log value of several indicators 
of technological, high-tech, scientif ic, industrial and service-sector production). 
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Figure L: Changes over Time in Several Variables for LOW-INCOME COUNTRIES
The data in the figure show  changes in overall expenditure (in USD), changes in government size (as expenditure as a percent of GDP), 
changes in GDP and changes in the complexity of government's organisational environment (as measured by the log value of several indicators 
of technological, high-tech, scientif ic, industrial and service-sector production). 
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Many of the control variables reflect a significant amount of variance (even for countries 
within their own income-group). Figure M shows the number of observations, the means 
and standard deviations for the controls we used in our regression analysis. We do not 
comment on the means – as we do not wish to conduct very extensive analysis or 
interpretation on these variables. Instead, we note the relatively large standard deviations 
which have almost certainly reduced the precision of our regression coefficients for our 
independent variables of interest.42  
 
Figure M: Descriptive Statistics for Control Variables 
 
 Urban pop %  Deficits Means 
  N Mean s.d   N Mean s.d 
Low income 395 29.5 12.3  116 -1.8 5.7 
Middle income 933 55.4 18.6  392 -1.3 4.0 
High income 473 73.8 17.2  346 0.3 4.8 
All Grps 1801 54.5 22.9  854 -0.7 4.6 
        
 Debt to GDP  Govt Effic Means 
 N Mean s.d  N Mean s.d 
Low income 33 73.5 47.8  360 -0.9 0.5 
Middle income 190 50.1 28.9  853 -0.3 0.6 
High income 267 53.1 30.6  430 1.1 0.9 
All Grps 490 53.3 31.8  1643 -0.1 1.0 
        
 GINI Coefficient  Human Dev. Indicators 
 N Mean s.d  N Mean s.d 
Low income 45 39.9 6.2  335 0.4 0.1 
Middle income 195 43.4 9.9  758 0.6 0.1 
High income 42 32.6 4.1  189 0.8 0.1 
All Grps 282 41.2 9.6  1282 0.6 0.2 
        
        
 Unemployment  Business Freedom 
 N Mean s.d  N Mean s.d 
Low income 38 7.5 6.0  325 51.9 9.9 
Middle income 454 10.7 6.9  826 60.3 11.4 
High income 374 7.0 3.6  473 76.7 12.0 
All Grps 866 8.9 5.9  1624 63.4 14.5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
42 Large standard deviations in our control variables could reduce the precision of our regression analysis 
because the regression will try to “partition” such variation between these variables and the independent 
variables we care most about (the complexity, uncertainty, and affluence of government’s organisational 
environment). The effect of such variance on our variables of interest will depend on such variance 
reflects noise or real information.  
Figures N show a relatively high amount of correlation between our variables. 
Unsurprisingly, as shown in the first part of Figure N, the past and future values of our 
dependent and independent variables correlate with each other – as well as with the 
current values of these variables. These correlations show (again) the highly auto-
regressive nature of government expenditure and the sectoral composition of GDP. The 
second part of Figure N – showing correlations between our control variables, dependent 
and independent variables – shows much less correlation between variables. Our proxy 
for the complexity of the organisational environment statistically significantly correlates 
with all our independent variables of government size and structure. Other variables like 
human development indicators, urbanisation, and country size (as measured by 
population and land size) also statistically significantly correlate with several of our 
dependent variables for government size and structure.  
 
Our regression analysis – as shown by the results in Figures O to Figure Z – generally 
presents the results of four models of government size and structure. In general, the first 
model tests the expanded model without controls – looking at the effect of levels and 
rates of change of the uncertainty, complexity and affluence of the government’s 
organisational environment on the size and structure of government (taking country-
specific, year-specific, region-specific and grouping by income-level attributes into 
account). The second set of models tend to test the basic model with several of the most 
important controls. In these second sets of models, we regress our dependent variable on 
levels of our independent variables (uncertainty, complexity and resource availability in 
the government’s organisational environment) and the key control variables which we 
predict should most significantly affect our results if excluded. The third set of models 
tests whether our controls explain government size and structure better than the 
independent variables we hypothesize might affect government size and structure. These 
models, then substantively statistically test the null hypothesis, that our model’s 
variables have no effect on government size and structure.43 These models – almost 
unanimously – fit the data (as measured by R-squared coefficients) much worse than the 
other models.44 The fourth set of models tend to test whether the resource-based view of 
government organisational size and structure holds more explanatory power than 
contingency-view theories. In other words, we omit our proxies for the uncertainty and 
complexity of the organisational environment to test whether these models explain 
variation in government size and structure between countries and across time better than 
models which include these two variables.  
 
Using these four models of government organisational size and structure, we also 
evaluate whether organisational change occurs reactively (after changes in the 
macroeconomy) or strategically (before these changes occur). To test the fit of models of 
reactive organisational adaptation to government’s organisational environment, we use 
the previous year’s data for government size and structure in our regression analysis – 
regressing them against any particular year’s independent variables and control 
                                                 
43 We use the phrase “substantively statistically” because usually various statistical tests can indicate (with 
a confidence level of 95% or higher) whether at least one variable in the model statistically significantly 
correlates with the dependent variable(s) of interest. We assess though, using statistical indicators to refine 
our qualitative judgment, whether the model omitting measures of uncertainty, complexity and resource 
availability fit the data for the dependent variable better.   
44 R-squared coefficients (the final line reported in most of our regression panels) indicate the amount of 
variation in the data “explained” by the independent variables we chose for that particular model.  
variables. For example, a test of reactive government changes in organisational size for 
2000 would use the expenditure-to-GDP for 2001 and the estimates for macroeconomic 
uncertainty, complexity, urbanisation and so forth for the year 2000. Similarly, tests of 
models of strategic change in government’s organisational size for 2000 would use the 
expenditure-to-GDP ratio for 1999 – regressed against the values of all independent 
variables and controls for 2000. As explained previously, we defend this procedure on 
the basis that government policymakers can estimate changes in their organisational 
environment before they occur or during the year. 
 
Figure N: Correlation Matrix for Model Variables 
 
 
 
Complex Uncertain Govt 
Size 
Revenue/ 
Y  
Economic 
Structural 
Indicator 
Centralisation 
Structural 
Indicator 
Cen to 
Gen 
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Lag 
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Structural 
Indicator 
Lag 
Centralisation 
Structural 
Indicator 
Strategy 
Size to 
GDP 
Strategy 
Economic 
Structural 
Indicator 
Strategy 
Central 
Structural 
Indicator 
Complexity 1.00 -0.34 0.49 0.25 -0.19 0.05 0.88 0.55 -0.25 0.08 0.54 -0.32 0.08 
Uncertainty -0.34 1.00 -0.77 -0.75 0.55 -0.80 -0.68 -0.81 0.62 -0.62 -0.62 0.58 -0.82 
Govt Size  0.49 -0.77 1.00 0.85 -0.61 0.66 0.70 0.92 -0.68 0.63 0.85 -0.66 0.63 
Revenue/Y  0.25 -0.75 0.85 1.00 -0.66 0.60 0.48 0.85 -0.80 0.50 0.81 -0.65 0.68 
Economic 
Structural 
Indicator 
-0.19 0.55 -0.61 -0.66 1.00 -0.56 -0.45 -0.46 0.60 -0.46 -0.66 0.68 -0.62 
Centralisation 
Structural 
Indicator 
0.05 -0.80 0.66 0.60 -0.56 1.00 0.47 0.59 -0.57 0.77 0.53 -0.51 0.92 
Cen to Gen 
Employ 0.88 -0.68 0.70 0.48 -0.45 0.47 1.00 0.72 -0.48 0.39 0.69 -0.55 0.49 
Lag Size to GDP 0.55 -0.81 0.92 0.85 -0.46 0.59 0.72 1.00 -0.62 0.50 0.74 -0.60 0.57 
Lag Economic 
Structural 
Indicator 
-0.25 0.62 -0.68 -0.80 0.60 -0.57 -0.48 -0.62 1.00 -0.50 -0.81 0.64 -0.72 
Lag 
Centralisation 
Structural 
Indicator 
0.08 -0.62 0.63 0.50 -0.46 0.77 0.39 0.50 -0.50 1.00 0.51 -0.52 0.72 
Strategy Size to 
GDP 0.54 -0.62 0.85 0.81 -0.66 0.53 0.69 0.74 -0.81 0.51 1.00 -0.67 0.62 
Strategy 
Economic 
Structural 
Indicator 
-0.32 0.58 -0.66 -0.65 0.68 -0.51 -0.55 -0.60 0.64 -0.52 -0.67 1.00 -0.56 
Strategy 
Centralisation 
Structural 
Indicator 
0.08 -0.82 0.63 0.68 -0.62 0.92 0.49 0.57 -0.72 0.72 0.62 -0.56 1.00 
 
 
 
 
Figure N (continued): Correlation Matrix for Model Variables 
 
 
 
Govt 
Size 
Econ. 
Struct. 
Indic. 
Cent.  
Struct. 
Indic. 
 Complexity Uncertainty REV./ 
Y data 
Land Pop Urban 
pop % 
Debt to 
GDP 
GINI U 
 to  
total 
Def. wages 
lns 
wages 
change 
Govt 
Effic 
HDI Biz 
Free 
Complexity -0.84 0.87 -0.83  1.00 0.24 -0.87 0.98 0.97 0.96 -0.89 -0.68 0.67 -0.49 0.87 -0.78 0.22 1.00 -0.30 
Uncertainty -0.72 0.04 -0.72  0.24 1.00 -0.67 0.41 0.44 0.48 0.23 -0.56 0.77 0.55 -0.24 -0.38 0.17 0.26 -0.95 
Govt Size 1.00 -0.68 0.99  -0.84 -0.72 0.99 -0.92 -0.94 -0.95 0.51 0.78 -0.87 0.02 -0.47 0.72 -0.27 -0.85 0.71 
Revenue/ 
Y  0.99 -0.66 0.99  -0.87 -0.67 1.00 -0.95 -0.96 -0.97 0.56 0.82 -0.91 0.08 -0.55 0.75 -0.19 -0.88 0.69 
Land -0.92 0.82 -0.92  0.98 0.41 -0.95 1.00 1.00 1.00 -0.80 -0.78 0.79 -0.36 0.78 -0.76 0.22 0.99 -0.45 
Pop -0.94 0.81 -0.93  0.97 0.44 -0.96 1.00 1.00 1.00 -0.77 -0.79 0.80 -0.33 0.75 -0.76 0.23 0.98 -0.48 
Urban pop % -0.95 0.80 -0.95  0.96 0.48 -0.97 1.00 1.00 1.00 -0.74 -0.79 0.81 -0.30 0.72 -0.76 0.25 0.97 -0.51 
Debt to GDP 0.51 -0.86 0.51  -0.89 0.23 0.56 -0.80 -0.77 -0.74 1.00 0.46 -0.32 0.73 -0.98 0.54 -0.12 -0.88 -0.17 
GINI 0.78 -0.40 0.83  -0.68 -0.56 0.82 -0.78 -0.79 -0.79 0.46 1.00 -0.89 0.18 -0.47 0.48 -0.09 -0.72 0.58 
Unemploy to 
total -0.87 0.31 -0.89  0.67 0.77 -0.91 0.79 0.80 0.81 -0.32 -0.89 1.00 0.07 0.35 -0.68 -0.03 0.70 -0.82 
Deficits 0.02 -0.56 0.00  -0.49 0.55 0.08 -0.36 -0.33 -0.30 0.73 0.18 0.07 1.00 -0.78 0.36 -0.34 -0.49 -0.40 
wages lns -0.47 0.77 -0.47  0.87 -0.24 -0.55 0.78 0.75 0.72 -0.98 -0.47 0.35 -0.78 1.00 -0.62 0.05 0.87 0.13 
wages 
changes 0.72 -0.55 0.65  -0.78 -0.38 0.75 -0.76 -0.76 -0.76 0.54 0.48 -0.68 0.36 -0.62 1.00 -0.19 -0.77 0.57 
Govt Effic -0.27 0.53 -0.22  0.22 0.17 -0.19 0.22 0.23 0.25 -0.12 -0.09 -0.03 -0.34 0.05 -0.19 1.00 0.21 -0.15 
HDI -0.85 0.85 -0.84  1.00 0.26 -0.88 0.99 0.98 0.97 -0.88 -0.72 0.70 -0.49 0.87 -0.77 0.21 1.00 -0.32 
Biz Freedom 0.71 -0.03 0.69  -0.30 -0.95 0.69 -0.45 -0.48 -0.51 -0.17 0.58 -0.82 -0.40 0.13 0.57 -0.15 -0.32 1.00 
Economic 
Structural 
Indicator 
-0.68 1.00 -0.65  0.87 0.04 -0.66 0.82 0.81 0.80 -0.86 -0.40 0.31 -0.56 0.77 -0.55 0.53 0.85 -0.03 
Centralisation 
Structural 
Indicator 
0.99 -0.65 1.00  -0.83 -0.72 0.99 -0.92 -0.93 -0.95 0.51 0.83 -0.89 0.00 -0.47 0.65 -0.22 -0.84 0.69 
Figure O: Regression Results for Government Size 
 
 1 2 3 4
Complexity of the Organisational Environment -0.04 0.26    
  0.03 0.10    
Change in Complexity of the Organisational Environment 0.01     
  0.01     
Uncertainty of the Organisational Environment -0.01 -0.06    
  0.01 0.03    
Change in Uncertainty of the Organisational Environment 0.01     
  0.01     
Levels of Gross Domestic Product (GDP-logs) 0.08 -0.14    
  0.03 0.09    
Government Revenue to GDP ratios 0.02 0.82  0.06
  0.02 0.03  0.02
Change in Government Revenue to GDP ratios 0.00     
  0.01     
Variable Capturing Country-Specific Attributes -0.03 0.00 -0.06 0.00
  0.01 0.02 0.06 0.01
Variable Capturing Year-Specific Attributes -0.02 -0.02 0.19 0.01
  0.01 0.02 0.06 0.01
Variable Capturing Income-Group Specific Attributes -0.05 0.19 0.56 -0.02
  0.01 0.04 0.10 0.01
Variable Capturing Geographical Group Attributes 0.00 0.01 -0.11 0.00
  0.01 0.02 0.06 0.01
Country Size (in kilometres of land) -0.03 -0.08 0.44   
  0.01 0.03 0.09   
Previous year’s government size (lagged G/Y ratio) 0.51   0.94
  0.03   0.02
Previous year’s change in GDP (lagged GDP log diff)  -0.01     
  0.01     
Following year’s GDP (leading GDP log) 0.48     
  0.03     
Following year’s change in GDP (leading GDP log diffs) -0.09     
  0.01     
Percent of urban population  -0.03 0.00   
   0.03 0.08   
Debt-to-GDP ratios 0.17 0.19   
   0.02 0.06   
Proxy for Government Efficiency  -0.22 0.13   
   0.04 0.11   
Proxy for Business Freedom  -0.01 -0.01   
   0.03 0.08   
Population size    -0.39   
    0.08   
Unemployment as percent of total work-force  0.07   
    0.06   
Government deficits   -0.38   
    0.06   
Human Development Index (HDI values)   0.06   
    0.12   
       
Adjusted R2 0.985 0.91 0.68 0.96 
 
Figure P: Regression Results for Changes in Government Size 
 
 1 2 3 4
Complexity of the Organisational Environment 0.000  -0.06   
  0.125  0.07   
Change in Complexity of the Organisational Environment -0.086 -0.04    
  0.074 0.05    
Uncertainty of the Organisational Environment -0.034  0.00   
  0.108  0.02   
Change in Uncertainty of the Organisational Environment 0.040 0.01    
  0.079 0.05    
Change in Levels of Gross Domestic Product (GDP log diffs) 0.124 0.15    
  0.080 0.05    
Government Revenue to GDP ratios 0.046  0.06   
  0.115  0.04   
Change in Government Revenue to GDP ratios 0.051 0.02    
  0.090 0.06    
Variable Capturing Country-Specific Attributes -0.113 -0.03 0.00 -0.05
  0.074 0.05 0.01 0.06
Variable Capturing Year-Specific Attributes -0.087 -0.12 0.00 0.12
  0.088 0.05 0.01 0.06
Variable Capturing Income-Group Specific Attributes -0.335 -0.10 -0.02 -0.12
  0.172 0.07 0.03 0.09
Variable Capturing Geographical Group Attributes 0.190 0.03 0.02 -0.01
  0.130 0.06 0.02 0.08
Percent of urban population 0.038   0.01
  0.113   0.07
Debt-to-GDP ratios 0.012   0.00
  0.084   0.06
Unemployment as percent of total work-force -0.005   -0.07
  0.079   0.06
Proxy for Government Efficiency -0.121 -0.06    
  0.162 0.07    
Proxy for Business Freedom 0.106     
  0.098     
Previous year’s change in GDP (lagged GDP log diff) 0.023 -0.10    
  0.083 0.05    
Previous year’s government size (lagged G/Y ratio)  4.97   
    0.08   
Levels of Gross Domestic Product (GDP-logs)   0.05   
    0.07   
Following year’s government size (leading G/Y ratio)  -5.09   
    0.08   
Population size    -0.01
     0.06 
      
Adjusted R2 0.00 0.029 0.89 0.009 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure Q: Regression Results for Lagged Government Size  
(Lagged Expenditure to GDP)  
 
  1 2 3 4 
Variable Capturing Country-Specific Attributes -0.12 -0.02 0.00 -0.04
  0.07 0.03 0.01 0.02
Variable Capturing Year-Specific Attributes 0.10 0.06 0.00 -0.01
  0.07 0.04 0.01 0.02
Variable Capturing Income-Group Specific Attributes 0.46 0.72 0.07 0.25
  0.13 0.05 0.02 0.04
Variable Capturing Geographical Group Attributes -0.03 -0.03 0.01 -0.03
  0.08 0.04 0.01 0.03
Population size -0.09     
  0.07     
Percent of urban population -0.22     
  0.08     
Debt-to-GDP ratios 0.25     
  0.06     
Unemployment as percent of total work-force 0.20   0.08
  0.07   0.02
Proxy for Government Efficiency 0.12   -0.19
  0.13   0.04
Human Development Index (HDI values) 0.36     
  0.15     
Proxy for Business Freedom -0.28     
  0.10     
Complexity of the Organisational Environment -0.23 -0.01   
   0.05 0.02   
Change in Complexity of the Organisational Environment -0.02    
   0.04    
Uncertainty of the Organisational Environment -0.22 -0.05   
   0.04 0.02   
Change in Uncertainty of the Organisational Environment 0.03    
   0.04    
Change in Levels of Gross Domestic Product (GDP log diffs)  -0.03    
   0.04    
Change in Government Revenue to GDP ratios -0.01    
   0.04    
Government Revenue to GDP ratios  0.91 0.84
    0.02 0.03
Government deficits   -0.26   
    0.01   
Debt-to-GDP ratios   0.13
     0.02
     
Adjusted R2 0.53 0.48 0.92 0.87 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure R: Regression Results for Lagged Changes in Government Size  
(Lagged Changes in Expenditure to GDP)  
 
 1 2 3 4
Complexity of the Organisational Environment 0.08 -0.01    
  0.07 0.24    
Change in Complexity of the Organisational Environment 0.01  0.02   
  0.04  0.06   
Uncertainty of the Organisational Environment 0.06 0.08    
  0.06 0.06    
Change in Uncertainty of the Organisational Environment 0.08  0.02   
  0.04  0.06   
Current year’s government size (G/Y ratio) -0.30     
  0.24     
Government Revenue to GDP ratios -0.17 0.16    
  0.12 0.07    
Change in Government Revenue to GDP ratios 0.48  0.60   
  0.04  0.06   
Variable Capturing Country-Specific Attributes 0.05 0.02 0.03 -0.06
  0.04 0.05 0.06 0.12
Variable Capturing Year-Specific Attributes -0.04 0.03 0.01 0.12
  0.04 0.05 0.06 0.11
Variable Capturing Income-Group Specific Attributes -0.24 -0.22 -0.02 0.03
  0.08 0.09 0.10 0.23
Variable Capturing Geographical Group Attributes 0.02 0.02 0.08 -0.11
  0.05 0.06 0.10 0.15
Previous year’s government size (lagged G/Y ratio) 0.65     
  0.25     
Levels of Gross Domestic Product (GDP-logs)  0.05    
   0.22    
Government deficits  -0.11 -0.23 -0.09
   0.05 0.06 0.13
Debt-to-GDP ratios  -0.02 -0.10
    0.06 0.11
Unemployment as percent of total work-force  -0.07 -0.04
    0.06 0.12
Population size    0.04
     0.12
Percent of urban population   0.19
     0.17
Proxy for Government Efficiency    -0.02
     0.21
Human Development Index (HDI values)    -0.35
     0.26
Proxy for Business Freedom   0.12
     0.17
       
Adjusted R2 0.24 0.02 0.33 0.00 
          
 
 
 
 
 
Figure S: Regression Results for Previous Year’s Government Size  
(current year’s government expenditure to GDP ratios regressed against the previous 
year’s dependent variables)  
 
  1 2 3 
Complexity of the Organisational Environment 0.02 -0.02   
  0.03 0.01   
Change in Complexity of the Organisational Environment -0.01    
  0.02    
Uncertainty of the Organisational Environment -0.08 -0.02   
  0.03 0.01   
Change in Uncertainty of the Organisational Environment 0.08    
  0.02    
Government Revenue to GDP ratios 0.87 0.05 0.87
  0.03 0.03 0.03
Change in Government Revenue to GDP ratios -0.05    
  0.02   
Variable Capturing Country-Specific Attributes 0.06 -0.02 -0.07
  0.02 0.01 0.03
Variable Capturing Year-Specific Attributes 0.01 0.01 0.02
  0.02 0.01 0.03
Variable Capturing Income-Group Specific Attributes 0.05 0.01 0.06
  0.04 0.02 0.05
Variable Capturing Geographical Group Attributes -0.04 -0.02 -0.04
  0.03 0.01 0.03
Proxy for Government Efficiency 0.04    
  0.03    
Human Development Index (HDI values) -0.05  0.12
  0.04  0.06
Current year’s government size (G/Y ratio) 0.95   
   0.03   
Debt-to-GDP ratios -0.01 0.04
   0.01 0.03
Percent of urban population  0.00
    0.04
Unemployment as percent of total work-force  0.00
    0.03
Government deficits   -0.26
    0.03
Proxy for Government Efficiency   -0.10
    0.05
Proxy for Business Freedom  -0.08
    0.04
    
 Adjusted R2 0.86 0.97 0.94 
        
 
 
 
 
 
Figure T: Regression Results for Previous Year’s Changes in Government Size 
(current year’s changes in government expenditure to GDP ratios regressed against the 
previous year’s dependent variables)  
 
 1 2 3
Complexity of the Organisational Environment 0.01    
  0.07    
Change in Complexity of the Organisational Environment 0.09 0.10   
  0.05 0.05   
Uncertainty of the Organisational Environment -0.10    
  0.09    
Change in Uncertainty of the Organisational Environment 0.09 0.04   
  0.06 0.05  
Current year’s government size (G/Y ratio) -0.38   
  0.14   
Previous year’s government size (lagged G/Y ratio) -0.05 -0.07   
  0.05 0.05  
Government Revenue to GDP ratios 0.39   
  0.14   
Change in Government Revenue to GDP ratios -0.09 -0.07   
  0.05 0.05  
Variable Capturing Country-Specific Attributes -0.04 -0.05   
  0.05 0.05   
Variable Capturing Year-Specific Attributes 0.07 0.06   
  0.05 0.05   
Variable Capturing Income-Group Specific Attributes -0.01 -0.07   
  0.10 0.06  
Variable Capturing Geographical Group Attributes -0.09 -0.10   
  0.06 0.06  
Government deficits  0.07   
   0.05  
Population size   -0.10
    0.09
Percent of urban population  0.04
    0.11
Debt-to-GDP ratios  -0.18
    0.08
Proxy for Government Efficiency   -0.18
    0.14
Human Development Index (HDI values)   -0.08
    0.14
Proxy for Business Freedom  0.07
    0.13
Adjusted R2  0.047 0.03 
   
 
 
 
 
 
Figure U: Regression Results for Economic Structural Indicator 
(dependent variable as the current year’s ratio of expenditure on general government 
services and economic affairs as a proportion of social protection spending) 
 
 1 2 3 4
Complexity of the Organisational Environment 0.25  0.13   
  0.07  0.10   
Change in Complexity of the Organisational Environment 0.01 0.05    
  0.05 0.06    
Uncertainty of the Organisational Environment 0.21  -0.02   
  0.07  0.08   
Change in Uncertainty of the Organisational Environment 0.24 0.19    
  0.05 0.06    
Current year’s government size (G/Y ratio) -0.34  -0.08   
  0.11  0.16   
Previous year’s government size (lagged G/Y ratio) 0.05 0.03    
  0.05 0.06    
Government Revenue to GDP ratios 0.11  0.03   
  0.11  0.16   
Change in Government Revenue to GDP ratios -0.05 -0.07    
  0.05 0.06    
Variable Capturing Country-Specific Attributes -0.11 -0.09 -0.17 -0.94
  0.05 0.06 0.06 0.16
Variable Capturing Year-Specific Attributes -0.05 -0.08 -0.12 0.23
  0.05 0.06 0.06 0.09
Variable Capturing Income-Group Specific Attributes -1.17 -1.37 -1.20 -0.57
  0.11 0.10 0.12 0.24
Variable Capturing Geographical Group Attributes 1.08 1.21 0.91 0.34
  0.09 0.10 0.10 0.20
Unemployment as percent of total work-force 0.12 0.11 0.14 0.16
  0.06 0.06 0.07 0.12
Government deficits  0.09 0.07 0.12
   0.06 0.11 0.11
Debt-to-GDP ratios  -0.02 0.44
    0.07 0.16
Population size    0.71
     0.14
Percent of urban population   0.15
     0.23
Proxy for Government Efficiency    0.31
     0.25
Human Development Index (HDI values)    -0.76
     0.29
Proxy for Business Freedom   0.48
        0.15
    
 Adjusted R2 0.65 0.58 0.66 0.73
 
 
 
 
 
Figure V: Regression Results on Lagged Economic Structural Indicator 
(dependent variable as the subsequent year’s ratio of expenditure on general government 
services and economic affairs as a proportion of social protection spending) 
 
 1 2 3 4
Complexity of the Organisational Environment 0.37 0.52    
  0.09 0.11    
Change in Complexity of the Organisational Environment -0.11  -0.12   
  0.06  0.06   
Uncertainty of the Organisational Environment 0.19 -0.23    
  0.08 0.18    
Change in Uncertainty of the Organisational Environment 0.28  0.09   
  0.07  0.06   
Current year’s government size (G/Y ratio) -0.46 -0.14    
  0.31 0.17    
Previous year’s government size (lagged G/Y ratio) -0.05  -0.12   
  0.06  0.08   
Government Revenue to GDP ratios 0.42 0.22    
  0.31 0.15    
Change in Government Revenue to GDP ratios -0.08  -0.10   
  0.06  0.06   
Variable Capturing Country-Specific Attributes -0.18 -0.81 -0.09 -0.71
  0.06 0.10 0.06 0.18
Variable Capturing Year-Specific Attributes 0.02 0.10 -0.06 0.22
  0.06 0.08 0.06 0.10
Variable Capturing Income-Group Specific Attributes -1.43 -1.14 -1.16 -0.59
  0.14 0.18 0.10 0.28
Variable Capturing Geographical Group Attributes 1.00 0.71 0.92 0.44
  0.11 0.12 0.09 0.24
Debt-to-GDP ratios -0.13 0.00  0.33
  0.07 0.10  0.18
Unemployment as percent of total work-force 0.10 0.37  0.16
  0.06 0.09  0.14
Government deficits -0.18  0.02 0.20
  0.17  0.06 0.12
Human Development Index (HDI values)  -0.77  -0.70
   0.17  0.31
Change in Government Expenditure in USD terms (log diffs)  0.15   
    0.08   
Population size    0.56
     0.15
Proxy for Business Freedom   0.41
     0.16
Proxy for Government Efficiency    0.20
     0.29
Percent of urban population   0.37
        0.25
 Adjusted R2 0.70 0.88 0.46 0.69
 
 
 
 
Figure W: Regression Results on Previous Year’s Economic Structural Indicator 
(dependent variable as the previous year’s ratio of expenditure on general government 
services and economic affairs to social protection spending) 
 
  1 2 3 4 
Complexity of the Organisational Environment 0.80 0.11    
  0.67 0.07    
Change in Complexity of the Organisational Environment -0.26  0.00   
  0.28  0.06   
Uncertainty of the Organisational Environment -1.38 -0.05    
  1.51 0.09    
Change in Uncertainty of the Organisational Environment 0.51  0.26   
  0.35  0.06   
Current year’s government size (G/Y ratio) -1.60 -0.26    
  0.87 0.10    
Previous year’s government size (lagged G/Y ratio) 0.12  0.00   
  0.20  0.08   
Government Revenue to GDP ratios 1.51 0.26    
  0.99 0.11    
Change in Government Revenue to GDP ratios -0.24  0.00   
  0.27  0.06   
Variable Capturing Country-Specific Attributes 0.22 -0.04 -0.05 -0.91
  0.33 0.05 0.06 0.21
Variable Capturing Year-Specific Attributes -0.68 -0.16 -0.14 0.17
  0.50 0.06 0.06 0.10
Variable Capturing Income-Group Specific Attributes -1.80 -1.02 -1.65 -0.72
  1.58 0.12 0.12 0.28
Variable Capturing Geographical Group Attributes 0.92 0.99 1.45 0.47
  1.13 0.09 0.12 0.23
Percent of urban population -0.09   0.23
  0.39   0.26
Gini coefficients 0.67     
  0.48     
Proxy for Government Efficiency -0.74 -0.38  0.05
  0.77 0.09  0.29
Proxy for Business Freedom -0.36     
  0.63     
Change in Levels of Gross Domestic Product (GDP log diffs)  0.04    
   0.06    
Change in Government Expenditure in USD terms (log diffs) 0.06   
    0.08   
Unemployment as percent of total work-force  0.00 0.11
    0.06 0.15
Debt-to-GDP ratios   0.57
     0.19
Government deficits    0.12
     0.13
Proxy for Business Freedom   0.57
     0.18
Human Development Index (HDI values)       -0.49
        0.34
 Adjusted R2 0.51 0.57 0.59 0.68
Figure X: Regression Results for the Centralisation Structural Indicator 
(dependent variable as central government expenditure as a proportion of general 
government expenditure) 
 
 1 2 3 4
Complexity of the Organisational Environment -0.46 -0.42    
  0.37 0.29    
Change in Complexity of the Organisational Environment 0.00  0.03   
  0.03  0.08   
Uncertainty of the Organisational Environment 0.07 0.07    
  0.16 0.15    
Change in Uncertainty of the Organisational Environment 0.00  -0.47   
  0.05  0.08   
Change in Government Expenditure in USD terms (log diffs) -0.02  -0.44   
  0.07  0.15   
Current year’s government size (G/Y ratio) 0.32 -0.79    
  0.32 0.26    
Previous year’s government size (lagged G/Y ratio) -0.02  0.38   
  0.07  0.13   
Change in Levels of Gross Domestic Product (GDP log diffs) -0.03  -0.10   
  0.04  0.10   
Government Revenue to GDP ratios -0.25 0.59    
  0.33 0.22    
Change in Government Revenue to GDP ratios 0.02  -0.08   
  0.04  0.08   
Variable Capturing Country-Specific Attributes 0.53 -0.10 -0.11 0.36
  0.12 0.09 0.09 0.07
Variable Capturing Year-Specific Attributes 0.00 0.04 0.31 -0.20
  0.09 0.08 0.09 0.06
Variable Capturing Income-Group Specific Attributes -1.01 -0.18 -0.64 -1.03
  0.34 0.15 0.10 0.09
Variable Capturing Geographical Group Attributes 0.58 0.02 0.22 0.45
  0.24 0.11 0.13 0.09
Percent of urban population -1.01   -0.71
  0.21   0.12
Debt-to-GDP ratios 0.17   0.03
  0.08   0.06
Unemployment as percent of total work-force -0.04  0.08 -0.08
  0.08  0.13 0.05
Government deficits 0.04  -0.41 0.04
  0.09  0.09 0.08
Proxy for Government Efficiency 0.08 0.81  0.58
  0.12 0.12  0.11
Human Development Index (HDI values) 2.09 -0.47  0.89
  0.57 0.21  0.16
Proxy for Business Freedom 0.01 0.00  0.13
  0.08 0.10  0.05
Levels of Gross Domestic Product (GDP-logs)  0.75    
   0.26    
 Adjusted R2 0.99 0.51 0.54 0.95
 
 
Figure Y: Regression Results for Lagged Centralisation Structural Indicator 
(dependent variable as subsequent year’s central government expenditure as a proportion 
of general government expenditure) 
 
  1 2 3 4 
Complexity of the Organisational Environment 0.09 -0.21    
  0.11 0.30    
Change in Complexity of the Organisational Environment 0.05  0.14   
  0.09  0.10   
Uncertainty of the Organisational Environment -0.05 1.38    
  0.17 0.67    
Change in Uncertainty of the Organisational Environment -0.39  -0.38   
  0.09  0.09   
Change in Government Expenditure in USD terms (log diffs) -0.39  -0.34   
  0.17  0.17   
Change in government size (log diffs) 0.21  0.25   
  0.15  0.15   
Change in Levels of Gross Domestic Product (GDP log diffs) -0.07 -0.21 -0.29   
  0.11 0.12 0.12   
Government Revenue to GDP ratios 0.09 -0.46    
  0.11 0.40    
Change in Government Revenue to GDP ratios -0.08  -0.08   
  0.09  0.09   
Variable Capturing Country-Specific Attributes -0.10 0.54 -0.05 0.30
  0.11 0.35 0.10 0.07
Variable Capturing Year-Specific Attributes 0.32 0.16 0.36 -0.09
  0.10 0.16 0.11 0.07
Variable Capturing Income-Group Specific Attributes -0.78 -0.86 -0.42 -1.05
  0.17 0.69 0.15 0.13
Variable Capturing Geographical Group Attributes 0.32 0.09 0.15 0.14
  0.15 0.32 0.12 0.10
Unemployment as percent of total work-force 0.18 0.13  -0.01
  0.15 0.22  0.06
Government deficits -0.42  -0.37 -0.16
  0.10  0.12 0.10
Current year’s government size (G/Y ratio) 0.51    
   0.46    
Debt-to-GDP ratios -0.16  0.00
   0.16  0.08
Proxy for Government Efficiency  1.81  0.72
   0.34  0.13
Human Development Index (HDI values)   -0.11 0.58
    0.15 0.17
Proxy for Business Freedom   0.16
     0.07
Percent of urban population   -0.37
        0.11
Adjusted R2 0.64 0.75 0.34 0 .89
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure Z: Regression Results for the Previous Year’s  
Centralisation Structural Indicator 
(dependent variable as previous year’s central government expenditure as a proportion 
of general government expenditure) 
 
 
  1 2 3 4 
Complexity of the Organisational Environment -0.10 0.01    
  0.10 0.11    
Change in Complexity of the Organisational Environment 0.05  0.07   
  0.08  0.08   
Uncertainty of the Organisational Environment 0.56 0.08    
  0.19 0.14    
Change in Uncertainty of the Organisational Environment -0.30  -0.44   
  0.09  0.08   
Change in Government Expenditure in USD terms (log diffs) -0.36  -0.38   
  0.15  0.14   
Current year’s government size (G/Y ratio) -0.86 -1.98    
  0.34 0.39    
Change in government size (log diffs) 0.45  0.33   
  0.13  0.13   
Change in Levels of Gross Domestic Product (GDP log diffs) -0.06 0.05    
  0.10 0.11    
Government Revenue to GDP ratios 0.76 1.83    
  0.31 0.35    
Change in Government Revenue to GDP ratios -0.11  -0.11   
  0.08  0.08   
Variable Capturing Country-Specific Attributes 0.14 -0.06 -0.06 0.35
  0.11 0.10 0.08 0.08
Variable Capturing Year-Specific Attributes 0.20 0.12 0.16 -0.09
  0.10 0.10 0.09 0.06
Variable Capturing Income-Group Specific Attributes -0.35 -0.46 -0.73 -0.93
  0.17 0.17 0.12 0.11
Variable Capturing Geographical Group Attributes 0.24 0.39 0.14 0.36
  0.15 0.13 0.12 0.09
Unemployment as percent of total work-force 0.11 0.22  0.00
  0.15 0.11  0.06
Proxy for Government Efficiency 0.55  0.30 0.53
  0.16  0.12 0.12
Government deficits  -0.60 -0.28 0.01
   0.13 0.09 0.09
Proxy for Business Freedom  0.00 0.12
    0.11 0.05
Percent of urban population   -0.70
     0.13
Debt-to-GDP ratios   0.00
     0.06
Human Development Index (HDI values)    0.82
        0.18
 Adjusted R2 0.52 0.42 0.40 0.95
 
 
FIGURE AA: CLASSIFICATION OF GOVERNMENT SIZE 
ORGANISATIONAL ADAPTATION  
(least error grouping of countries’ expenditure to GDP, environmental complexity, 
environmental uncertainty and revenue to GDP) 
 
CONTEMPORARY 
Australia, Belarus, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Egypt, 
Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Ghana, Iran, Ireland, Jamaica, Kuwait, Latvia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Macedonia, 
Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Namibia, New Zealand, Norway, Oman, Papua New Guinea, Poland, 
Romania, Russian Federation, Sierra Leone, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, 
Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, Uruguay, Venezuela.  
STRATEGIC 
Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Lesotho, 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Seychelles, Slovenia, Sweden,, United Kingdom, United States.  
REACTIVE 
Albania, Argentina, Armenia, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Cambodia, Canada, Chile, Cote d'Ivoire, El 
Salvador, Georgia, Ghana, Guatemala, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Korea, 
Kyrgyz Republic, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritius, Mongolia, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Panama, 
Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Russian Federation, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, Thailand, Trinidad and 
Tobago, Uganda, United States, Venezuela, Zambia.  
 
The groupings in the Figure – which we used in our regression analysis to divide countries into groups --
show the best clustering of (country) cases using countries’ expenditure to GDP, lagged expenditure to 
GDP, leading expenditure to GDP, revenue-to-GDP and our proxies for the complexity and uncertainty of 
the government’s organisational environment. A country may appear in more than one category if a run of 
years data from that country fit best partially into one group (such as strategic or reactive organisational 
adaptation) while another run of data from different years fit into another category.  
 
 
 
 
FIGURE AB: GROUPING OF COUNTRIES BY ECONOMIC-TO-SOCIAL 
PROTECTION STRUCTURE 
 
CONTEMPORARY  
Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Kuwait, Lithuania, Moldova, 
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Russian Federation, Slovenia, Spain, Ukraine.  
STRATEGIC 
Denmark, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland       
REACTIVE 
Egypt, El Salvador, Indonesia, Iran, Kazakhstan, Korea, Lithuania, Moldova, Mongolia, Nepal, Romania, 
Thailand, Tunisia, Ukraine, Venezuela.  
The groupings in the Figure – which we used in our regression analysis to divide countries into groups --
show the best clustering of (country) cases using countries’ expenditure on economic affairs relative to its 
spending on social protection as well as lagged and leading values of this economic centralisation 
indicator, as well as revenue-to-GDP and our proxies for the complexity and uncertainty of the 
government’s organisational environment. A country may appear in more than one category if a run of 
years data from that country fit best partially into one group (such as strategic or reactive organisational 
adaptation) while another run of data from different years fit into another category.  
 
 
 
FIGURE AC: GROUPING OF COUNTRIES BY CENTRALISATION 
 
CONTEMPORARY 
Armenia, Iran, Malaysia, Mauritius, Paraguay, Peru      
STRATEGIC 
Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Moldova, Mongolia, Peru, 
Russian Federation, Slovenia, Ukraine.  
REACTIVE 
Canada, Switzerland 
The groupings in the Figure – which we used in our regression analysis to divide countries into groups --
show the best clustering of (country) cases using countries’ expenditure by central government relative to 
general government expenditure as well as lagged and leading values of this centralisation indicator, as 
well as revenue-to-GDP and our proxies for the complexity and uncertainty of the government’s 
organisational environment. A country may appear in more than one category if a run of years data from 
that country fit best partially into one group (such as strategic or reactive organisational adaptation) while 
another run of data from different years fit into another category.  
 
 
Figure AD: Distances between Clusters of Countries Used for Regression Analysis  
 
 Group Number 
 No. 1 No. 2 No. 3 No. 4 No. 5 No. 6 No. 7 
No. 1 ** 686 574 256 1100 1619 1616 
No. 2 26 ** 165 263 471 357 225 
No. 3 23 12 ** 505 255 279 386 
No. 4 16 16 22 ** 1041 1199 967 
No. 5 33 21 15 32 ** 341 461 
No. 6 40 18 16 34 18 ** 90 
No. 7 40 15 19 31 21 9 ** 
The data in the figure show the (Euclidian) distances between clusters of data. The clustering procedure 
tries to maximise these distances in order to find distinct groups of data. These “distances” represent the 
values of each point of data subtracted from other points of data around it (very roughly translating the 
statistical procedure). We show the squared distances between each group above the diagonal (which we 
represent by asterisks).  
 
 
FIGURE AE: Groupings of Countries According to the Best Fit for Changes in 
Government Size 
(using least variance clustering of government size, complexity indices, uncertainty 
indices and resources) 
 
Country Grouping  Country  Grouping 
Belgium              1  Cote d'Ivoire        4 
Cyprus               1  Kyrgyz Republic      4 
Greece               1  Madagascar           4 
Italy                1  Mongolia             4 
Jamaica              1  Sri Lanka            4 
Bhutan               2  Germany              5 
Brazil               2  Switzerland          5 
Canada               2  United Kingdom       5 
El Salvador          2  United States        5 
India                2  Australia            6 
Moldova              2  Belarus              6 
Pakistan             2  Czech Republic       6 
Papua New Guinea   2  Estonia              6 
Philippines          2  Ireland              6 
Senegal              2  Latvia               6 
Spain                2  Lithuania            6 
Tunisia              2  Russian Federation   6 
Turkey               2  Slovak Republic      6 
Uganda               2  Bangladesh           7 
Ukraine              2  Georgia              7 
Uruguay              2  Guatemala            7 
Austria              3  Indonesia            7 
Denmark              3  Kazakhstan           7 
Finland              3  Mauritius            7 
France               3  Mexico               7 
Hungary              3  Oman                 7 
Netherlands          3  Peru                 7 
New Zealand          3  Thailand             7 
Norway               3    
Poland               3    
Portugal             3    
Spain                3    
Sweden               3    
The groupings in the graph show the members of each cluster of data depicted in the previous 
figure. A country may appear in more than one category if a run of years data from that country fit 
best partially into one group (such as strategic or reactive organisational adaptation) while another 
run of data from different years fit into another category. 
 
Figure AF: Groupings of Countries By the Rate of Change in the Size of 
Government 
(using least variance clustering of changes in government size, changes in complexity 
indices, changes in uncertainty indices and changes in resources) 
 
 
Group 1  Group 2  Group 3  Group 4 
Australia            1  Bangladesh          2  Austria              3  Belgium              4 
Belarus              1  Denmark              2  Belgium              3  Cyprus               4 
Czech Republic      1  El Salvador          2  Canada               3  Greece               4 
Denmark              1  Finland              2  France               3  Italy                4 
Estonia              1  Georgia              2  Georgia              3  Jamaica              4 
Georgia              1  Germany              2  Hungary              3  Kyrgyz Republic     4 
Guatemala            1  Ireland              2  India                3  Mongolia             4 
Indonesia            1  Mauritius            2  Moldova              3  Sri Lanka            4 
Ireland              1  Moldova              2  Mongolia             3  Uruguay              4 
Kazakhstan           1  Netherlands          2  
Papua New 
Guinea     3      
Latvia               1  New Zealand         2  Philippines          3    
Lithuania            1  Norway               2  Portugal             3    
Mauritius            1  Poland               2  Senegal              3    
Moldova              1  Slovak Republic     2  Sri Lanka            3    
Norway               1  Spain                2  Sweden               3    
Oman                 1  Sweden               2  Tunisia              3    
Peru                 1  Tunisia              2  Uganda               3    
Slovak Republic     1  Tunisia              2  Uruguay              3    
Switzerland          1  United Kingdom     2       
Thailand             1  United States       2       
Uganda               1  Uruguay              2       
The groupings in the graph show the members of clusters of data we found using the same clustering 
method as shown in the previous figures. We do not report the distance between groups as these distances 
do not tell (us at least) very much of qualitative importance. A country may appear in more than one 
category if a run of years data from that country fit best partially into one group (such as strategic or 
reactive organisational adaptation) while another run of data from different years fit into another category. 
